Verdict on Prime Minister's Office role in 2G scam:SC

                                                                                1


                                                                REPORTABLE


                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA



                    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION



                   CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1193   OF 2012

               (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 27535 of 2010)




Dr. Subramanian Swamy                                      ... Appellant
                                     versus
Dr. Manmohan Singh and another                             ... Respondents
                              J U D G M E N T


G. S. Singhvi, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    Whether a complaint can be filed by a citizen for prosecuting a public servant for an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act,   1988   (for   short,   `the   1988   Act')   and   whether   the   authority
competent to sanction prosecution of a public servant for offences under   the   1988   Act   is   required   to   take   an   appropriate   decision  within the time specified in clause I(15) of the directions contained  in paragraph 58 of the judgment of this Court in Vineet Narain v. Union of India (1998) 1 SCC 226 and the guidelines issued by the


                                                                                   2


Central   Government,   Department   of   Personnel   and   Training   and the   Central   Vigilance   Commission   (CVC)   are   the   question   which require consideration in this appeal.





3.    For   the   last   more   than   three   years,   the  appellant   has   been



vigorously   pursuing,   in   public   interest,   the   cases   allegedly



involving   loss   of   thousands   of   crores   of   rupees   to   the   Public



Exchequer   due   to   arbitrary   and   illegal   grant   of   licences   at   the



behest   of   Mr.   A.   Raja   (respondent   No.   2)   who   was   appointed   as



Minister   for   Communication   and   Information   Technology   on



16.5.2007 by the President on the advice of Dr. Manmohan Singh



(respondent No. 1).  After collecting information about the grant of



licences,   the   appellant   made   detailed   representation   dated



29.11.2008   to   respondent   No.   1   to   accord   sanction   for



prosecution of respondent No. 2 for offences under the 1988 Act.



In   his   representation,   the   appellant   pointed   out   that   respondent



No.   2   had   allotted   new   licences   in   2G   mobile   services   on   `first



come, first served' basis to novice telecom companies, viz., Swan



Telecom and Unitech, which was in clear violation of Clause 8 of



the   Guidelines   for   United   Access   Services   Licence   issued   by   the



Ministry   of   Communication   and   Information   Technology   vide



letter   No.10-21/2005-BS.I(Vol.II)/49   dated   14.12.2005   and,


                                                                                      3


thereby, caused loss of over Rs. 50,000 crores to the Government.



The appellant gave details of the violation of Clause 8 and pointed



out that the two officers, viz., R.J.S. Kushwaha and D. Jha of the



Department of Telecom, who  had  opposed the  showing  of undue



favour to Swan Telecom, were transferred just before the grant of



licences   and   Bharat   Sanchar   Nigam   Limited   (BSNL)   which   had



never   entered   into   a   roaming   agreement   with   any   operator,   was



forced  to   enter   into   such   an  agreement  with   Swan  Telecom.   The



appellant further pointed out that immediately after acquiring 2G



spectrum licences, Swan Telecom and Unitech sold their stakes to



foreign companies, i.e., Etisalat, a telecom operator from UAE and



Telenor of Norway respectively and, thereby, made huge profits at



the   expense   of   public   revenue.   He   claimed   that   by   2G   spectrum



allocation under respondent No. 2, the Government received only



one-sixth   of   what   it   would   have   received   if   it   had   opted   for   an



auction. The appellant pointed out how respondent No. 2 ignored



the recommendations of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India



(TRAI) and gave totally unwarranted benefits to the two companies



and   thereby   caused   loss   to   the   Public   Exchequer.     Some   of   the



portions of the appellant's representation are extracted below:


                                                                            4


"Clause   8   has   been   violated   as   follows:   While   Anil

Dhirubhai   Ambani   Group   (ADAG),   the   promoters   of

Reliance   Communications   (R   Com),   had  more   than   10

per   cent   stake   in   Swan   Telecom,   the   figures   were

manipulated   and   showed   as   9.99   per   cent   holding   to

beat the said Clause.  The documents available disclose

that on March 2, 2007, when Swan Telecom applied for

United Access Services Licences, it was owned 100 per

cent   by   Reliance   Communications   and   its   associates

viz.   Reliance   Telecom,   and   by   Tiger   Trustees   Limited,

Swan   Infonet   Services   Private   Limited,   and   Swan

Advisory Services Private  Limited  (see Annexure  I).    At

one   or   the   other   point   of   time,   employees   of   ADAG

(Himanshu   Agarwal,   Ashish   Karyekar,   Paresh   Rathod)

or   its   associate   companies   have   been   acquiring   the

shares   of   Swan   Telecom   itself.     But   still   the   ADAG

manipulated the holdings in Swan to reduce it to only

9.99 per cent.  Ambani has now quietly sold his shares

in   Swan   to   Delphi   Investments,   a   Mauritius   based

company   owned   by   Ahmed   O.   Alfi,   specializing   in

automobile spare parts.   In turn,   Swan has sold 45%

of   its   shares   to   UAE's   Emirates   Telecom   Corporation

(Etisalat)   for   Rs.9000   crores!     All   this   is   highly

suspicious   and   not   normal   business   transactions.

Swan   company   got   60%   of   the   22   Telecom   licenced

areas at a throw away price of Rs.1650 crores, when it

was worth Rs.60,000 crores total.



      Room   has   operations   in   the   same   circles   where

the application for Swan Telecom was filed.   Therefore,

under   Clause   8   of   the   Guidelines,   Swan   should   not

have been allotted spectrum by the Telecommunication

Ministry.     But   the   company   did   get   it   on   Minister's

direction,   which   is   an   undue   favour   from   him   (Raja).

There  was   obviously  a  quid   pro  quo  which  only   a   CBI

enquiry can reveal, after an FIR is registered.   There is

no need for a P/E, because the CVC has already done

the preliminary enquiry.



Quite   surprisingly,   the   2G   spectrum   licences   were

priced   at   2001   levels   to   benefit   these   private   players.

That   was   when   there   were   only   4   million   cellphone


                                                                                    5


     subscribers; now it is 350 million.  Hence 2001 price is

     not applicable today.



     Immediately after acquiring 2G spectrum licences both

     Swan   and   Unitech   sold   their   stakes   to   foreign

     companies at a huge profits.  While Swan Telecom sold

     its   stakes   to   UAE   telecom   operator   Etisalat,   Unitech

     signed   a   deal   with   Telenor   of   Norway   for   selling   its

     share at huge premiums.



     In   the   process   of   this   2G   spectrum   allocation,   the

     government   received   only   one-sixth   of   what   it   would

     have   got   had   it   gone   through   a   fresh   auction   route.

     The total loss to the exchequer of giving away 2G GSM

     spectrum   in   this   way   -   including   to   the   CDMA

     operators   -   is   over   Rs.50,000   crores  and   is   said   to   be

     one   of   the   biggest   financial   scams   of   all   times   in   the

     country.



           While   approving   the   2G   licences,   Minister   Raja

     turned a blind eye to the fact that these two companies

     do not have any infrastructure to launch their services.

     Falsely claiming that the Telecom Regulatory Authority

     of   India   had   approved   the   first-cum-first   served   rule,

     Raja   went   ahead   with   the   2G   spectrum   allocation   to

     two   debutants   in   the   Telecom   sector.     In   fact   earlier

     TRAI had discussed the spectrum allocation issue with

     existing   services   providers   and   suggested   to   the

     Telecom   Ministry   that   spectrum   allocation   be   made

     through   a   transparent   tender   and   auction   process.

     This is confirmed by what the TRAI Chairman N. Misra

     told   the   CII   organized   conference   on   November   28,

     2008 (Annexure 2).  But Raja did not bother to listen to

     the TRAI either and pursued the process on `first come,

     first   served'   basis,   benefiting   those   who   had   inside

     information,   causing   a   loss   of   Rs.50,000   crores   to   the

     Government.     His   dubious   move   has   been   to   ensure

     benefit to others at the cost of the national exchequer."



     The   request   made   in   the   representation,   which   was   relied



upon   by   the   learned   Attorney   General   for   showing   that   the


                                                                                    6


appellant had himself asked for an investigation, is also extracted



below:



        "According   to   an   uncontradicted   report   in   CNN-IBN

        news channel of November 26, 2008, you are said to be

        "very   upset   with   A.   Raja   over   the   spectrum   allocation

        issue".        This   confirms   that   an   investigation   is

        necessary,   for   which   I   may   be   given   sanction   so   that

        the process of law can be initiated.



        I,   therefore,   writ   to   demand   the   grant   of   sanction   to

        prosecute   Mr.   A.   Raja,   Minister   for   Telecom   of   the

        Union   of   India   for   offences   under   the   Prevention   of

        Corruption   Act.     The   charges   in   brief   are   annexed

        herewith (Annexure 3)."  



   

4.      Since   the   appellant   did   not   receive   any   response   from



respondent   No.1,   he   sent   letters   dated   30.5.2009,   23.10.2009,



31.10.2009,   8.3.2010   and   13.3.2010   and   reiterated   his



request/demand   for   grant   of   sanction   to   prosecute   respondent



No.2.  In his letter dated 31.10.2009, the appellant referred to the



fact   that   on   being   directed   by   the   CVC,   the   Central   Bureau   of



Investigation   (CBI)   had   registered   a   first   information   report,   and



claimed   that  prima   facie  case   is   established   against   respondent



No.   2   for   his   prosecution   under   Sections   11   and   13(1)(d)   of   the



1988   Act.     The   appellant   also   claimed   that   according   to   various



Supreme   Court   judgments   it   was   not   necessary   to   carry   out   a



detailed   inquiry,   and   he   had   produced   sufficient   evidence   for


                                                                                    7


grant   of   sanction   to   initiate   criminal   prosecution   against



respondent No. 2 for the misuse of authority and pecuniary gains



from   corrupt   practices.     In   his   subsequent   letters,   the   appellant



again   asserted   that   the   nation   had   suffered   loss   of   nearly



Rs.65,000   crores   due   to   arbitrary,   unreasonable   and   mala   fide



action   of   respondent   No.2.     In   letter   dated   13.3.2010,   the



appellant   referred   to   the   proceedings   of   the   case   in   which   this



Court refused to interfere with the order of the Delhi High Court



declaring that the decision of respondent No.2 to change the cut



off   date   fixed   for   consideration   of   applications   made   for   grant   of



licences was arbitrary and mala fide.





5.    After  1 year and  4-1/2 months  of the  first letter  written by



him, Secretary, Department of Personnel and Training, Ministry of



Personnel sent letter dated 19.3.2010 to the appellant mentioning



therein that the CBI had registered a case on 21.10.2009 against



unknown officers of the Department of Telecommunications (DoT),



unknown   private   persons/companies   and   others   and   that   the



issue   of   grant   of   sanction   for   prosecution   would   arise   only   after



perusal of the evidence collected by the investigating agency and



other   material   provided   to   the   Competent   Authority   and   that   it


                                                                                      8


would  be premature to consider  sanction  for  prosecution  at that



stage.




6.    On   receipt   of   the   aforesaid   communication,   the   appellant



filed   Civil   Writ   Petition   No.   2442/2010   in   the   Delhi   High   Court



and prayed for issue of a mandamus to respondent No.1 to pass



an order for grant of sanction for prosecution of respondent No. 2.



