Friday, February 4, 2011

Misuse of Discretionary Power: PIL


Joydeep Mukharjee Vs. State of West Bengal & Ors.

ORDER

Petitioner, who claims to be a public spirited person from the State of West Bengal and a member of the All India Legal Aid Forum, which is an organisation stated to be working for upliftment of the downtrodden, has filed the present Public Interest Litigation claiming the following relief:

1. allow this writ petition and appoint a committee functioning under direct supervision of the court to scrutinize all the cases of discretionary allotments after due notice to the allottees and based upon this committee's report issue a writ of and/or direction in the nature of mandamus quashing all the allotments of Government lands in Salt Lake City made unconstitutionally, illegally, arbitrarily, whimsically, capriciously with mala fide motive and in clandestine manner in colourable and arrogant exercise of so-called "Discretionary Power" by the respondent; and

2. pass an order directing the Calcutta High Court to send the case record of CO No.7553(W) of 1986, Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Welfare Association vs. State of West Bengal to furnish the same to this Hon'ble Court with notice to the petitioner therein and to hear and dispose of the said CO No.7553(W) of 1986 on its merit after setting aside the order dated 2.9.2003.
3. direct the respondents herein to produce the Master Plan as originally framed from the original records of the Salt Lake City.

4. impose exemplary damages of substantially high amount on the respondent No.2 to 6 to set a deterrent example and also to compensate the public exchequer for the loss caused to the general public for reasons of discretionary allotment of valuable plots by the Respondents to suit their personal, political, nepotistic and financial ends; and

5. pass any other order further order/s as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper." Above prayers are claimed on the averment that even after pronouncement of judgment of this Court in Dipak K. Ghosh v. State of West Bengal [(2006) 3 SCC 765], there has been violation of the original Master Plan of the Salt Lake City against which several demonstrations were taken out. The petitioner also submits that the issues raised in Writ Petition No. 7553 filed in the Calcutta High Court have not been settled by that Court or even by this Court. In his submissions, these issues require consideration being questions of great importance. According to the petitioner, the Salt Lake City was the result of dream of the late Chief Minister Dr. B.C. Roy of establishing a new township for the lower and middle income groups on the eastern side of Calcutta (now Kolkata) and the land to be used for that purpose was the reclaimed land of the Salt Lake. In the year 1967, a Master Plan was prepared under the Government instructions and the Government was expected to develop the area in accordance with that Master Plan which had, inter alia, made the following provisions:

a. " 60% plots are earmarked as residential plots.
b. Separate drainage and sewerage system.
c. Open space to the tune of 12%
d. Location of commercial plots in one zone.
e. Location of few shop allowable plots meant to cater to the local needs of each residential plots.
f. Roads on different types.
g. Open space and other amenities such as Park.
h. Separate area to reserve for co-operative or different organisations like CMDA Union Government Departments, Administrative building local centers, play ground, education institutions and also suitable allocation of Parks in each block."

The development scheme contained various restrictions regarding user of plots, construction of buildings, transfer and/or partition of plots and buildings. The West Bengal Government Township (Extension of Civic Amenities) Ordinance, 1975, was promulgated to provide for an extension of civic amenities of Government Township in West Bengal and for the matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. This Ordinance was replaced by the West Bengal Government Township(Extension of Civic Amenities) Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as` the Act'). Section 2(b) of the Act enumerated different civic amenities like drainage, sewerage, sanitation, roads, maintenance, public health, parks etc. Till about 1977, according to the petitioner, there was great transparency in functioning of the Administrator, appointed under Section 4 of the Act, who was responsible for implementation of the provisions of the Act and except 500 plots, out of nearly 6000plots, rest have been distributed.

It is alleged that the Chief Minister's discretionary quota was created by unlawful and confidential executive orders without even informing the Cabinet and illegally usurping the statutory powers of the Administrator. Further that the State Government formed a Salt Lake Advisory Committee which started distributing the plots clandestinely. Certain deviations were also made from the Master Plan. The Government started carving out new residential plots from the land originally earmarked for civic amenities, ecological balance, maintenance, public facilities etc. in violation of the approved Master Plan. Sometime in the year 1985, in view of the serious public protest, the Government dissolved the Salt Lake Advisory Committee and amended the Act by West Bengal Government Township (Extension of Civic Amenities) (Amendment) Act, 1985 (for short, the `1985Amendment Act').

