Wednesday, April 24, 2019

Insurer Bound By 'Sum Insured'; Depreciation To Be Applied Only For Post Policy Period : SC

 1 Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL NO.1299 OF 2019

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil)No.27695 of 2018)

SUMIT KUMAR SAHA ……Appellant

VERSUS

RELIANCE GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. ..…. Respondent

JUDGMENT

Uday Umesh Lalit, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises out of final judgment and order dated 16.02.2018 passed by the National Consumers Disputes Redressal Commission (‘the National Commission’, for short) in First Appeal No.182 of 2014.

3. On 27.03.2007 the appellant purchased one Volvo Hydraulic Excavator for a sum of Rs.49,75,000/- with VAT amounting to Rs.1,99,000/-, the total purchase value thus being Rs.51,74,000/-. Immediately after the purchase said Hydraulic Excavator was insured with the respondent vide Civil Appeal No1299./2019 @ SLP(C)No.27695/2018 Sumit Kumar Saha vs. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. “Contractor, Plants & Machinery Insurance Policy” bearing number 150719225001168. The insurance policy thereafter stood renewed. For the period 22.07.2009 to 21.07.2010, the sum insured was Rs.46,56,600/- on payment of premium of Rs.33,700/-. The column regarding ‘coverage’ mentioned the ‘year of make’ of said Excavator as ‘2007’. Under the caption – PROVISIONS, the policy contained following stipulations:-

“1. SUM INSURED – It is a requirement of this insurance that the sum insured shall be equal to the cost of replacement of the insured property by new property of the same kind and same capacity, which shall mean its replacement cost including freight, dues and customs duties if any and erection costs.

2. BASIS OF INDEMNITY -

a) In cases where damage to an insured item can be repaired the Company will pay expenses necessarily incurred to restore the damaged machine to its condition immediately prior to the accident/loss plus the cost of dismantling and re-erection incurred for the purpose of effecting the repairs as well as ordinary freight to and from a repair-shop, customs duties and dues if any, to the extent such expenses have been included in the sum insured. If the repairs are executed at a workshop owned by the insured, the Company will pay the cost of materials and wages incurred for the purpose of the repairs plus a reasonable percentage to cover overhead charges. No deduction shall be made for depreciation in respect of parts replaced, except those with limited life, but the value of any salvage will be taken into account. If the cost of repairs as detailed hereinabove equals or exceeds the actual value of the  machinery insured immediately before the occurrence of the damage, the settlement shall be made on the basis provided for in (b) below. b) In cases where an insured item is totally destroyed the Company will pay the actual value of the item immediately before the occurrence of the loss, including costs for ordinary freight, erection and customs duties if any, provided such expenses have been included in the sum insured, such actual value to be calculated by deducting proper depreciation form the replacement value of the item. The Company will also pay any normal charges for dismantling of the machinery destroyed but the salvage shall be taken into account. Any extra charges incurred for overtime, night-work, work on public holiday, express freight, are covered by this insurance only if especially agreed to in writing. In the event of the Makers’ drawing, patterns and core boxes necessary for the execution of a repair, not being available, the Company shall not be liable for the cost of making any such drawings, patterns and core boxes. The cost of any alteration, improvements or overhauls shall not be recoverable under this Policy. The cost of any provisional repairs will be borne by the Company if such repairs constitute part of the final repairs, and do not increase the total repair expenses. If the sum insured is less than the amount required to be insured as per Provision-I herein above, the Company will pay only in such proportion as the sum insured bears to the amount required to be insured. Every item, if more than one, shall be subject to this condition separately. The Company will make payments only after being satisfied, with the necessary bills and documents, that the repairs have been effected or replacement have taken place, as the case may be. The Company may, however, not insist for bills and documents in case of total loss where the insured is unable to replace the damaged equipment for reasons beyond their control. In such a case claims can be settled on ‘Indemnity Basis’.”

4. Said Hydraulic Excavator was hired and was to be used at a different location. The appellant duly intimated the change of location. On 30.06.2010 the Hydraulic Excavator was badly damaged in a fire while it was at such changed location. An FIR was lodged on 01.07.2010 with the local police and the respondent was also immediately intimated about the damage and was requested to survey the damage and settle the claim.

5. On 07.07.2010 a surveyor came to be appointed by the respondent to survey and assess the loss and damage. Though the survey was undertaken, the claim of the appellant was not getting settled and as such reminders were sent by the appellant on 18.08.2010 and 10.02.2011. Thereafter, on 13.04.2011 the appellant was intimated that the loss was assessed by the surveyor at Rs.25,24,273/-.