The   Division   Bench   of   the   Delhi   High   Court   referred   to   the



submission of the learned Solicitor General that when respondent



No. 1 has directed investigation by the CBI and the investigation



is   in   progress,   it   is   not   permissible   to   take   a   decision   on   the



application of the appellant either to grant or refuse the sanction



because that may affect the investigation, and dismissed the writ



petition by recording the following observations:



      "The   question   that   emanates   for   consideration   is

      whether,   at   this   stage,   when   the   investigation   by   the

      CBI  is in   progress  and  this  Court  had  earlier  declined

      to   monitor   the   same   by   order   dated   25th  May,   2010,

      which   has   been   pressed   into   service   by   the   learned

      Solicitor   General   of   India,   it   would   be   appropriate   to

      direct   the   respondent   no.   1   to   take   a   decision   as

      regards   the   application   submitted   by   the   petitioner

      seeking sanction to prosecute.


      In   our   considered   opinion,   when   the   matter   is   being

      investigated   by   the   CBI,   and   the   investigation   is   in

      progress, it would not be in fitness of things to issue a

      mandamus to the first respondent to take a decision on

      the application of the petitioner."


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7.    The special leave petition filed by the appellant, out of which



this  appeal  arises,  was  initially  taken up  for  consideration   along



with SLP(C) No. 24873/2010 filed by the Center for Public Interest



Litigation   against   order   dated   25.5.2010   passed   by   the   Division



Bench of the High Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3522/2010 to



which  reference  had   been  made   in  the   impugned   order.    During



the   course   of   hearing   of   the   special   leave   petition   filed   by   the



appellant,   the   learned   Solicitor   General,   who   had   appeared   on



behalf of respondent No. 1, made a statement that he has got the



record   and   is   prepared   to   place   the   same   before   the   Court.



However,   keeping   in   view   the   fact   that   the   record   sought   to   be



produced   by   the   learned   Solicitor   General   may   not   be   readily



available   to   the   appellant,   the   Court   passed   order   dated



18.11.2010   requiring   the   filing   of   an   affidavit   on   behalf   of



respondent   No.   1.   Thereafter,   Shri   V.   Vidyavati,   Director   in   the



PMO filed affidavit dated 20.11.2010, which reveals the following



facts:




      "(i) On 1.12.2008, the Prime Minister perused the letter

      and noted "Please examine and let me know the facts of

      this case". This was marked to the Principal Secretary

      to   the   Prime   Minister   who   in   turn   marked   it   to   the

      Secretary. The Secretary marked it to me as Director in

      the   PMO.   I   prepared   a   note   dated   5.12.2008   factually


                                                                             10


summarizing   the   allegations   and   seeking   approval   to

obtain the factual position from the sectoral side (in the

PMO dealing with Telecommunications).


(ii)   On   11.12.2008,   a   copy   of   appellant's   letter   dated

29.11.2008   was   sent   to   the   Secretary,   Department   of

Telecommunication   for   submitting   a   factual   report.

The Department of Telecommunication sent reply dated

13.02.2009 incorporating his comments.


(iii)   In   the   meanwhile,   letters   dated   10.11.2008   and

22.11.2008   were   received   from   Shri   Gurudas   Gupta

and   Shri   Suravaran   Sudhakar   Reddy   respectively

(copies   of   these   letters   have   not   been   produced   before

the Court). The same were forwarded to the Department

of   Telecommunication   on   25.03.2009   for   sending   an

appropriate reply to the appellant.


(iv)   On   01.06.2009,   letter   dated   30.05.2009   received

from the appellant was placed before respondent No.1,

who   recorded   the   following   endorsement   "please

examine and discuss".


(v) On 19.06.2009, the Director of the concerned Sector

in   the   PMO   recorded   that   the   Minister   of

Telecommunications   and   Information   Technology   has

sent   D.O.   letter   dated   18.06.2009   to   the   appellant.

When   letter   dated   23.10.2009   of   the   appellant   was

placed   before   respondent   No.1,   he   recorded   an

endorsement on 27.10.2009 "please discuss".


(vi)    In   response   to   letter   dated   31.10.2009   of   the

appellant,   respondent   No.1   made   an   endorsement

"please examine".


(vii)   On   18.11.2009,   respondent   No.1   stated   that

Ministry   of   Law   and   Justice   should   examine   and

advice.  The   advice   of  Ministry  of  Law   and   Justice   was

received on 8.2.2010.  Para 7 thereof was as follows:


        "From the perusal of letter dated 23.10.2009 and

        31.10.2009,   it   is   noticed   that   Shri   Swamy   wants

        to   rely   upon   the   action   and   investigation   of   the

        CBI   to   collaborate   and   strengthen   the   said


                                                                                 11


            allegation   leveled   by   him   against   Shri   A.   Raja,

            Minister   for   Communication   and   Information

            Technology.  It  is  specifically  mentioned  in  Para  2

            of the letter dated 31.10.2009 of Shri Swamy that

            the   FIR   was   registered   by   the   CBI   and   "the

            substance   of   the   allegation   made   by   me   in   the

            above   cited   letters   to   you   are   already   under

            investigation". If it is so, then it may be stated that

            decision to accord of sanction of prosecution may

            be   determined   only   after   the   perusal   of   the

            evidence   (oral   or   documentary)   collected   by   the

            investigation agency, i.e., CBI and other materials

            to be provided to the competent authority."


      (viii) On 05.03.2010, the deponent prepared a note that

      an   appropriate   reply   be   sent   to   the   appellant   in   the

      light   of   the   advice   given   by   the   Law   Department   and

      final   reply   was   sent   to   the   appellant   after   respondent

      No.1 had approved note dated 17.03.2010."





8.    The   appellant   filed   rejoinder   affidavit   on   22.11.2010   along



with a copy of letter dated 18.6.2009 written to him by respondent



No. 2 in the context of representation dated 29.11.2008 submitted



by him to respondent No.1.




9.    Although,   respondent   No.2   resigned   from   the   Council   of



Ministers on 14.11.2010, the appellant submitted that the issues



relating   to   his   right   to   file   a   complaint   for   prosecution   of



respondent No.2 and grant of sanction within the time specified in



the judgment in Vineet Narain's case should be decided.


                                                                                      12


10.    During  the   course   of  hearing,   the   learned  Attorney  General



filed   written   submissions.     After   the   hearing   concluded,   the



learned Attorney General filed supplementary written submissions



along   with   a   compilation   of   126   cases   in   which   the   sanction   for



prosecution   is   awaited   for   periods   ranging   from   more   than   one



year to few months




11.    Final order in this case was deferred because it was felt that



the   directions   given   by   this   Court   in   Vineet   Narain's   case   may



require further elaboration in the light of the order passed in Civil



Appeal   No.   10660/2010   (arising   out   of   SLP(C)   No.   24873/2010)



and   the   fact   that   decision   on   the   question   of   grant   of   sanction



under the 1988 Act and other statutes is pending for a sufficiently



long time in 126 cases. However, as the investigation with regard



to some of the facets of what has come to be termed as 2G case is



yet   to   be   completed,   we   have   considered   it   appropriate   to   pass



final order in the matter.




12.    Appellant Dr. Subramanian Swamy argued that the embargo



contained in Section  19(1) of the  1988 Act operates only against



the   taking   of   cognizance   by   the   Court   in   respect   of   offences



punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 committed by a



public   servant,     but   there   is   no   bar   to   the   filing   of   a   private


                                                                                   13


complaint   for   prosecution   of   the   concerned   public   servant   and



grant   of   sanction   by   the   Competent   Authority,   and   that



respondent No. 1 was duty bound to take appropriate decision on



his representation within the time specified in clause I(15) of the



directions   contained   in   paragraph   58   of   Vineet   Narain's   case,



more   so   because   he   had   placed   sufficient   evidence   to   show   that



respondent No.2 had committed offences under the 1988 Act.




13.    The   learned   Attorney   General   argued   that   the   question   of



grant of sanction for prosecution of a public servant charged with



any of the offences enumerated in Section 19(1) arises only at the



stage when the Court decides to take cognizance and any request



made prior to that is premature.   He submitted that the embargo



contained   in   Section   19(1)   of   the   Act   is   applicable   to   the   Court



which   is   competent   to   take   cognizance   of   an   offence   punishable



under   Sections   7,   10,   11,   13   and   15   alleged   to   have   been



committed by a public servant and there is no provision for grant



of sanction at a stage before the competent Court applies its mind



to the issue of taking cognizance. Learned Attorney General relied



upon the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in Superintendent



and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v. Abani Kumar Banerjee AIR



1950 Cal. 437 as also the judgments of this Court in R.R. Chari v.


                                                                                  14


State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   1951   SCR   312,   Devarapalli



Lakshminarayana Reddy v. V. Narayana Reddy (1976) 3 SCC 252,



Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana (1987) 1 SCC 476, Krishna Pillai



v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 (Supp) SCC 121,  State of West Bengal v.



Mohd.   Khalid   (1995)   1   SCC   684,   State   through   C.B.I.   v.   Raj



Kumar   Jain   (1998)   6   SCC   551,   K.   Kalimuthu   v.   State   (2005)   4



SCC   512,   Centre   for   Public   Interest   Litigation   v.   Union   of   India



(2005) 8 SCC 202 and State of Karnataka v. Pastor P. Raju (2006)



6  SCC  728 and   argued  that   letter  dated  29.11.2008 sent by  the



appellant   for   grant   of   sanction   to   prosecute   respondent   No.2   for



the alleged offences under the 1988 Act was wholly misconceived



and   respondent   No.1   did   not   commit   any   illegality   or



constitutional impropriety by not entertaining his prayer, more so



because the appellant had himself asked for an investigation into



the   alleged   illegal   grant   of   licences   at   the   behest   of   respondent



No.2.  Learned Attorney General further argued that the appellant



does not have the  locus standi  to file a complaint for prosecuting



respondent   No.2   because   the   CBI   is   already   investigating   the



allegations of irregularity committed in the grant of licences for 2G



spectrum and the loss, if any, suffered by the Public Exchequer.


                                                                                     15


14.    We have considered the respective submissions.   Section 19



of the 1988 Act reads as under:



       "19. Previous sanction  necessary for  prosecution. -  (1)

       No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable

       under   sections   7,   10,   11,   13   and   15   alleged   to   have

       been   committed   by   a   public   servant,   except   with   the

       previous sanction, -


             (a)   in   the   case   of   a   person   who   is   employed   in

             connection with the affairs of the Union and is not

             removable   from   his   office   save   by   or   with   the

             sanction   of   the   Central   Government,   of   that

             Government;


             (b)   in   the   case   of   a   person   who   is   employed   in

             connection   with   the   affairs   of   a   State   and   is   not

             removable   from   his   office   save   by   or   with   the

             sanction   of   the   State   Government,   of   that

             Government;


             (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority

             competent to remove him from his office.



       (2)   Where   for   any   reason  whatsoever  any  doubt   arises

       as to whether the previous sanction as required under

       sub-section   (1)   should   be   given   by   the   Central

       Government   or   the   State   Government   or   any   other

       authority,   such   sanction   shall   be   given   by   that

       Government   or   authority   which   would   have   been

       competent to remove the public servant from his office

       at the time when the offence was alleged to have been

       committed.



       (3) Notwithstanding  anything  contained  in the  Code  of

       Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974),-  



             (a)   no   finding,   sentence   or   order   passed   by   a

             special   Judge   shall   be   reversed   or   altered   by   a

             court   in   appeal,   confirmation   or   revision   on   the

             ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or

             irregularity   in,   the   sanction   required   under   sub-


                                                                                    16


             section   (1),  unless  in  the  opinion  of  that  court,  a

             failure   of   justice   has   in   fact   been   occasioned

             thereby;



             (b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this

             Act   on   the   ground   of   any   error,   omission   or

             irregularity   in   the   sanction   granted   by   the

             authority,   unless   it   is   satisfied   that   such   error,

             omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of

             justice;



             (c)    no   court   shall   stay   the   proceedings   under

             this   Act   on   any   other   ground   and   no   court   shall

             exercise   the   powers   of   revision   in   relation   to   any

             interlocutory   order   passed   in   any   inquiry,   trial,

             appeal or other proceedings.



       (4)   In   determining   under   sub-section   (3)   whether   the

       absence   of,   or   any   error,   omission   or   irregularity   in,

       such sanction has occasioned or resulted in a failure of

       justice the court shall have regard to the  fact whether

       the objection could and should have been raised at any

       earlier stage in the proceedings.



             Explanation. - For the purposes of this section,



             (a)   error   includes   competency   of   the   authority   to

             grant sanction;



             (b)   a   sanction   required   for   prosecution   includes

             reference to any requirement that the prosecution

             shall be at the instance of a specified authority or

             with   the   sanction   of   a   specified   person   or   any

             requirement of a similar nature."




15.    The question whether sanction for prosecution of respondent



No.2 for the offences allegedly committed by him under the 1988



Act   is   required   even   after   he   resigned   from   the   Council   of



Ministers,   though   he   continues   to   be   a   Member   of   Parliament,


                                                                                     17


need not detain us because the same has already been answered



by the Constitution Bench in R. S. Nayak v. A. R. Antulay (1984) 2



SCC 183 the relevant portions of which are extracted below:




     "Now   if   the   public   servant   holds   two   offices   and   he   is

     accused   of   having   abused   one   and   from   which   he   is

     removed   but   continues   to   hold   the   other   which   is

     neither   alleged   to   have   been   used   (sic  misused)   nor

     abused,   is   a   sanction   of   the   authority   competent   to

     remove him  from  the  office  which  is neither  alleged or

     shown to have been abused or misused necessary? The

     submission   is   that   if   the   harassment   of   the   public

     servant   by   a   frivolous   prosecution   and   criminal   waste

     of   his   time   in   law   courts   keeping   him   away   from

     discharging   public   duty,   are   the   objects   underlying

     Section 6, the same would be defeated if it is held that

     the   sanction   of   the   latter   authority   is   not   necessary.

     The submission does not commend to us. We fail to see

     how   the   competent   authority   entitled   to   remove   the

     public servant from an office which is neither alleged to

     have been used (sic  misused) or abused would be able

     to   decide   whether   the   prosecution   is   frivolous   or

     tendentious.   An   illustration   was   posed   to   the   learned

     counsel   that   a   minister   who   is   indisputably   a   public

     servant   greased   his   palms   by   abusing   his   office   as

     minister, and then ceased to hold the office before the

     court was called upon to take cognizance of the offence

     against him and therefore, sanction as contemplated by

     Section   6   would   not   be   necessary;   but   if   after

     committing the offence and before the date of taking of

     cognizance of the offence, he was elected as a Municipal

     President   in   which   capacity   he   was   a   public   servant

     under the relevant municipal law, and was holding that

     office   on   the   date   on   which   court   proceeded   to   take

     cognizance   of   the   offence   committed   by   him   as   a

     minister, would a sanction be necessary and that too of

     that authority competent to remove him from the office

     of   the   Municipal   President.   The   answer   was   in

     affirmative.   But   the   very   illustration   would   show   that

     such   cannot   be   the   law.   Such   an   interpretation   of


                                                                                    18


     Section   6   would   render   it   as   a   shield   to   an

     unscrupulous   public   servant.   Someone   interested   in

     protecting   may   shift   him   from   one   office   of   public

     servant   to   another   and   thereby   defeat   the   process   of

     law. One can legitimately envisage a situation  wherein

     a   person   may   hold   a   dozen   different   offices,   each   one

     clothing him with the status of a public servant under

     Section   21   IPC   and   even   if   he   has   abused   only   one

     office   for   which   either   there   is   a   valid   sanction   to

     prosecute   him   or   he   has   ceased   to   hold   that   office   by

     the time court was called upon to take cognizance, yet

     on this assumption, sanction of 11 different competent

     authorities   each   of   which   was   entitled   to   remove   him

     from   11   different   public   offices   would   be   necessary

     before   the   court   can   take   cognizance   of   the   offence

     committed   by   such   public   servant,   while   abusing   one

     office   which   he   may   have   ceased   to   hold.  Such   an

     interpretation is contrary to all canons of construction

     and leads to an absurd end product which of necessity

     must   be   avoided.   Legislation   must   at   all   costs   be

     interpreted in such a way that it would not operate as a

     rogue's charter.



     We   would   however,   like   to   make   it   abundantly   clear

     that if the two decisions purport to lay down that even

     if   a   public   servant   has   ceased   to   hold   that   office   as

     public   servant   which   he   is   alleged   to   have   abused   or

     misused for corrupt motives, but on the date of taking

     cognizance   of   an   offence   alleged   to   have   been

     committed by him as a public servant which he ceased

     to be and holds an entirely different public office which

     he   is   neither   alleged   to   have   misused   or   abused   for

     corrupt   motives,   yet   the   sanction   of   authority

     competent to remove him from such latter office would

     be   necessary   before   taking   cognizance   of   the   offence

     alleged   to   have   been   committed   by   the   public   servant

     while   holding   an   office   which   he   is   alleged   to   have

     abused   or   misused   and   which   he   has   ceased   to   hold,

     the decision in our opinion, do not lay down the correct

     law   and   cannot   be   accepted   as   making   a   correct

     interpretation of Section 6."


                                                                                    19




16.    The same view has been taken in Habibullsa Khan v. State of



Orissa (1995) 2 SCC  437 (para 12), State of H.P. v. M. P. Gupta



(2004)   2   SCC   349   (paras   17   and   19),   Parkash   Singh   Badal   v.



State of Punjab (2007) 1 SCC 1 and Balakrishnan Ravi Menon v.



Union  of India  (2007) 1 SCC  45.   In Balakrishnan  Ravi  Menon's



case, it was argued that the observations made in para 25 of the



judgment   in   Antulay's   case   are   obiter.     While   negating   this



submission, the Court observed :    



       "Hence, it is difficult to accept the contention raised by

       Mr.   U.R.   Lalit,   the   learned  Senior   Counsel   for   the

       petitioner that the aforesaid finding given by this Court

       in Antulay case is obiter.



       Further, under Section 19 of the PC Act, sanction is to

       be   given   by   the   Government   or   the   authority   which

       would   have   been   competent   to   remove   the   public

       servant from his office at the time when the offence was

       alleged   to   have   been   committed.   The   question   of

       obtaining   sanction   would   arise   in   a   case   where   the

       offence has been committed by a public servant who is

       holding   the   office   and   by   misusing   or   abusing   the

       powers of the office, he has committed the offence. The

       word "office" repeatedly used in Section 19 would mean

       the "office" which the public servant misuses or abuses

       by   corrupt   motive   for   which   he   is   to   be   prosecuted.

       Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 19 are as under:



             "19.  Previous   sanction   necessary   for   prosecution.

             --(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence

             punishable   under   Sections   7,   10,   11,   13   and   15

             alleged   to   have   been   committed   by   a   public

             servant, except with the previous sanction,--

             (a)   in   the   case   of   a   person   who   is   employed   in

             connection with the affairs of the Union and is not


                                                                                   20


        removable   from   his   office   save   by   or   with   the

        sanction   of   the   Central   Government,   of   that

        Government;



        (b)   in   the   case   of   a   person   who   is   employed   in

        connection   with   the   affairs   of   a   State   and   is   not

        removable   from   his   office   save   by   or   with   the

        sanction   of   the   State   Government,   of   that

        Government;



        (c) in the case of any other person, of the authority

        competent to remove him from his office.



        (2)   Where   for   any   reason   whatsoever   any   doubt

        arises   as   to   whether   the   previous   sanction   as

        required under sub-section (1) should be given by

        the Central Government or the State Government

        or   any   other   authority,   such   sanction   shall   be

        given   by   that   Government   or   authority   which

        would  have  been competent to  remove the  public

        servant   from   his   office   at   the   time   when   the

        offence was alleged to have been committed."



C
  lauses  (
             a
               )
                  and ( b
                         )
                          of sub-section (1) specifically provide

that   in   case   of   a   person   who   is   employed   and   is   not

removable from his office by the Central Government or

th
     e State Government, as the case may be,   sa
                                                                 nction    to

prosecute   is   required   to   be   obtained   either   from   the

Central   Government   or   the   State   Government.   The

emphasis   is   on   the   words   "who   is   employed"   in

connection   with   the   affairs   of   the   Union   or   the   State

Government.   If   he   is   not   employed   then   Section   19

nowhere provides for obtaining such sanction. Further,

under   sub-section   (2),   the   question   of   obtaining

sanction   is   relatable   to   the   time   of   holding   the   office

when the  offence was alleged to have been committed.

In case where the person is not holding the said office

as he might have retired, superannuated, be discharged

or   dismissed  then  the   question   of  removing  would  not

arise.   Admittedly,   when   the   alleged   offence   was

committed, the petitioner was appointed by the Central

Government. He demitted his office after completion of


                                                                                 21


       five years' tenure. Therefore, at the relevant time when

       the   charge-sheet   was   filed,   the   petitioner   was   not

       holding the office of the Chairman of Goa Shipyard Ltd.

       Hence,   there   is   no   question   of   obtaining   any   previous

       sanction of the Central Government."



                                                    (emphasis supplied)




17.    The same view was reiterated in Parkash Singh Badal's case



and the argument that even though some of the accused persons



had ceased to be Ministers, they continued to be the Members of



the   Legislative   Assembly   and   one   of   them   was   a   Member   of



Parliament   and   as   such   cognizance   could   not   be   taken   against



them without prior sanction, was rejected.




18.    The   next   question   which   requires   consideration   is   whether



the   appellant   has   the  locus   standi  to   file   a   complaint   for



prosecution   of   respondent   No.2   for   the   offences   allegedly



committed   by   him   under   the   1988   Act.       There   is   no   provision



either   in   the   1988   Act   or   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure,   1973



(CrPC) which bars a citizen from filing a complaint for prosecution



of a public servant who  is alleged to have committed an  offence.



Therefore, the argument of the learned Attorney General that the



appellant cannot file a complaint for prosecuting respondent No.2



merits   rejection.     A   similar   argument   was   negatived   by   the



Constitution   Bench   in   A.R.   Antulay   v.   Ramdas   Sriniwas   Nayak


                                                                                  22


(1984) 2 SCC 500.   The facts of that case show that on a private



complaint   filed   by   the   respondent,   the   Special   Judge   took



cognizance   of   the   offences   allegedly   committed   by   the   appellant.