The relevant portion from the report of the surveyor Cunningham Lindsey was to the following effect :- “GROSS LOSS Both types of claim settlement possibilities viz. in Partial Loss and Constructive Total Loss basis were explored. Finally, it was established that PL i.e. repairing of the whole 
excavator will involve much higher than its insured value. Hence, we have considered it as case of Constructive Total Loss. Considering the above, the Gross Loss comes around Rs.5,100,000.00, which is the present new replacement cost of same type and capacity of excavator. Refer attached quotation for new machine. MARKET VALUE OF LOSS Since procurement, i.e. 27th March 2007 and the date of loss i.e. 30th June 2010 the subject excavator was in operation for 3 years and 3 months. As such, considering the life of such excavator as 10 years, the depreciation for 3 years and 3 months works out to 32.5% . Hence, the depreciated value or Market Value of the excavator is Rs.3,442,500.00 SALVAGE REALISATION The matter of salvage was first discussed with the insured, who refused to retain the same. Immediately, we informed all the details of the affected machine to the insurer for appropriate action on the salvage disposal through their concerned department. As a result of the same, the insurer vide their mail dated 21st February 2011, confirmed that they had recovered Rs.650,000 from the subject excavator, which we opine to be extremely fair and reasonable considering the extent of damage to the excavator and remoteness of the location of loss. ASSESSED LOSS Rs.2,792,500.00 (as net of salvage) UNDER INSURANCE The present new replacement cost of an excavator of same type and capacity is Rs.5,100,000.00, whereas the sum insured taken for the same is of Rs.4,656,000.00. On comparing those two, it is worked out that the property is under insured by 8.71%. ADJUSTED LOSS Rs.2,549,273.25 (as net of under insurance) DEDUCTIBLE For Individual Value over Rs.25 lakhs upto Rs.50 lakhs Rs.25,000.00 (Flat Excess) for claims arising out of perils other than AOG perils. NET ADJUSTED LOSS Rs.2,524,273.00 (as net of policy excess) RECOMMENDATION We recommend payment of the net adjusted amount of Rs.2,524,273 under Policy No.1507192215001168 in full discharge of the claim subject to Agreed Bank Clause.”

6. The appellant being aggrieved, filed case No.CC/18/11 before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, West Bengal (‘the State Commission’, for short). The appellant submitted that the Excavator was a total loss and that he was entitled to the insured amount of Rs.46,56,600/-  along with interest @ 12% p.a. and compensation as claimed in the complaint. During the pendency of the matter, the appellant placed on record the report of a surveyor appointed by him. Said surveyor had assessed the loss on two counts, namely “loss assessed on repairing basis” at Rs.94,64,357.70 and on “total loss basis” at Rs.41,90,940.00.

The relevant portion from the report of said surveyor named Subbiah Jeyakarthigesan was as under :- “LOSS ASSESSED ON REPAIRING BASIS Rs.9,464,357.70 (Rupees Ninety four lacs sixty four thousand three hundred fifty seven & seventy only). ASSESSMENT ON TOTAL LOSS BASIS Present depreciated cost of the Excavator as declared to the Insurance Company and accepted by them Nu. 4,656,600.00 Less: 10% Depreciation for usage from the date of insurance to the date of accident Rs. 465,660.00 ______________ Assessed on Total Loss Basis Rs. 4,190,940.00 (Rupees Forty one lacs ninety thousand nine hundred forty only.) UNDER INSURANCE In my opinion the under insurance in this case will not be applicable as the total machine has been totally burnt. The machine has been insured for Rs.46,56,600.00 which is after application of depreciation from the period of purchase to the last renewal of the insurance policy, as such I have not applied any under insurance in this case.”