The latter objected to the jurisdiction of the Special Judge on two



counts, including the one that the Court set up under Section 6 of



the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (for short, `the 1952 Act')



was   not   competent   to   take   cognizance   of   any   of   the   offences



enumerated   in   Section   6(1)(a)   and   (b)   upon   a   private   complaint.



His   objections   were   rejected   by   the   Special   Judge.     The   revision



filed by the appellant was heard by the Division Bench of the High



Court   which   ruled   that   a   Special   Judge   is   competent   and   is



entitled   to   take   cognizance   of   offences   under   Section   6(1)(a)   and



(b)   on   a   private   complaint   of   the   facts   constituting   the   offence.



The High Court was of the opinion that a prior investigation under



Section   5A   of   the   Prevention   of   Corruption   Act,   1947   (for   short,



`the 1947 Act') by a police officer of the designated rank is not sine



qua non  for taking cognizance of an offence under Section 8(1) of



the   1952   Act.    Before  the   Supreme   Court,   the   argument  against



the  locus   standi  of   the   respondent   was   reiterated   and   it   was



submitted that  Section   5A of the  1947  Act is mandatory  and an



investigation by the designated officer is a condition precedent to


                                                                                   23


the   taking   of   cognizance   by   the   Special   Judge   of   an   offence   or



offences   committed   by   a   public   servant.   While   dealing   with   the



issue   relating   to   maintainability   of   a   private   complaint,   the



Constitution Bench observed:



      "It   is   a   well   recognised   principle   of   criminal

      jurisprudence  that  anyone  can  set or  put  the  criminal

      law   into   motion   except   where   the   statute   enacting   or

      creating   an   offence   indicates   to   the   contrary.   The

      scheme   of   the   Code   of   Criminal   Procedure   envisages

      two   parallel   and   independent   agencies   for   taking

      criminal   offences   to   court.   Even   for   the   most   serious

      offence   of   murder,   it   was   not   disputed   that   a   private

      complaint can, not only be filed but can be entertained

      and   proceeded   with   according   to   law.  Locus   standi   of

      the   complainant   is   a   concept   foreign   to   criminal

      jurisprudence   save   and   except   that   where   the   statute

      creating   an   offence   provides   for   the   eligibility   of   the

      complainant,   by   necessary   implication   the   general

      principle   gets   excluded   by   such   statutory   provision.

      Numerous   statutory   provisions,   can   be   referred   to   in

      support of this legal position such as (i) Section 187-A

      of Sea Customs Act, 1878 (ii) Section 97 of Gold Control

      Act,   1968   (iii)   Section   6   of   Import   and   Export   Control

      Act,   1947   (iv)   Section   271   and   Section   279   of   the

      Income   Tax   Act,   1961   (v)   Section   61   of   the   Foreign

      Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, (vi) Section 621 of the

      Companies   Act,   1956   and   (vii)   Section   77   of   the

      Electricity Supply  Act. This list is only  illustrative  and

      not   exhaustive.  While   Section   190   of   the   Code   of

      Criminal   Procedure   permits   anyone   to   approach   the

      Magistrate  with  a complaint, it does not  prescribe any

      qualification  the  complainant  is required to fulfil to be

      eligible   to   file   a   complaint.   But   where   an   eligibility

      criterion   for   a   complainant   is   contemplated   specific

      provisions   have   been   made   such   as   to   be   found   in

      Sections   195   to   199   of   the   CrPC.   These   specific

      provisions   clearly   indicate   that   in   the   absence   of   any

      such   statutory   provision,   a   locus   standi   of   a


                                                                                   24


     complainant   is   a   concept   foreign   to   criminal

     jurisprudence.  In   other   words,   the   principle   that

     anyone   can   set   or   put   the   criminal   law   in   motion

     remains   intact   unless   contra-indicated   by   a   statutory

     provision.   This   general   principle   of   nearly   universal

     application   is   founded   on   a   policy   that   an   offence   i.e.

     an act or omission made punishable by any law for the

     time being in force is not merely an offence committed

     relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an

     offence   against   society.   The   society   for   its   orderly   and

     peaceful   development   is   interested   in   the   punishment

     of   the   offender.   Therefore,   prosecution   for   serious

     offences   is   undertaken   in   the   name   of   the   State

     representing   the   people   which   would   exclude   any

     element of private vendetta or vengeance. If such is the

     public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an

     act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of

     the   authority   competent   to   deal   with   it,   is   immaterial

     and   irrelevant   unless   the   statute   indicates   to   the

     contrary. Punishment of the offender in the interest of

     the   society   being   one   of   the   objects   behind   penal

     statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to

     initiate   proceedings   cannot   be   whittled   down,

     circumscribed   or   fettered   by   putting   it   into   a   strait-

     jacket   formula   of   locus   standi   unknown   to   criminal

     jurisprudence,   save   and   except   specific   statutory

     exception. To hold that such an exception exists that a

     private   complaint  for  offences  of  corruption  committed

     by public servant is not maintainable, the court would

     require   an   unambiguous   statutory   provision   and   a

     tangled   web   of   argument   for   drawing   a   far   fetched

     implication,   cannot   be   a   substitute   for   an   express

     statutory provision."



                                                    (emphasis supplied)



     The Constitution Bench then considered whether the Special



Judge can take cognizance only on the basis of a police report and



answered the same in negative in the following words:


                                                                             25


"In   the   matter   of   initiation   of   proceeding   before   a

Special Judge under Section 8(1), the Legislature while

conferring   power   to   take   cognizance   had   three

opportunities to unambiguously state its mind whether

the cognizance can be taken on a private complaint or

not.   The   first   one   was   an   opportunity   to   provide   in

Section   8(1)   itself   by   merely   stating   that   the   Special

Judge   may   take   cognizance   of   an   offence   on   a   police

report   submitted   to   it   by   an   investigating   officer

conducting investigation as contemplated by Section 5-

A. While providing for investigation by designated police

officers  of   superior   rank,   the   Legislature   did  not   fetter

the   power   of   Special   Judge   to   take   cognizance   in   a

manner   otherwise   than   on   police   report.   The   second

opportunity   was   when   by   Section   8(3)   a   status   of   a

deemed   public   prosecutor   was   conferred   on   a   private

complainant  if he  chooses to  conduct  the  prosecution.

The Legislature being aware of a provision like the one

contained   in   Section   225   of   the   CrPC,   could   have   as

well provided that in every trial before a Special Judge

the   prosecution   shall   be   conducted   by   a   Public

Prosecutor,   though   that   itself   would   not   have   been

decisive   of   the   matter.   And   the   third   opportunity   was

when   the   Legislature   while   prescribing   the   procedure

prescribed   for   warrant   cases   to   be   followed   by   Special

Judge   did   not   exclude   by   a   specific   provision   that   the

only   procedure   which   the   Special   Judge   can   follow   is

the one prescribed for trial of warrant cases on a police

report.  The   disinclination   of   the   Legislature   to   so

provide   points   to   the   contrary   and   no   canon   of

construction   permits   the   court   to   go   in   search   of   a

hidden or implied limitation on the power of the Special

Judge   to   take   cognizance   unfettered   by   such

requirement of its being done on a police report alone.

In   our   opinion,   it   is   no   answer   to   this   fairly   well-

established legal position  that for the  last 32 years no

case   has   come   to   the   notice   of   the   court   in   which

cognizance  was  taken  by a  Special Judge  on  a private

complaint for offences punishable under the 1947 Act."



                                              (emphasis supplied)


                                                                                         26


      The   Court   then   referred  to   Section   5A   of   the   1947   Act,   the



provisions   of   the   1952   Act,   the   judgments   in   H.N.   Rishbud   and



Inder Singh v. State of Delhi (1955) 1 SCR 1150, State of M.P. v.



Mubarak Ali 1959 Supp. (2) SCR 201, Union  of India v. Mahesh



Chandra AIR 1957 M.B. 43 and held:



      "Having carefully examined these judgments in the light

      of   the   submissions   made,   the   only   conclusion   that

      unquestionably   emerges   is   that   Section   5-A   is   a

      safeguard   against   investigation   of   offences   committed

      by public servants, by petty or lower rank police officer.

      It has nothing to do directly or indirectly with the mode

      and   method   of   taking   cognizance   of   offences   by   the

      Court   of   Special   Judge.  It   also   follows   as   a   necessary

      corollary that provision of Section 5-A is not a condition

      precedent to initiation of proceedings before the Special

      Judge   who   acquires   power   under   Section   8(1)   to   take

      co
           gnizance   of   offences   enumerated   in   Section   6(1)( a
                                                                                   )
                                                                                   

      a
        nd   ( b
                ),
                    with   this   limitation   alone   that   it   shall   not   be

      upon commitment to him by the Magistrate.


      Once   the   contention   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   that

      investigation   under   Section   5-A   is   a   condition

      precedent   to   the   initiation   of   proceedings   before   a

      Special   Judge   and   therefore   cognizance   of   an   offence

      cannot  be taken except upon a police report, does not

      commend   to   us   and   has   no   foundation   in   law,   it   is

      unnecessary   to   refer   to   the   long   line   of   decisions

      co
           mmencing   from   Ta
                                       ylor    v.   Ta
                                                       ylor ;    N
                                                                 azir   Ahmad    v.

      Kin
            g-Emperor        and   ending   with               C
                                                                hettiam   Veettil

      A
        mmad    v.   Ta
                            luk   Land   Board ,    laying   down   hitherto

      uncontroverted   legal   principle   that   where   a   statute

      requires   to   do   a   certain   thing   in   a   certain   way,   the

      thing   must   be   done   in   that   way   or   not   at   all.   Other

      methods of performance are necessarily forbidden.


      Once   Section   5-A   is   out   of   the   way   in   the   matter   of

      taking   cognizance   of   offences   committed   by   public

      servants   by   a   Special   Judge,   the   power   of   the   Special


                                                                              27


Judge to take cognizance of such offences conferred by

Section 8(1) with only one limitation, in any one of the

known   methods   of   taking   cognizance   of   offences   by

courts   of   original   jurisdiction   remains   undented.   One

such   statutorily   recognised   well-known   method   of

taking   cognizance   of   offences   by   a   court   competent   to

take   cognizance   is   upon   receiving  a   complaint  of   facts

which   constitutes   the   offence.   And   Section   8(1)   says

that   the   Special   Judge   has   the   power   to   take

cognizance   of   offences   enumerated   in   Section   6(1)(a)

and   (b)   and   the   only   mode   of   taking   cognizance

excluded   by   the   provision   is   upon   commitment.  It

therefore,   follows   that   the   Special   Judge   can   take

cognizance   of   offences   committed   by   public   servants

upon   receiving   a   complaint   of   facts   constituting   such

offences.


It was, however, submitted that  even if it be held that

the   Special   Judge   is   entitled   to   entertain   a   private

complaint,   no   further   steps   can   be   taken   by   him

without directing an investigation under Section 5-A so

that the safeguard of Section 5-A is not whittled down.

This   is   the   selfsame   argument   under   a   different

apparel.   Accepting   such   a   submission   would

tantamount   to  saying   that   on   receipt   of   the   complaint

the   Special   Judge   must   direct   an   investigation   under

Section 5-A, There is no warrant for such an approach.