7. The State Commission allowed the complaint. The relevant portions of its order dated 04.12.2013 are as under :- “Thirdly, the loss assessed by the Surveyor appointed by the insurance company has taken into consideration the depreciation value @ 32% of the original purchase value of Rs.51,74,000/- only, but the premium as on 7th July 2009 was made after fixing depreciation value. It is quite reasonable that the depreciation value, as pointed out by the surveyor appointed by the insured in reply to question No.8 of the OP, that the depreciation has been applied by the OP at the time of renewal of policy and depreciation can be applied only once, only from the period from the date of renewal of insurance to the date of accident. Again, in reply to question No.9 of the OP, it has been held that under insurance @ 8.71% is incorrect as the insurance company has put in their own value at the time of renewing the policy without obtaining the proposal form from the owner of the excavator machine. We also agree with the view taken by the surveyor appointed by the insured as stated in his reply to question No.10 of the OP that salvage wreck is the property of the insurance company and it cannot be forced upon the owner of the damaged machine……………. Ordered That the complaint be and the same is allowed on contest against O.P.Nos. 1 & 2 who are hereby directed to pay a sum of Rs.41,90,940/- (Forty one lakh ninety thousand nine hundred and forty only) with interest @ Rs.8% p.a. from the date of filing of the claim. The said  OPs. are also directed to pay a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (One lakh only) as compensation for harassment, mental agony and financial loss, apart from another sum of Rs.5,000/- (Five thousand only) as costs. The entire amount shall be paid by OP Nos.1 & 2 within 45 days from the date of this order in default whereof, interest @9% p.a. shall be payable till full realisation.” 8. The respondent, being aggrieved filed First Appeal No.182 of 2014 which was partly allowed by the National Commission vide its judgment and order dated 16.02.2018. The National Commission held as under: “… … …The Insurance Company is responsible to indemnify the loss on the basis of the replacement of the damaged machine in the same condition at which it was at the day of the accident. In the present case, though IDV of Rs.46,56,000/- was mentioned in the policy and was agreed between the parties, however, if the new machine is available for Rs.51,00,000/- then on that basis the same machine of 3.25 years age could be available on the approximate price being arrived at by deducting the depreciation for 3.25 years from the current price of the new machine. Obviously, the insurance Company shall go for this price for replacement as this is less than the IDV. On this basis, the surveyor has calculated depreciated price of the new machine fit for replacement as Rs.34,42,500/- after applying depreciation of 10% p.a. since the purchase of the machine on the current price of new machine till the date of accident.”  The National Commission further observed that the salvage value to the tune of Rs.6,50,000/-, which was realized by the respondent could not have been deducted from the aforesaid sum of Rs.34,42,500/. The National Commission, thus directed the respondent to pay a sum of Rs.34,17,500/- for settlement of the insurance claim of the appellant. It was found that since the respondent was willing to settle the matter for Rs.25,42,273/-, the respondent would be liable to pay interest on the differential amount of Rs.8,93,227/- @ 8% p.a.

9. The decision of the National Commission is presently under appeal. We heard Mr. Soumya Roop Sanyal, learned Advocate for the appellant and Mr. Joy Basu, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent. The appellant contended that it was a case of a total loss as accepted by both the surveyors and going by the “sum insured” as agreed by the parties, the appellant was entitled to Rs.46,56,000/-. It was submitted that the Insurance Company was well aware that the Excavator was of 2007 make and after deducting appropriate depreciation the value that was arrived at for the purposes of cover of insurance was Rs.46,56,600/-. Countering said submission, the respondent submitted that despite stipulation of such amount as sum insured, the Insurance Company would not be disentitled in the present case from contending that the actual value after suffering appropriate depreciation ought to be one that was indicated by its surveyor. Reliance was placed upon the decision of this Court in Sikka Papers Limited v. National Insurance Company Limited and others .

10. It is common ground that as a result of fire, the Excavator was a “total loss” and the insured would be entitled to the replacement cost of the Excavator. The point, however, is what is the amount or value that the insured is entitled to.

11. The policy in question indicates that the “year of make” of the Excavator was “2007” while the policy was for the period 22.07.2009 to 21.07.2010. The parties were aware that the Excavator was purchased in the year 2007 for Rs.51.74 lakhs. If the contract mentioned the sum insured to be Rs.46,56,600/- the parties must be deemed to be aware about the significance of that sum and the fact that it represented the value of the Excavator as on the date when the coverage was obtained. In this regard the conclusion arrived at and the observations made in Dharmendra Goel v. Oriental Insurance Company Limited2 are noteworthy. In that case a vehicle was bought in the year 2000 and the relevant period of coverage was 2002-2003. The vehicle 1 (2009)7 SCC 777 2 (2008) 8 SCC 279  met with an accident. The surveyor found it to be a total loss which was assessed at Rs.1,80,000/-. In an action instituted in the Consumer Forum, the National Commission had granted compensation at said level of Rs.1,80,000/- with interest. Questioning such assessment, the insured was in an appeal and submitted, inter alia, that he was entitled to the sum insured, namely, Rs.3,54,000/-. Paragraphs 5 and 7 of the decision bring out the principle that the Insurance Company having accepted the value of the vehicle to be Rs.3,54,000/-, was bound by that value. Said paragraphs 5 and 7 were as under: “5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record very carefully. The facts as narrated above remain uncontroverted. Admittedly, the accident had happened on 10-9-2002 during the validity of the insurance policy taken on 13-2-2002 insuring the vehicle for Rs 3,54,000 on a premium of Rs 8498. It is also the admitted position that the vehicle had been declared to be a total loss by the surveyor appointed by the Company though the value of the vehicle on total loss basis had been assessed at Rs 1,80,000. We are, in the circumstances, of the opinion that as the Company itself had accepted the value of the vehicle at Rs 3,54,000 on 13-2-2002, it could not claim that the value of the vehicle on total loss basis on 10-9-2002 i.e. on the date of the accident was only Rs 1,80,000. … … …  7. It must be borne in mind that Section 146 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 casts an obligation on the owner of a vehicle to take out an insurance policy as provided under Chapter XI of the Act and any vehicle driven without taking such a policy invites a punishment under Section 196 thereof. It is, therefore, obvious that in the light of this stringent provision and being in a dominant position the insurance companies often act in an unreasonable manner and after having accepted the value of a particular insured good disown that very figure on one pretext or the other when they are called upon to pay compensation. This “take it or leave it” attitude is clearly unwarranted not only as being bad in law but ethically indefensible. We are also unable to accept the submission that it was for the appellant to produce evidence to prove that the surveyor’s report was on the lower side in the light of the fact that a price had already been put on the vehicle by the Company itself at the time of renewal of the policy. We accordingly hold that in these circumstances, the Company was bound by the value put on the vehicle while renewing the policy on 13-2-2002.”