Astounding as it appeared to us, in all solemnity it was

submitted that investigation of an offence by a superior

police   officer   affords   a   more   solid   safeguard   compared

to   a   court.  Myopic   as  this   is,  it   would   topsy  turvy  the

fundamental   belief   that   to   a   person   accused   of   an

offence there  is no  better safeguard than  a court.  And

this   is   constitutionally   epitomised   in   Article   22   that

upon   arrest   by   police,   the   arrested   person   must   be

produced  before  the   nearest  Magistrate  within  twenty-

four hours of the arrest. Further, numerous provisions

of the Code of Criminal Procedure such as Section 161,

Section 164, and Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act

would   show   the   Legislature's   hesitation   in   placing

confidence   on   police   officers   away   from   court's   gaze.

And   the   very   fact   that   power   is   conferred   on   a

Presidency Magistrate or Magistrate of the first class to


                                                                                       28


       permit police officers of lower rank to investigate these

       offences   would   speak   for   the   mind   of   the   Legislature

       that   the   court   is   a   more   reliable   safeguard   than   even

       superior police officers."


                                                       (emphasis supplied)





19.    In view of the aforesaid judgment of the Constitution Bench,



it must be held that the appellant has the right to file a complaint



for   prosecution   of   respondent   No.2   in   respect   of   the   offences



allegedly committed by him under the 1988 Act.




20.    The   argument   of   the   learned   Attorney   General   that   the



question  of granting sanction  for prosecution  of a public servant



charged   with   an   offence   under   the   1988   Act   arises   only   at   the



stage   of   taking   cognizance   and   not   before   that   is   neither



supported   by   the   plain   language   of   the   section   nor   the   judicial



precedents relied upon by him.  Though, the term `cognizance' has



not been defined either in the 1988 Act or the CrPC, the same has



acquired a definite meaning and connotation from various judicial



precedents.  In legal parlance cognizance is "taking judicial notice



by the court of law, possessing jurisdiction, on a cause or matter



presented before it so as to decide whether there is any basis for



initiating   proceedings   and   determination   of   the   cause   or   matter



judicially".     In   R.   R.   Chari   v.   State   of   U.P.   (1951)   SCR   312,   the


                                                                                  29


three Judge Bench approved the  following  observations  made by



the Calcutta High Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of



Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Abni Kumar Banerjee (supra):




     "What is taking cognizance has not been defined in the

     Criminal   Procedure   Code   and   I   have   no   desire   to

     attempt to define it. It seems to me clear however that

     before   it   can   be   said   that   any   magistrate   has   taken

     cognizance   of   any   offence   under   section   190(1)(a),

     Criminal   Procedure  Code,   he   must   not   only   have

     applied his mind to the contents of the petition but he

     must  have   done   so  for   the   purpose   of  proceeding   in  a

     particular   way   as   indicated   in   the   subsequent

     provisions   of   this   Chapter   -   proceeding   under   section

     200   and   thereafter   sending   it   for   inquiry   and   report

     under   section   202.   When   the   magistrate   applies   his

     mind   not   for   the   purpose   of   proceeding   under   the

     subsequent   sections   of   this   Chapter,   but   for   taking

     action   of   some   other   kind,   e.g.   ordering   investigation

     under   section   156(3),   or   issuing   a   search   warrant   for

     the   purpose   of   the   investigation,   he   cannot   be   said   to

     have taken cognizance of the offence."





21.   In  Mohd. Khalid's case, the Court referred to Section 190 of



the CrPC and observed :




     "In its broad and literal sense, it means taking notice of

     an   offence.   This   would   include   the   intention   of

     initiating   judicial   proceedings   against   the   offender   in

     respect   of   that   offence   or   taking   steps   to   see   whether

     there is any  basis for  initiating  judicial  proceedings or

     for other purposes. The word `cognizance' indicates the

     point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial

     notice of an offence. It is entirely a different thing from

     initiation   of   proceedings;   rather   it   is   the   condition

     precedent   to   the   initiation   of   proceedings   by   the


                                                                                   30


       Magistrate   or   the   Judge.  Cognizance   is   taken   of   cases

       and not of persons."



22.    In Pastor P. Raju's case, this Court referred to the provisions



of Chapter XIV and Sections 190 and 196 (1-A) of the CrPC and



observed :





       "There is no bar against registration of a criminal case

       or investigation by the police agency or submission of a

       report   by   the   police   on   completion   of   investigation,   as

       contemplated by Section 173 CrPC. If a criminal case is

       registered, investigation   of the   offence  is done   and the

       police submits a report as a result of such investigation

       before a Magistrate without the previous sanction of the

       Central   Government   or   of   the   State   Government   or   of

       the   District   Magistrate,   there   will   be   no   violation   of

       Section   196(1-A)   CrPC   and   no   illegality   of   any   kind

       would be committed."





       The Court then referred to some of the precedents including



the judgment in Mohd. Khalid's case and observed :




       "It is necessary to mention here that taking cognizance

       of   an   offence   is   not   the   same   thing   as   issuance   of

       process.   Cognizance   is   taken   at   the   initial   stage   when

       the   Magistrate   applies   his   judicial   mind   to  the  facts

       mentioned in a complaint or to a police report or upon

       information   received   from   any   other   person   that   an

       offence has been committed. The issuance of process is

       at   a   subsequent   stage   when   after   considering   the

       material   placed   before   it   the   court   decides   to   proceed

       against the offenders against whom  a prima facie case

       is made out."


                                                                                  31


23.    In   Kalimuthu's   case,   the   only   question   considered   by   this



Court   was   whether   in   the   absence   of   requisite   sanction   under



Section  197 CrPC, the Special Judge for CBI  cases, Chennai did



not   have   the   jurisdiction   to   take   cognizance   of   the   alleged



offences.     The   High   Court   had   taken   the   view   that   Section   197



was   not   applicable   to   the   appellant's   case.     Affirming   the   view



taken by the High Court, this Court observed :




       "The   question   relating   to   the   need   of   sanction   under

       Section   197   of   the   Code   is   not   necessarily   to   be

       considered  as  soon   as  the   complaint  is  lodged  and   on

       the   allegations   contained   therein.   This   question   may

       arise   at   any   stage   of   the   proceeding.   The   question

       whether   sanction   is   necessary   or   not   may   have   to   be

       determined from stage to stage. Further, in cases where

       offences   under   the   Act   are   concerned,   the   effect   of

       Section 197, dealing with the question of prejudice has

       also to be noted."





24.    In Raj Kumar Jain's case, this Court considered the question



whether   the   CBI   was   required   to   obtain   sanction   from   the



prosecuting authority before approaching the Court for accepting



the  report under  Section  173(2) of the  CrPC.   This question  was



considered   in   the   backdrop   of   the   fact   that   the   CBI,   which   had



investigated   the   case   registered   against   the   respondent   under



Section  5(2) read with  Section  5(1)(e) of  the  1947 Act found that



the   allegation   made   against   the   respondent   could   not   be


                                                                                  32


substantiated.     The   Special   Judge   declined   to   accept   the   report



submitted   under   Section   173(2)   CrPC   by   observing   that   the   CBI



was   required   to   place   materials   collected   during   investigation



before   the   sanctioning   authority   and   it   was   for   the   concerned



authority  to grant or  refuse sanction.    The Special Judge opined



that only after the decision of the sanctioning authority, the CBI



could   submit   the   report   under   Section   173(2).     The   High   Court



dismissed the petition filed by the CBI and confirmed the order of



the Special Judge.  This Court referred to Section 6(1) of the 1947



Act and observed:




      "From   a   plain   reading   of   the   above   section   it   is

      evidently   clear   that   a   court   cannot   take   cognizance   of

      the offences mentioned therein without sanction of the

      appropriate   authority.   In   enacting   the   above   section,

      the   legislature   thought   of   providing   a   reasonable

      protection   to   public   servants   in   the   discharge   of   their

      official functions so that they may perform  their  duties

      and   obligations   undeterred   by   vexatious   and

      unnecessary   prosecutions.   Viewed  in   that   context,   the

      CBI   was   under   no   obligation   to   place   the   materials

      collected   during   investigation   before   the   sanctioning

      authority, when they found that no case was made out

      against the respondent. To put it differently, if the CBI

      had found on investigation that a prima facie case was

      made out against the respondent to place him on trial

      and   accordingly   prepared   a   charge-sheet   (challan)

      against   him,   then   only   the   question   of   obtaining

      sanction of the authority under Section 6(1) of the Act

      would have arisen for without that the Court would not

      be competent to take cognizance of the charge-sheet. It

      must,  therefore,   be   said   that   both   the   Special   Judge

      and   the   High   Court   were   patently   wrong   in   observing


                                                                                 33


       that  the CBI was required to obtain  sanction  from  the

       prosecuting authority before approaching the Court for

       accepting the report under Section 173(2) CrPC."





25.    In   our   view,   the   decisions   relied   upon   by   the   learned



Attorney   General   do   not   have   any   bearing   on   the   moot   question



whether   respondent   No.1,   being   the   Competent   Authority   to



sanction   prosecution   of   respondent   No.2,   was   required   to   take



appropriate   decision   in   the   light   of   the   direction   contained   in



Vineet Narain's case.




26.    Before  proceeding  further,  we  would  like  to  add  that  at   the



time of taking cognizance of the offence, the Court is required to



consider the averments made in the complaint or the charge sheet



filed  under   Section  173.    It   is  not   open  for   the  Court   to   analyse



the  evidence  produced  at  that   stage  and  come  to  the  conclusion



that no prima facie case is made out for proceeding further in the



matter. However,  before  issuing the  process, it that   it is open to



the   Court   to   record   the   evidence   and   on   consideration   of   the



averments made in the complaint and the evidence thus adduced,



find out whether  an offence has been made out. On finding that



such an offence has been made out the Court may direct the issue



of process to the respondent and take further steps in the matter.


                                                                                   34


If   it   is   a   charge-sheet   filed   under   Section   173   CrPC,   the   facts



stated by the prosecution in the charge-sheet, on the basis of the



evidence collected during investigation, would disclose the offence



for which cognizance would be taken by the Court. Thus, it is not



the province of the Court at that stage to embark upon and shift



the evidence to come to the conclusion whether or not an offence



has been made out.




27.    We may also observe that grant or refusal of sanction is not



a quasi judicial function and the person for whose prosecution the



sanction is sought is not required to be heard by the Competent



Authority   before   it   takes   a   decision   in   the   matter.       What   is



required   to   be   seen   by   the   Competent   Authority   is   whether   the



facts   placed   before   it   which,   in   a   given   case,   may   include   the



material collected by the complainant or the investigating agency



prima facie disclose commission of an offence by a public servant.



If   the   Competent   Authority   is   satisfied   that   the   material   placed



before it is sufficient for prosecution of the public servant, then it



is required to grant sanction. If the satisfaction of the Competent



Authority is otherwise, then it can refuse sanction. In either case,



the decision taken on the complaint made by a citizen is required


                                                                                  35


to   be   communicated   to   him   and   if   he   feels   aggrieved   by   such



decision, then he can avail appropriate legal remedy.




28.    In   Vineet   Narain's   case,   the   Court   entertained   the   writ



petitions   filed   in   public   interest   for   ensuring   investigation   into



what   came   to   be   known   as   `Hawala   case'.     The   writ   petition



remained   pending   for   almost   four   years.     During   that   period,



several   interim   orders  were   passed  which  are  reported   as  Vineet



Narain v. Union of India 1996 (1) SCALE (SP) 42, Vineet Narain v.