12. Mr. Basu, learned Senior Advocate, however relied upon the decision of this Court in Sikka Papers (supra). In that matter a diesel generating set purchased in the year 1997 for Rs.45 lakhs was insured for Rs.35 lakhs for the period from 08.04.1999 to 07.04.2000. Said diesel generating set broke down. The complainant demanded what it had paid i.e. Rs.25 lakhs for the repairs but the insurer, relying upon the report of the Surveyor, did not agree. According to the Surveyor the net loss was Rs.14,45,000/-. But the Surveyor found that the generating set was under insured and as such the figure of net loss that was assessed ought to suffer deduction of 25.71%. The net assessed loss was, therefore, at the level of Rs.10,47,491/-.

This Court raised two questions:

“(1) Whether the insurer was justified in accepting report dated 15-5-2000 submitted by the surveyor who had assessed the loss of Rs.14,45,000/- after deducting about Rs.10,55,000/- from Rs.25,00,000/- i.e. actual amount paid by the complainant for repairing the diesel generating set?

(2) Whether the insurer was justified in deducting an amount of Rs.3,71,509.50 (25.71%) as under insurance from the loss assessed at Rs.14,45,000/- by the surveyor in its report dated 15-5-2000?” As regards first question, this Court found that insurer would not be liable in respect of wearing out of machinery from normal use or exposure and the cost of replacement of insured property by new property of the same kind and same capacity would be subject to the exception that repair or replacement would not extend to the machinery or parts which had undergone normal wear and tear. With regard to the second question, on facts it was found that there was an element of under insurance and the surveyor was justified in deducting 25.71%.

13. We do not see how the decision in Sikka Papers (supra) could be of any relevance in the present matter. The cases of “under insurance”  stand on a completely different footing. In such cases the Insurance Company stands denied of appropriate premium. If the sum insured is, in any way, lesser than the real value of the subject matter of insurance, and if there be cases of partial replacement or partial loss, it is well accepted that the Insurance Company is entitled to proportionate deduction representing the proportion of undervaluation. It is this facet of the matter which weighed with the Court in Sikka Papers (supra) in affirming the surveyor’s report in so far as 25.71% deduction was concerned. Even in the present matter under the caption “Provisions”, the stipulation in para 2 is to the effect that if the sum insured “is less than the amount required to be insured ……. the company will pay only in such proportion as the sum insured bears to the amount required to be insured.”

14. It is not the case of the Insurance Company that there was any “under insurance” in the present matter. On the other hand, the contention is that as against the sum insured which was Rs.46,56,600/- the depreciated value was Rs.34,42,500/-. So according to the Insurance Company, if at all it was a case of over insurance. If we go by the idea of receipt of premium, then the Insurance Company had received more than what according to it the real value would have justified.

15. It is precisely in this set of facts that the question in the present matter arises. If both the sides, with their eyes open, had arrived at a particular figure to be the real value of the subject matter of insurance, is it open to any party to dispute said sum and contend that the real value was something different from what was declared by the parties to be the sum insured. One may understand cases where there is non-disclosure of material facts which may go to the root of the matter and as such the sanctity of the agreement itself may get affected. But if both the parties had agreed and arrived at an understanding, which understanding was otherwise not vitiated by any misrepresentation, fraud or coercion, the parties must be held bound by stipulation of such figure. This was the idea and the underlying principle in Dharmendra Goel (supra)

16. The relevant stipulation in the present case, namely clause (b) of Provision -Basis of Indemnity speaks of calculation of actual value by deducting “proper depreciation”. The Surveyor of the Insurance Company has worked the figure of depreciation by starting with the figure of Rs.51 lakhs as the cost of a new Excavator and then deducting 32.5% by way of depreciation assuming the life of Excavator to be 10 years. In his assessment,  therefore, the stipulation of the figure of Rs.46,56,600/- on the day the contract was entered into, had no significance. Was he right and justified and how could he assume the life of the Excavator to be 10 years? If that was the understanding between the parties, the figure of sum insured could have been different. If the surveyor was calculating the depreciation from the day when the policy was entered into till the date when the accident occurred, such exercise could certainly be justified. But the exercise undertaken was in the nature of not only considering the depreciation post the policy but even including the period prior thereto. That exercise was already undertaken by the parties and in their assessment the real value of the Excavator as on the day when the policy was taken out was Rs.46,56,600/-. In the face of such agreement and understanding, the surveyor could not have calculated depreciation for a period prior to the date of policy or contract. The purport of aforesaid clause was to arrive at proper valuation as on the day when there was total destruction. He could have undertaken the exercise post the date of policy to assess the real value of the insured property as on the date when the fire actually took place. And for such purposes, the assessment must start with the amount described as “sum insured” on the day when the contract was entered into. It was not open to the Surveyor or to the Insurance Company to Civil Appeal No1299./2019 @ SLP(C)No.27695/2018 Sumit Kumar Saha vs. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. 18 disregard the figure stipulated as ‘sum insured’. The loss had to be assessed in the present case, keeping said figure in mind.

17. Having considered the entire matter, in our view, except in cases where the agreement on part of the Insurance Company is brought about by fraud, coercion or misrepresentation or cases where principle of uberrima fide is attracted, the parties are bound by stipulation of a particular figure as sum insured. Therefore, the surveyor and the Insurance Company were not justified in any way in questioning and disregarding the amount of “sum insured”. Further depreciation, if any, can always be computed keeping the figure of “sum insured” in mind. The starting figure, therefore, in this case had to be the figure which was stipulated as “sum insured”. Since Excavator, after the policy was taken out was used for eleven months, there must be some reasonable depreciation which ought to be deducted from the “sum insured”. The surveyor appointed by the insured was right in deducting 10% and in arriving at the figure of Rs.41,90,940/-. The other issue which weighed with the surveyor appointed by the Insurance Company regarding deduction of salvage value was rightly answered by the National Commission and as such does not require any elaboration. We, thus, find that the Civil Appeal No1299./2019 @ SLP(C)No.27695/2018 Sumit Kumar Saha vs. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. 19 assessment made by the State Commission was quite correct and that made by the National Commission was completely incorrect.


18. We, therefore, allow this appeal, set aside the decision of the National Commission and restore the judgment and order passed by the State Commission. No costs.

………..…..……..……J. (Uday Umesh Lalit)
.………….……………J. (R. Subhash Reddy)

New Delhi, January 30, 2019 

Sunday, April 7, 2019

An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not stand on par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full-fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over:SC

Page 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL No.10942 OF 2014

 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 4648 of 2008]

G.M. (OPERATIONS) S.B.I & ANR. .. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

R. PERIYASAMY ..RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

S. A. BOBDE, J.

Leave granted.

2. The appellant, General Manager of the State Bank of India has preferred this appeal against the Judgment and Final Order dated 30.08.2007 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal No. of 2375 of 1999. By 1 Page 2 the impugned Judgment the High Court dismissed the appellant’s Writ Appeal and confirmed the finding and Judgment of the learned Single Judge by which the respondent’s Writ Petition was allowed and the orders dismissing him from service were set aside.

3. The respondent – Periyasamy, was serving as a Permanent Cash Officer at the Dharmapuri Branch of the State Bank of India in 1986. In a departmental enquiry, he was charged with being accountable for a shortage detected in the currency chest in his joint custody along with one Ganesan. By the second charge, he was charged with not adhering to the laid down instructions regarding currency chest transactions and for committing lapses in the maintenance of the currency chest register. By the third charge, he was charged with excessive outside borrowings in violation of Rule 41(i) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Service Rules.