Union of India (1996) 2 SCC 199, Vineet Narain v. Union of India



(1997)   4   SCC   778   and   Vineet   Narain   v.   Union   of   India   (1997)   5



SCALE 254.  The final order was passed in Vineet Narain v. Union



of   India   (1998)   1   SCC   226.     In   (1996)   2   SCC   199,   the   Court



referred   to   the   allegations   made   in   the   writ   petition   that



Government   agencies   like   the   CBI   and   the   revenue   authorities



have failed to perform their duties and legal obligations inasmuch



as they did not investigate into the matters arising out of seizure



of   the   so-called   "Jain   Diaries"   in   certain   raids   conducted   by   the



CBI. The Court took note of the allegation that the arrest of some



terrorists  led   to   the   discovery   of   financial   support   to   them   by



clandestine   and   illegal   means   and   a   nexus   between   several



important   politicians,   bureaucrats   and   criminals,   who   were


                                                                                  36


recipients   of   money   from   unlawful   sources,   and   proceeded   to



observe:




       "The   facts   and   circumstances   of   the   present   case   do

       indicate that it is of utmost public importance that this

       matter is examined thoroughly by this Court to ensure

       that   all   government   agencies,   entrusted   with   the   duty

       to   discharge   their   functions   and   obligations   in

       accordance with law, do so, bearing in mind constantly

       the   concept   of   equality   enshrined   in   the   Constitution

       and the basic tenet of rule of law: "Be you ever so high,

       the   law   is   above   you."   Investigation   into   every

       accusation   made   against   each   and   every   person   on   a

       reasonable basis, irrespective of the position and status

       of   that   person,   must   be   conducted   and   completed

       expeditiously.   This   is   imperative   to   retain   public

       confidence  in the  impartial  working of  the  government

       agencies."




29.    After   examining   various   facets   of   the   matter   in   detail,   the



three Judge Bench in its final order reported in (1998) 1 SCC 226



observed :




       "These principles of public life are of general application

       in every democracy and one is expected to bear them in

       mind while scrutinising the conduct of every holder of a

       public office. It is trite that the holders of public offices

       are   entrusted   with   certain   powers   to   be   exercised   in

       public interest alone and, therefore, the office is held by

       them   in   trust   for   the   people.   Any   deviation   from   the

       path of rectitude by any of them amounts to a breach of

       trust and must be severely dealt with instead of being

       pushed under the carpet. If the conduct amounts to an

       offence,   it   must   be   promptly   investigated   and   the

       offender against whom  a prima facie case is made out

       should be prosecuted expeditiously so that the majesty

       of law is upheld and the rule of law vindicated. It is the


                                                                                     37


       duty   of   the   judiciary   to   enforce   the   rule   of   law   and,

       therefore, to guard against erosion of the rule of law.


       The   adverse   impact   of   lack   of   probity   in   public   life

       leading   to   a   high   degree   of   corruption   is   manifold.   It

       also   has   adverse   effect   on   foreign   investment   and

       funding from the International Monetary Fund and the

       World   Bank   who   have   warned   that   future   aid   to

       underdeveloped   countries   may   be   subject   to   the

       requisite   steps   being   taken   to   eradicate   corruption,

       which   prevents   international   aid   from   reaching   those

       for whom it is meant. Increasing corruption has led to

       investigative   journalism   which   is   of   value   to   a   free

       society.   The   need   to   highlight   corruption   in   public   life

       through   the   medium   of   public   interest   litigation

       invoking judicial review may be frequent in India but is

       not unknown in other countries: R. v. Secy. of State for

       Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs."




       In   paragraph   58   of   the   judgment,   the   Court   gave   several



directions   in   relation   to   the   CBI,   the   CVC   and   the   Enforcement



Directorate.     In   para   58   (I)(15),   the   Court   gave   the   following



direction:




       "Time-limit   of   three   months   for   grant   of   sanction   for

       prosecution   must   be   strictly   adhered   to.   However,

       additional   time   of   one   month   may   be   allowed   where

       consultation is required with the Attorney General (AG)

       or any other law officer in the AG's office."



30.    The   CVC,   after   taking   note   of   the   judgment   of   the   Punjab



and Haryana High Court in Jagjit Singh v. State of Punjab (1996)



Crl. Law Journal 2962, State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma 1991 Supp.



1 SCC 222, Superintendent of Police (CBI) v. Deepak Chowdhary,


                                                                                38


(1995)   6   SC   225,   framed   guidelines   which   were   circulated   vide



office order No.31/5/05 dated 12.5.2005.  The relevant clauses of



the guidelines are extracted below:




      "2(i) Grant   of   sanction   is   an   administrative   act.     The

      purpose   is   to   protect   the   public   servant   from

      harassment   by   frivolous   or   vexatious   prosecution   and

      not   to   shield   the   corrupt.     The   question   of   giving

      opportunity to the public servant at that stage does not

      arise.     The   sanctioning   authority   has   only   to   see

      whether   the   facts   would   prima-facie   constitutes   the

      offence.





      (ii)     The competent authority cannot embark upon an

      inquiry to judge the truth of the allegations on the basis

      of   representation   which   may   be   filed   by   the   accused

      person before the Sanctioning Authority, by asking the

      I.O. to offer his comments or to further investigate the

      matter   in   the   light   of   representation   made   by   the

      accused   person   or   by   otherwise   holding   a   parallel

      investigation/enquiry by calling for the record/report of

      his department.





      (vii)    However, if in any case, the Sanctioning Authority

      after consideration  of the  entire material placed before

      it,   entertains   any   doubt   on   any   point   the   competent

      authority   may   specify   the   doubt   with   sufficient

      particulars   and   may   request   the   Authority   who   has

      sought sanction to clear the doubt.   But that would be

      only to clear the doubt in order that the authority may

      apply   its   mind   proper,   and   not   for   the   purpose   of

      considering   the   representations   of   the   accused   which

      may be filed while the matter is pending sanction.


                                                                                    39


       (viii) If   the   Sanctioning   Authority   seeks   the   comments

       of   the   IO   while   the   matter   is   pending   before   it  for

       sanction,   it   will   almost   be   impossible   for   the

       Sanctioning   Authority   to   adhere   to   the   time   limit

       allowed by the Supreme Court in Vineet Narain's case."





31.    The aforementioned guidelines are in conformity with the law



laid down by this Court that while considering the issue regarding



grant or refusal of sanction, the only thing which the Competent



Authority is required to see is whether the material placed by the



complainant   or   the   investigating   agency  prima   facie  discloses



commission   of   an   offence.     The   Competent   Authority   cannot



undertake   a   detailed   inquiry   to   decide   whether   or   not   the



allegations made against the public servant are true.




32.    In  the   light   of   the   above   discussion,   we   shall   now   consider



whether the High Court was justified in refusing to entertain the



writ petition filed by the appellant.   In this context, it is apposite



to   observe   that   the   High   Court   had   proceeded   under   a   wholly



erroneous   assumption   that   respondent   No.1   had   directed



investigation by the CBI into the allegations of grave irregularities



in   the   grant   of   licences.     As   a   matter   of   fact,   on   receipt   of



representation   dated   4.5.2009   that   the   grant   of   licences   by



respondent   No.2   had   resulted   in   huge   loss   to   the   Public


                                                                                     40


Exchequer, the CVC got conducted an inquiry under Section 8(d)



of   the   Central   Vigilance   Commission   Act,   2003   and   forwarded   a



copy of the report to the Director, CBI for making an investigation



into   the   matter   to   establish   the   criminal   conspiracy   in   the



allocation of 2G spectrum under the UASL policy of the DoT and



to bring to book all the wrongdoers. Thereupon, the CBI registered



FIR   No.RC-DI-2009-A-0045   dated   21.10.2009   against   unknown



officials   of   the   DoT,   unknown   private   persons/companies   and



others   for   offences   under   Section   120-B   IPC   read   with   Sections



13(2) and 13(1)(d) of the 1988 Act.   For the next about one year,



the matter remained dormant and the CBI took steps for vigorous



investigation only when this Court intervened in the matter.   The



material   placed   on   record   does   not   show   that   the   CBI   had



registered   a   case   or   started   investigation   at   the   instance   of



respondent No.1.




33.    On   his   part,   the   appellant   had   submitted   representation   to



respondent   No.   1   almost   one   year   to   the   registration   of   the   first



information   report   by   the   CBI   and   highlighted   the   grave



irregularities   committed   in   the   grant   of   licences   resulting   in   the



loss of thousands of crores of rupees to the Public Exchequer.  He



continuously pursued the matter by sending letters to respondent


                                                                                   41


No.1 at regular intervals.  The affidavit filed by Shri V. Vidyawati,



Director   in   the   PMO   shows   that   the   matter   was   placed   before



respondent No.1 on 1.12.2008, who directed the concerned officer



to   examine   and   apprise   him   with   the   facts   of   the   case.



Surprisingly,   instead   of   complying   with   the   direction   given   by



respondent   No.1   the   concerned   officer   sent   the   appellant's



representation to the DoT which was headed by none other than



respondent   No.2   against   whom   the   appellant   had   made   serious



allegations of irregularities in the grant of licences.  It was natural



for   respondent   No.2   to   have   seized   this   opportunity,   and   he



promptly   sent   letter   dated   18.6.2009   to   the   appellant   justifying



the   grant   of   licences.   The   concerned   officer   in   the   PMO   then



referred the matter to the Ministry of Law and Justice for advice.



It   is   not   possible   to   appreciate   that   even   though   the   appellant



repeatedly   wrote   letters   to   respondent   No.1   highlighting   the



seriousness of the allegations made in his first representation and



the   fact   that   he   had   already   supplied   the   facts   and   documents



which   could   be   made   basis   for   grant   of   sanction   to   prosecute



respondent No.2 and also pointed out that as per the judgments



of   this   Court,   detailed   inquiry   was   not   required   to   be   made   into



the allegations, the concerned officers in the PMO kept the matter


                                                                                     42


pending   and   then   took   the   shelter   of   the   fact   that   the   CBI   had



registered   the   case   and   the   investigation   was   pending.     In   our



view, the officers in the PMO and the Ministry of Law and Justice,



were duty bound to apprise respondent No.1 about seriousness of



allegations made by the appellant and the judgments of this Court



including   the   directions   contained   in   paragraph   58(I)   of   the



judgment in Vineet Narain's case as also the guidelines framed by



the  CVC  so  as to  enable  him  to  take  appropriate  decision  in the



matter. By the very nature of the office held by him, respondent



No. 1 is not expected to personally look into the minute details of



each and every case placed before him and has to depend on his



advisers   and   other   officers.   Unfortunately,   those   who   were



expected to give proper advice to respondent No. 1 and place full



facts   and   legal   position   before   him   failed   to   do   so.   We   have   no



doubt   that   if   respondent   No.1   had   been   apprised   of   the   true



factual   and   legal   position   regarding   the   representation   made   by



the   appellant,   he   would   have   surely   taken   appropriate   decision



and   would   not   have   allowed   the   matter   to   linger   for   a   period   of



more than one year.