4. An enquiry was duly conducted. The charged officer, the respondent, was given an opportunity to defend himself 2 Page 3 and an Inquiry Report dated 03.11.1986 was submitted to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority considered the entire report and after discussing the same came to the conclusion that there was a preponderance of the probability that the respondent had been surreptitiously removing currency notes from the chest over a period of time, the shortage being Rs. 1,25,000/-. The disciplinary authority also took note of the fact that he was lending money to others, even without a pro-note indicating that he had large amounts of cash. The disciplinary authority, therefore, recommended the dismissal of the respondent from the service of the Bank in terms of Rule 49(h) of the State Bank of India (Supervising Staff) Rules by an order dated 27th July, 1989. Thereafter, the Chief General Manager considered the Inquiry Report and the recommendation of the disciplinary authority and concurred with the views of the disciplinary authority. Against the dismissal, the respondent preferred an appeal under the Service Rules of the Bank. However, the appeal was also turned down by the order dated 14.05.1990. Against the said orders, the respondent 3 Page 4 preferred a Writ Petition before the Madras High Court. As observed earlier, the learned Single Judge allowed the petition and the Division Bench dismissed the appeal against the petition. Hence, the Bank has preferred this appeal.

5. While the respondent was working as a Cash Officer, at the Dharmapuri Branch with Ganesan, the branchaccountant, as a joint custodian, the Branch inspection took place between 20.02.1986 to 05.04.1986. The respondent had been working as the Cash Officer from 16.11.1985. Certain irregularities were found in the inspection. As a result of the irregularities, instructions were given to follow the dual locking system for the storage bins where cash was stored and for the dividing doors with effect from 05.04.1986. On that very night, the respondent met with an accident. The strong room keys which were supposed to be in the physical possession of the respondent were found in his Cupboard in the Branch. From 07.04.1986 to 09.04.1986, one Swaminathan officiated as the Cash Officer. From 10.04.1986 to 11.04.1986, one N Krishnan officiated as the Cash Officer. From 12.04.1986 to 17.04.1986, again, Shri 4 Page 5 Swaminathan officiated as the Cash Officer. According to the appellant, there was no transfer of notes from the operative bins of the bank to the storage bins and there was no cash withdrawal from the storage bins between 05.04.1986 to 14.04.1986. On 15.4.1986, a cash shortage of Rs.40,000/- was noticed by the officiating Cash Officer. Therefore, the verification of the entire currency chest was conducted, which showed a total cash shortage of Rs.1,25,000/-. An internal investigation was conducted wherein it was found that the shortage in cash had taken place between 16.11.1985 and 05.04.1986 when the respondent and Ganesan were joint custodians. Show cause notices were issued to the respondent and Ganesan. Apparently, the other joint custodian, Ganesan has also been punished but he has not challenged his punishment. In the reply to the show cause notice, the respondent admitted various lapses on his part regarding the maintenance of the currency chest books. In particular, the respondent stated in his reply that perhaps the shortage of Rs. 1,25,000/- escaped his attention due to various reasons and was thus unfortunate. The 5 Page 6 respondent sought permission to peruse the relevant books and registers at the Dharmapuri branch and was allowed to do so. The Inquiring Officer eventually submitted a report and held the respondent guilty of charges as stated earlier. The following are the important features of the Inquiry Report:

a) When the branch inspection was concluded on 05.04.1986, it was noticed that during the tenure of the respondent as the permanent Cash Officer of the Branch, several currency storage bins inside the branch strong-room were not locked with dual pad locks and some were kept open when they were not being operated upon.

b) Shortages were detected in the note bundles by the respondent. Upon further inspection, shortages in three more sections from the bundles last handled by the respondent, were also discovered.

c) The two employees, who acted as Cash Officers after the charged officials, i.e. the respondent and Ganesan 6 Page 7 exited on 05.04.1985, had performed their duties, during the period 05.04.1986 to 14.04.1986 when the storage strong room was locked with dual pad locks and they had functioned in the presence of the permanent Accountant of the Branch.

d) Unlike in the case of acting Cash Officers, when the respondent used to function as Cash Officer, the Accountant Shri Ganesan was in the habit of leaving him alone inside the Strong Room while he attended to his desk work outside. The significance of this last finding is that the shortages were found to have occurred between 16.11.1985 to 5.4.1986 when the respondent worked as the Cash Officer of the Branch and not from 05.04.1986 to 15.04.1986, when others had acted as Cash Officers for the reasons stated hereinbefore. The respondent was also convicted of the other two relatively minor charges.


6. The learned Single Judge, at the instance of the respondent, went into the entire matter in tedious detail. 7 Page 8 The Single Judge considered the entire evidence, even reproduced it in parts, and upon re-appreciation of the evidence, virtually disagreed with the findings of facts recorded by the Inquiry Officer and set aside the respondent’s dismissal.

7. Shri Vikas Singh, the learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that both, the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench, in confirming the order, have violated the well settled parameters of the scope of the Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in such matters. Shri Singh submitted that the High Court embarked on the unusual and unwarranted exercise of re-appreciating the evidence and reversed the well considered findings of fact recorded by the Inquiry Officer. The learned counsel for the appellant brought to our notice the very first decision, which authoritatively settled the law on this point in the State of Andhra 8 Page 9 Pradesh and others vs. Shri Rama Rao1 , where this Court observed as follows:

“This report was considered by the authority competent to impose punishment and a provisional conclusion that the respondent merited punishment of dismissal for the charges held established by the report was recorded. A copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer was sent to the respondent and he was called upon to submit his representation against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him. The respondent submitted his representation which was considered by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Northern Range, Waltair. That Officer referred to the evidence of witnesses for the State about the arrest of Durgalu on March 5, 1954, and the handing over of Durgalu to the respondent on the same day. He observed that the evidence of Durgalu that after he was arrested on March 5: 1954, he had made good his escape and was again arrested on March 8, 1954, could not be accepted. Holding that the charge against the respondent was serious and had on the evidence 1 AIR 1963 SC 1723 9 Page 10 been adequately proved, in his view the only punishment which the respondent deserved was of dismissal from the police force.”


8. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya2 , this Court observed as follows:-

“7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion 2 (2011) 4 SCC 584 10 Page 11 or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India : (1995) 6 SCC 749, Union of India v. G. Ganayutham : (1997) 7 SCC 463, Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana : (1999) 5 SCC 76 and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. ShashiKant S Patil (2000) 1 SCC 416).” It is not necessary to multiply authorities on this point. Suffice it to say that the law is well settled in this regard.


9. It is not really necessary to deal with the judgment of the learned Single Judge since that has merged with the judgment of the Division Bench. However, some observations are necessary. The learned Single Judge committed an error in approaching the issue by asking whether the findings have been arrived on acceptable evidence or not and coming to the conclusion that there was 11 Page 12 no acceptable evidence, and that in any case the evidence was not sufficient. In doing so, the learned Single Judge lost sight of the fact that the permissible enquiry was whether there is no evidence on which the enquiry officer could have arrived at the findings or whether there was any perversity in the findings. Whether the evidence was acceptable or not, was a wrong question, unless it raised a question of admissibility. Also, the learned Single Judge was not entitled to go into the question of the adequacy of evidence and come to the conclusion that the evidence was not sufficient to hold the respondent guilty.


10. It is interesting to note that the learned Single Judge went to the extent of observing that the concept of preponderance of probabilities is alien to domestic enquiries. On the contrary, it is well known that the standard of proof that must be employed in domestic enquiries is in fact that of the preponderance of probabilities. In Union of India Vs. Sardar Bahadur3 , this Court held that a disciplinary 3 (1972) 4 SCC 618 12 Page 13 proceeding is not a criminal trial and thus, the standard of proof required is that of preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. This view was upheld by this Court in State Bank of India & ors. Vs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde4 . More recently, in State Bank of India Vs. Narendra Kumar Pandey5 , this Court observed that a disciplinary authority is expected to prove the charges leveled against a bank-officer on the preponderance of probabilities and not on proof beyond reasonable doubt. Further, in Union Bank of India Vs. Vishwa Mohan6 , this Court was confronted with a case which was similar to the present one. The respondent therein was also a bank employee, who was unable to demonstrate to the Court as to how prejudice had been caused to him due to non-supply of the inquiry authorities report/findings in his case. This Court 4 (2006) 7 SCC 212 5 (2013) 2 SCC 740 6 (1998) 4 SCC 310 13 Page 14 held that in the banking business absolute devotion, diligence, integrity and honesty needs to be preserved by every bank employee and in particular the bank officer. If this were not to be observed, the Court held that the confidence of the public/depositors would be impaired. Thus in that case the Court set-aside the order of the High Court and upheld the dismissal of the bank employee, rejecting the ground that any prejudice had been caused to him on account of non-furnishing of the inquiry report/findings to him. While dealing with the question as to whether a person with doubtful integrity ought to be allowed to work in a Government Department, this Court in Commissioner of Police New Delhi & Anr. Vs. Mehar Singh7 , held that while the standard of proof in a criminal case is proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the proof in a departmental proceeding is merely the preponderance of probabilities. The Court observed that quite often criminal cases end in acquittal 7 (2013) 7 SCC 685 14 Page 15 because witnesses turn hostile and therefore, such acquittals are not acquittals on merit. An acquittal based on benefit of doubt would not stand on par with a clean acquittal on merit after a full-fledged trial, where there is no indication of the witnesses being won over. The long standing view on this subject was settled by this Court in R.P. Kapur Vs. Union of India8 , whereby it was held that a departmental proceeding can proceed even though a person is acquitted when the acquittal is other than honourable. We are in agreement with this view. In administrative law, it is a settled principle that the onus of proof rests upon the party alleging the invalidity of an order9 . In other words, there is a presumption that the decision or executive order is properly and validly made, a presumption expressed in the maxim omnia praesumuntur 8 AIR 1964 SC 787 9 Minister of National Revenue v. Wright’s Canadian Ropes Ltd. (1947) AC 109 at 122; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Cpn. (1948) 1 KB 223 at 228; Fawcett Properties Ltd. v. Buckingham County Council (1959) Ch. 543 at 575, affirmed (1961) AC 636. 15 Page 16 rite esse acta which means ‘all things are presumed to be done in due form10.’