34.    In the result, the appeal is allowed.   The impugned order is



set aside.   It is declared that the appellant had the right to file a


                                                                                 43


complaint for prosecuting respondent No.2.   However, keeping in



view   the   fact   that   the   Court   of   Special   Judge,   CBI   has   already



taken   cognizance   of  the    offences    allegedly   committed   by



respondent   No.2   under   the   1988   Act,   we   do   not   consider   it



necessary to give any other direction in the matter.   At the same



time, we deem it proper to observe that in future every Competent



Authority   shall   take   appropriate   action   on   the   representation



made   by   a   citizen   for   sanction   of   the   prosecution   of   a   public



servant   strictly   in   accordance   with   the   direction   contained   in



Vineet   Narain   v.   Union   of   India   (1998)   1   SCC   226   and   the



guidelines framed by the CVC.





                                             ..........................................J.

                                              [G.S. Singhvi]




                                                               

                                             ...........................................J.

                                             [Asok Kumar Ganguly]



New Delhi,

January 31, 2012.


                                                       REPORTABLE



                IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION



                 CIVIL APPEAL NO.1193 OF 2012

           (Arising out of SLP (C) No.27535/2010)



Dr. Subramanian Swamy                            ....Appellant(s)





                            - Versus -





Dr. Manmohan Singh & another                     ....Respondent(s)





                        J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.





1.    After   going   through   the   judgment   rendered   by   my



      learned   brother   G.S.   Singhvi,   J.,   I   am   in



      agreement   with   the   various   conclusions   reached   by



      His   Lordship.   However,   I   have   added   my   own   views



      on certain important facts of the questions raised



      in this case.





2.    Brother   Singhvi,   J.,   has   come   to   a   finding   that



      having   regard   to   the   very   nature   of   the   office



      held by respondent No.1, it may not be expected of



      respondent No.1 to personally look into the minute





                                  44


      details   of   each   and   every   matter   and   the



      respondent   No.1,   having   regard   to   the   burden   of



      his   very   onerous   office,   has   to   depend   on   the



      officers   advising   him.   At   the   same   time   it   may   be



      noted   that   in   the   course   of   submission,   the



      appellant,   who   argued   in   person,   did   not   ever



      allege   any   malafide   or   lack   of   good   faith   against



      the   respondent   No.1.   The   delay   which   had   taken



      place   in   the   office   of   the   respondent   No.1   is



      unfortunate   but   it   has   not   even   been   alleged   by



      the appellant that there was any deliberate action



      on   the   part   of   the   respondent   No.1   in   causing   the



      delay.   The   position   of   respondent   No.1   in   our



      democratic   polity   seems   to   have   been   summed   up   in



      the   words   of   Shakespeare   "Uneasy   lies   the   head



      that wears a crown" (Henry, The Fourth, Part 2 Act



      3, scene 1).





3.    I   also   agree   with   the   conclusions   of   bother



      Singhvi,   J.,   that   the   appellant   has   the   locus   to



      file   the   complaint   for   prosecution   of   the



      respondent No.2 in respect of the offences alleged



      to   have   been   committed   by   him   under   the   1988   Act.


                                   45


Therefore,   I   agree   with   the   finding   of   brother



Singhvi,   J.,   that   the   argument   of   the   learned



Attorney   General   to   the   contrary   cannot   be



accepted.   Apart   from   that   the   learned   Attorney



General   in   the   course   of   his   submission   proceeded



on   the   basis   that   the   question   of   sanction   has   to



be   considered   with   reference   to   Section   19   of   the



Prevention   of   Corruption   Act   (hereinafter   "the



P.C. Act") or with reference to Section 197 of the



Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter "the



Code"),   and   the   scheme   of   both   the   sections   being



similar   (Vide   paragraph   3   of   the   supplementary



written   submission   filed   by   the   learned   Attorney



General).   In   fact,   the   entire   submission   of   the



learned   Attorney   General   is   structured   on   the



aforesaid   assumption.   I   fail   to   appreciate   the



aforesaid   argument   as   the   same   is   contrary   to   the



scheme   of   Section   19   of   the   P.C.   Act   and   also



Section   197   of   the   Code.   In  Kalicharan   Mahapatra



vs.  State   of   Orissa  reported   in   (1998)   6   SCC   411,



this   Court   compared   Section   19   of   P.C.   Act   with



Section 197 of the Code. After considering several




                             46


      decisions   on   the   point   and   also   considering



      Section   6   of   the   old   P.C.   Act,   1947   which   is



      almost   identical   with   Section   19   of   the   P.C.   Act,



      1988 and also noting Law Commission's Report, this



      Court   in   paragraph   13   of  Kalicharan  (supra)   came



      to the following conclusions:





        "13.        The         sanction             contemplated               in

        Section   197   of   the   Code   concerns   a

        public   servant   who   "is   accused   of   any

        offence   alleged   to   have   been   committed

        by him while acting or purporting to act

        in   the   discharge   of   his   official   duty",

        whereas  the   offences  contemplated   in  the

        PC Act are those which cannot be treated

        as         acts         either         directly         or         even

        purportedly done in the discharge of his

        official   duties.   Parliament   must   have

        desired   to   maintain   the   distinction   and

        hence   the   wording   in   the   corresponding

        provision   in   the   former   PC   Act   was

        materially   imported   in   the   new   PC   Act,

        1988   without   any   change   in   spite   of   the

        change made in Section 197 of the Code."





4.    The   above   passage   in  Kalicharan  (supra)   has   been



      quoted with approval subsequently by this Court in



      Lalu   Prasad  vs.  State   of   Bihar  reported   in   2007



      (1)  SCC 49  at paragraph  9, page  54.    In paragraph



      10,   (page   54   of   the   report)   this   Court   held   in




                                               47


      Lalu   Prasad  (supra)   that   "Section   197   of   the   Code



      and   Section   19   of   the   Act   operate   in   conceptually



      different fields".





5.    In   view   of   such   consistent   view   by   this   Court   the



      basic   submission   of   the   learned   Attorney   General



      to the contrary is, with respect, untenable.





6.    I   also   entirely   agree   with   the   conclusion   of



      learned   brother   Singhvi,   J.,   that   the   argument   of



      the   learned   Attorney   General   that   question   for



      granting   sanction   for   prosecution   of   a   public



      servant   charged   with   offences   under   the   1988   Act



      arises only at the stage of cognizance is also not



      acceptable.





7.    In   formulating   this   submission,   the   learned



      Attorney         General         substantially         advanced         two



      contentions. The first contention is that an order



      granting   sanction   is   not   required   to   be   filed



                                        48


      along   with   a   complaint   in   connection   with   a



      prosecution   under   Section   19   of   the   P.C.   Act.   The



      aforesaid   submission   is   contrary   to   the   settled



      law   laid   down   by   this   Court   in   various   judgments.



      Recently a unanimous three-judge Bench decision of



      this   Court   in   the   case   of  State   of   Uttar   Pradesh



      vs.  Paras Nath Singh, [(2009) 6 SCC 372], speaking



      through   Justice   Pasayat   and   construing   the



      requirement   of   sanction,   held   that   without



      sanction:





        "......The   very   cognizance   is   barred.   That

        is, the complaint cannot be taken notice

        of.   According   to  Black's   Law   Dictionary

        the          word           `cognizance'                       means

        `jurisdiction'   or   `the   exercise   of

        jurisdiction'   or   `power   to   try   and

        determine   causes'.   In   common   parlance,

        it   means   taking   notice   of.               A   court,

        therefore,            is                precluded               from

        entertaining   a   complaint   or   taking

        notice   of   it   or   exercising   jurisdiction

        if   it   is   in   respect   of   a   public   servant

        who   is   accused   of   an   offence   alleged   to

        have   been   committed  during   discharge   of

        his official duty."


                    (Para 6, page 375 of the report)





8.    The   other   contention   of   the   learned   Attorney



      General   is   that   in   taking   cognizance   under   the


                                          49


P.C.   Act   the   Court   is   guided   by   the   provisions



under   Section   190   of   the   Code   and   in   support   of



that   contention   the   learned   Attorney   General



relied         on         several         judgments.                    However,           the



aforesaid   submissions   were   made   without   noticing



the   judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of  Dilawar



Singh  vs.  Parvinder   Singh   alias   Iqbal   Singh   and



Another  (2005) 12 SCC 709. Dealing with Section 19



of   P.C.   Act   and   Section   190   of   the   Code,   this



Court   held   in   paragraph   8   at   page   713   of   the



report as follows:





  "......The Prevention of Corruption Act is a

  special   statute   and   as   the   preamble

  shows,   this   Act   has   been   enacted   to

  consolidate   and   amend   the   law   relating

  to   the   prevention   of   corruption   and   for

  matters   connected   therewith.   Here,   the

  principle               expressed              in         the          maxim

  generalia   specialibus   non   derogant  would

  apply   which   means   that   if   a   special

  provision   has   been   made   on   a   certain

  matter, that matter is excluded from the

  general                 provisions.                  (See              Godde

  Venkateswara Rao  v.  Govt. of A.P.,  State

  of   Bihar              v.     Dr.   Yogendra   Singh                       and

  Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and

  Higher   Secondary   Education  v.  Paritosh

  Bhupeshkumar                  Sheth.)          Therefore,                   the

  provisions of Section 19 of the Act will

  have   an   overriding   effect   over   the





                                      50


         general   provisions   contained   in   Section

         190......"





9.     Therefore,   concurring   with   brother   Singhvi,   J.,   I



       am   unable   to   uphold   the   submission   of   the   learned



       Attorney General.





10.    As   I   am   of   the   humble   opinion   that   the   questions



       raised and argued in this case are of considerable



       constitutional and legal importance, I wish to add



       my own reasoning on the same.





11.    Today,   corruption   in   our   country   not   only   poses   a



       grave   danger   to   the   concept   of   constitutional



       governance,   it   also   threatens   the   very   foundation



       of   Indian   democracy   and   the   Rule   of   Law.   The



       magnitude   of   corruption   in   our   public   life   is



       incompatible   with   the   concept   of   a   socialist,



       secular democratic republic. It cannot be disputed



       that   where   corruption   begins   all   rights   end.



       Corruption         devalues          human         rights,         chokes





                                      51


       development   and   undermines   justice,   liberty,



       equality,   fraternity   which   are   the   core   values   in



       our   preambular   vision.   Therefore,   the   duty   of   the



       Court   is   that   any   anti-corruption   law   has   to   be



       interpreted and worked out in such a fashion as to



       strengthen   the   fight   against   corruption.     That   is



       to   say   in   a   situation   where   two   constructions   are



       eminently   reasonable,   the   Court   has   to   accept   the



       one   that   seeks   to   eradicate   corruption   to   the   one



       which seeks to perpetuate it.





12.          Time   and   again   this   Court   has   expressed   its



       dismay   and   shock   at   the   ever   growing   tentacles   of



       corruption in our society but even then situations



       have not improved much. [See  Sanjiv Kumar v.  State



       of Haryana & ors., (2005) 5 SCC 517; State of A.P.



       v.  V.   Vasudeva   Rao,  (2004)   9   SCC   319;  Shobha



       Suresh   Jumani     v.     Appellate   Tribunal   Forfeited



       Property   &   another,   (2001)   5   SCC   755;  State   of



       M.P.   &   ors.  v.  Ram   Singh,   (2000)   5   SCC   88;  J.



       Jayalalitha  v.  Union   of   India   &   another,   (1999)   5





                                    52


       SCC   138;  Major   S.K.   Kale  v.  State   of   Maharashtra,



       (1977) 2 SCC 394.]