11. The Division Bench, in appeal, apparently found it fit to rely on an additional affidavit filed for the first time by the respondent in his Writ Petition, referring to the letter dated 30.12.1987 by which the respondent is purported to have sought the production of certain documents. It is not disputed that the respondent had not at any stage earlier made any grievance that he had written a letter dated 30.12.1987 calling upon the bank to produce certain documents for his perusal and which was denied. It is further not in dispute that there is no record of the bank having received the letter and there is no proof for it. The bank has denied receiving the letter and according to the bank they had received a letter dated 28.12.1987 and they had replied by their letter dated 14.01.1988. In their reply, there was no reference to the letter dated 30.12.1987 because they had not received it. We find that in the 10 Point of Ayr Collieries Ltd. v. Lloyd – George (1943) 2 All ER 546. 16 Page 17 absence of proof that any such letter demanding certain documents was received by the bank, it was not permissible for the High Court to proceed to draw an inference that there was a failure of natural justice in the bank having denied certain documents. Thus it may be said, that an administrative authority such as the Appellant, cannot be put to proof of the facts or conditions on which the validity of its order must depend, unless the Respondent can produce evidence which will shift the burden of proof on the shoulders of the Appellant. How much evidence is required for this purpose will always depend on the nature of that particular case. In Potato Marketing Board v. Merricks11 , it was held that if an order has an apparent fault on the face of it, the burden is easily transferred. However, if the grounds of attack are bad-faith or unreasonableness, the Plaintiff’s task is heavier.

12. On the question of shortage of money, the Division Bench merely upheld the findings of the learned 11 (1958) 2 QB 316 at 331; Cannock Chase DC v. Kelly (1978) 1 WLR 1. 17 Page 18 Single Judge that there was no clinching evidence in support of the charges. The Division Bench approved the findings of the Single Judge that the inquiry report that the shortage of cash occurred only between 16.11.1985 and 05.04.1986, when the respondent was a joint custodian, was based on surmise and conjecture. The Division Bench did not care to advert to the evidence. That evidence rightly relied on by the enquiry officer which established that the shortage did occur between 16.11.1985 and 05.04.1986. In fact the inquiring officer has given cogent reasons for rendering the findings that the shortage could not have occurred after 05.04.1986 upto the discovery of 15.04.1986, when two acting cashiers had functioned. Moreover, the observation that there is no clinching evidence in support of the charges is another way of saying that the evidence is insufficient or inadequate, which is not permissible. It bears repetition that sufficiency or adequacy of evidence is not the ground on which the findings of facts may be set-aside by the High Court under Article 226. The justification offered by the Division Bench that the learned Single Judge had to 18 Page 19 undertake the exercise of analysing the findings of the enquiry officer because the appellants had deprived the respondent of his livelihood is wholly untenable. A transgression of jurisdiction cannot be justified on the ground of consequences, as has been done. Moreover, the reliance by the Division Bench on Mathura Prasad Vs. Union of India & Ors.12 is entirely misplaced, since that case arose in an entirely different set of circumstances. We also find it difficult to understand the justification offered by the Division Bench that there was no failure on the part of the respondent to observe utmost devotion to duty because the case was not one of misappropriation but only of a shortage of money. The Division Bench has itself stated the main reason why its order cannot be upheld in the following words, “on reappreciation of the entire material placed on record, we do not find any reason to interfere with the well considered and merited order passed by the learned Single Judge.” 12 (2007) 1 SCC 437 19 Page 20 13. We accordingly set-aside the impugned order and dismiss the writ petition of the respondent.

14. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, we find it appropriate to direct the appellant to pay an adhoc sum of Rs.3,00,000/- to the respondent who has retired long ago and has drawn pension of which he will be deprived hereafter. Appeal disposed off as allowed.

…….................………..J. [J. CHELAMESWAR]
 ..........………………………J.  [S.A. BOBDE]

New Delhi, December 10, 2014

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