13.    Learned   Attorney   General   in   the   course   of   his



       submission   fairly   admitted   before   us   that   out   of



       total 319 requests for sanction, in respect of 126



       of   such   requests,   sanction   is   awaited.   Therefore,



       in more than 1/3rd cases of request for prosecution



       in   corruption   cases   against   public   servants,



       sanctions   have   not   been   accorded.   The   aforesaid



       scenario   raises   very   important   constitutional



       issues   as   well   as   some   questions   relating   to



       interpretation   of   such   sanctioning   provision   and



       also the role that an independent judiciary has to



       play   in   maintaining   rule   of   law   and   common   man's



       faith in the justice delivering system.





14.    Both   rule   of   law   and   equality   before   law   are



       cardinal   questions   in   our   Constitutional   Laws   as



       also   in   International   law   and   in   this   context   the



       role of the judiciary is very vital. In his famous


                                   53


       treatise   on   Administrative   Law,   Professor   Wade



       while   elaborating   the   concept   of   rule   of   law



       referred   to   the   opinion   of   Lord   Griffith's   which



       runs as follows:





       "the judiciary accept a responsibility for

       the   maintenance   of   the   rule   of   law   that

       embraces          a         willingness                  to             oversee

       executive         action               and         to         refuse               to

       countenance            behaviour                   that            threatens

       either   basic   human   rights   or   the   rule   of

       law."



       [See   R.   v.   Horseferry   Road   Magistrates'

       Court ex p. Bennett {1994) 1 AC 42 at 62]





15.    I   am   in   respectful   agreement   with   the   aforesaid



       principle.





16.    In   this   connection   we   might   remind   ourselves   that



       courts   while   maintaining   rule   of   law   must



       structure         its            jurisprudence                     on         the         famous



       formulation   of   Lord   Coke   where   the   learned   Law



       Lord   made   a   comparison   between   "the   golden   and



       straight   metwand   of   law"   as   opposed   to   "the



       uncertain and crooked cord of discretion".





                                               54


17.    The   right   of   private   citizen   to   file   a   complaint



       against   a   corrupt   public   servant   must   be   equated



       with his right to access the Court in order to set



       the   criminal   law   in   motion   against   a   corrupt



       public   official.          This   right   of   access,   a



       Constitutional   right   should   not   be   burdened   with



       unreasonable   fetters.   When   a   private   citizen



       approaches a court of law against a corrupt public



       servant   who   is   highly   placed,   what   is   at   stake   is



       not   only   a   vindication   of   personal   grievance   of



       that   citizen   but   also   the   question   of   bringing



       orderliness   in   society   and   maintaining   equal



       balance  in the  rule of  law. It  was pointed  out by



       the Constitution Bench of this Court in  Sheonandan



       Paswan vs. State of Bihar and Others, (1987) 1 SCC



       288 at page 315:





         "......It is now settled law that a criminal

         proceeding   is   not   a   proceeding   for

         vindication   of   a   private   grievance   but

         it   is   a   proceeding   initiated   for   the

         purpose of punishment to the offender in

         the   interest   of   the   society.   It   is   for

         maintaining stability and orderliness in


                                    55


         the   society   that   certain   acts   are

         constituted   offences   and   the   right   is

         given   to   any   citizen   to   set   the

         machinery   of   the   criminal   law   in   motion

         for the purpose of bringing the offender

         to   book.   It   is   for   this   reason   that   in

         A.R.   Antulay  v.  R.S.   Nayak  this   Court

         pointed   out   that   (SCC   p.   509,   para   6)

         "punishment   of   the   offender   in   the

         interest of the society being one of the

         objects   behind   penal   statutes   enacted

         for larger good of the society, right to

         initiate   proceedings   cannot   be   whittled

         down,   circumscribed   or   fettered   by

         putting   it   into   a   strait   jacket   formula

         of locus standi......"





18.    Keeping   those   principles   in   mind,   as   we   must,   if



       we look at Section 19 of the P.C. Act which bars a



       Court         from            taking          cognizance            of          cases         of



       corruption against a public servant under Sections



       7,   10,   11,   13   and   15   of   the   Act,   unless   the



       Central   or   the   State   Government,   as   the   case   may



       be,   has   accorded   sanction,   virtually   imposes



       fetters            on         private              citizens         and         also          on



       prosecutors from approaching Court against corrupt



       public   servants.   These   protections   are   not



       available   to   other   citizens.   Public   servants   are



       treated as a special class of persons enjoying the




                                                    56


said   protection   so   that   they   can   perform   their



duties without fear and favour and without threats



of   malicious   prosecution.            However,   the   said



protection against malicious prosecution which was



extended in public interest cannot become a shield



to   protect   corrupt   officials.   These   provisions



being   exceptions   to   the   equality   provision   of



Article   14   are   analogous   to   provisions   of



protective   discrimination   and   these   protections



must   be   construed   very   narrowly.   These   procedural



provisions   relating   to   sanction   must   be   construed



in   such   a   manner   as   to   advance   the   causes   of



honesty and justice and good governance as opposed



to   escalation   of   corruption.   Therefore,   in   every



case   where   an   application   is   made   to   an



appropriate   authority   for   grant   of   prosecution   in



connection   with   an   offence   under   P.C.   Act   it   is



the   bounden   duty   of   such   authority   to   apply   its



mind   urgently   to   the   situation   and   decide   the



issue   without   being   influenced   by   any   extraneous



consideration.   In   doing   so,   the   authority   must



make   a   conscious   effort   to   ensure   the   rule   of   law




                             57


and   cause   of   justice   is   advanced.     In   considering



the   question   of   granting   or   refusing   such



sanction,   the   authority   is   answerable   to   law   and



law   alone.   Therefore,   the   requirement   to   take   the



decision   with   a   reasonable   dispatch   is   of   the



essence   in   such   a   situation.   Delay   in   granting



sanction   proposal   thwarts   a   very   valid   social



purpose,   namely,   the   purpose   of   a   speedy   trial



with the requirement to bring the culprit to book.



Therefore,   in   this   case   the   right   of   the



sanctioning authority, while either sanctioning or



refusing   to   grant   sanction,   is   coupled   with   a



duty.   The   sanctioning   authority   must   bear   in   mind



that   what   is   at   stake   is   the   public   confidence   in



the   maintenance   of   rule   of   law   which   is



fundamental   in   the   administration   of   justice.



Delay   in   granting   such   sanction   has   spoilt   many



valid   prosecution   and   is   adversely   viewed   in



public   mind   that   in   the   name   of   considering   a



prayer   for     sanction,   a   protection   is   given   to   a



corrupt   public   official   as   a   quid   pro   quo   for



services   rendered   by   the   public   official   in   the




                             58


past   or   may   be   in   the   future   and   the   sanctioning



authority   and   the   corrupt   officials   were   or   are



partners in the same misdeeds. I may hasten to add



that   this   may   not   be   factual   position   in   this   but



the   general   demoralizing   effect   of   such   a   popular



perception   is   profound   and   pernicious.   By   causing



delay in considering the request for sanction, the



sanctioning  authority  stultifies  judicial  scrutiny



and   determination   of   the   allegations   against



corrupt   official   and   thus   the   legitimacy   of   the



judicial   institutions   is   eroded.   It,   thus,



deprives         a         citizen          of         his         legitimate               and



fundamental   right   to   get   justice   by   setting   the



criminal   law   in   motion   and   thereby   frustrates   his



right   to   access   judicial   remedy   which   is   a



constitutionally                  protected                 right.          In         this



connection,   if   we   look   at   Section   19   of   the   P.C.



Act,   we   find   that   no   time   limit   is   mentioned



therein.   This   has   virtually   armed   the   sanctioning



authority   with   unbridled   power   which   has   often



resulted in protecting the guilty and perpetuating



criminality and injustice in society.




                                      59


19.    There   are   instances   where   as   a   result   of   delayed



       grant   of   sanction   prosecutions   under   the   P.C.   Act



       against   a   public   servant   has   been   quashed.   See



       Mahendra   Lal   Das  vs.  State   of   Bihar   and   Others,



       (2002)   1   SCC   149,   wherein   this   Court   quashed   the



       prosecution   as   the   sanctioning   authority   granted



       sanction after 13 years. Similarly, in the case of



       Santosh   De  vs.  Archna   Guha   and   Others,   (1994)



       Supp.3   SCC   735,   this   Court   quashed   prosecution   in



       a case where grant of sanction was unduly delayed.



       There   are   several   such   cases.   The   aforesaid



       instances show a blatant subversion of the rule of



       law.   Thus,   in   many   cases   public   servants   whose



       sanction   proposals   are   pending   before   authorities



       for   long   periods   of   time   are   being   allowed   to



       escape criminal prosecution.





20.    Article   14   must   be   construed   as   a   guarantee



       against         uncanalized          and         arbitrary         power.



       Therefore,   the   absence   of   any   time   limit   in



                                      60


       granting sanction in Section 19 of the P.C. Act is



       not   in   consonance   with   the   requirement   of   the   due



       process   of   law   which   has   been   read   into   our



       Constitution by the Constitution Bench decision of



       this Court in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India and



       Another, (1978) 1 SCC 248.





21.    I   may   not   be   understood   to   have   expressed   any



       doubt about the constitutional validity of Section



       19   of   the   P.C.   Act,   but   in   my   judgment   the   power



       under   Section   19   of   the   P.C.   Act   must   be



       reasonably         exercised.            In         my         judgment         the



       Parliament   and   the   appropriate   authority   must



       consider   restructuring   Section   19   of   the   P.C.   Act



       in   such   a   manner   as   to   make   it   consonant   with



       reason, justice and fair play.





22.    In   my   view,   the   Parliament   should   consider   the



       Constitutional imperative of Article 14 enshrining



       the   rule   of   law   wherein   `due   process   of   law'   has



       been   read   into   by   introducing   a   time   limit   in


                                     61


Section 19 of the P.C. Act 1988 for its working in



a   reasonable   manner.   The   Parliament   may,   in   my



opinion, consider the following guidelines:





a) All   proposals   for   sanction   placed   before   any Sanctioning         Authority,         empowered         to         grant sanction for the prosecution of a public servant under section 19 of the P.C. Act must be decided within   a   period   of   three   months   of   the   receipt of the proposal by the concerned authority.

b) Where consultation is required with the Attorney General or the Solicitor General or the Advocate  General   of   the   State,   as   the   case   may   be,   and the same is not possible within the three months mentioned   in   clause   (a)   above,   an   extension   of one month period may be allowed, but the request for consultation is to be sent in writing within the   three   months   mentioned   in   (a)   above.   A   copy of   the   said   request   will   be   sent   to   the prosecuting agency or the private complainant to intimate   them   about   the   extension   of   the   time  limit. 

       c) At the end of the extended period of time limit, if no decision is taken, sanction will be deemed to   have   been   granted   to   the   proposal   for prosecution,   and   the   prosecuting   agency   or the private   complainant   will   proceed   to   file   the chargesheet/complaint   in   the   court   to commence prosecution   within   15   days   of   the   expiry   of   the aforementioned time limit. 


23.    With   these   additional   reasons,   as   indicated,   I agree   with   Brother   Singhvi,   J.,   and   allow   the appeal   and   the   judgment   of   the   High   Court   is   set  aside. No costs.

                                          .......................J.

                                          (ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

New Delhi
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January 31, 2012





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