The amendment also validated the allotments which had been made since October 1, 1976. As already noticed, Writ Petition No.7553 of 1986 was filed before the Calcutta High Court praying for issuance of an appropriate direction to the authorities not to deviate from the Master Plan and to declare the 1985 Amendment Act as ultra vires. Still another writ petition being Writ Petition No.17306 of 1997 was filed before that Court challenging the exercise of discretionary powers by the Chief Minister in regard to allotment of plots in the Salt Lake City. Challenge was also raised against the deviation from the Master Plan and various instances of the same were given in that writ petition. The writ petition, particularly, referred to Sectors 1, 2 and 3 of the City.

As alleged by the petitioner herein, Writ Petition No. 7553 of 1986 came to be dismissed for default without deciding the case on merits vide order dated September 2, 2003. Writ Petition No. 17306 of 1997 also came to be dismissed by the judgment of the Calcutta High Court dated February 5, 1999, primarily, on the ground that there was non-joinder of necessary parties, i.e. the persons to whom the allotments have been made under the discretionary quota and whose names had been disclosed in the reply affidavit filed in those proceedings have not been made parties in that petition. The learned Single Judge further observed that an interim order dated June 11, 1987 passed by another Bench of that Court in Writ Petition No.7553 of 1986 had allowed the Chief Minister to make allotment of plots from his discretionary quota and that order was still subsisting. As that order was passed in independent proceedings no directions in that regard were issued. But, however, the Court cautioned the Chief Minister that discretion in allotment of plots should be exercised in accordance with the criteria stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Common Cause, A Registered Society v. Union of India [(1996) 6 SCC 530].

The petitioner in that case filed a Special Leave Petition before this Court wherein leave was granted and it came to be registered as Civil Appeal No.6707 of 1999. This Court, vide its judgment dated November 19, 2004 titled as Tarak Singh v. Jyoti Basu [(2005) 1 SCC201], dismissed this Civil Appeal along with one writ petition, being Writ Petition No. 216 of 1999 titled as Dipak K. Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, which was directly filed as a Public Interest Litigation before this Court raising similar challenges. In these proceedings, vide order dated November 13, 2003, this Court allowed the impleadment of Respondent No. 24 (to be read as Respondent No. 8vide order of that Bench dated December 17, 2004), Mr. B.P. Banerjee, former Judge of the Calcutta High Court and passed the final order/judgment dated November 19, 2004 quashing the allotment made in favour of that Respondent despite the fact that he had raised construction on that plot.

This writ petition was dismissed qua all the respondents except against Respondent No. 24. The writ petition was allowed qua that Respondent on the ground that the learned Judge had compromised his divine duty with his personal interest during the hearing of Writ Petition No.7553 of 1986. It is further the allegation of the petitioner that the plots from the discretionary quota were allotted on political and financial consideration and in lieu of favourable services rendered and that there was a complete abuse of the discretionary quota by the authorities concerned and even the change in land use from commercial to residential and vice-versa on the will of the allottees was in arbitrary manner. Petitioner further prays that this Court should appoint a Committee to scrutinize all those cases where allotments have been made from the discretionary quota and quash all the allotments made there under. The challenge of the petitioner is primarily based upon the ground that discretionary quota for distribution of plots in the Salt Lake City was arbitrary, illegal and in violation of the Master Plan. Resultantly, it was in violation of equality and right to life as enshrined in Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Further, by allotting lands earmarked for civic amenities, the State has violated its promise extended in the Master Plan on the basis of which people have purchased plots in the scheme and, as such, these allotments tantamount to undue enrichment of the State at the cost of the allottees and, therefore, such allotments are in violation of the law stated by the Supreme Court in the case of Common Cause, A Registered Society (supra). Before we proceed to discuss the merits of the challenge made by the petitioner to the discretionary allotment, we would like to complete the factual matrix of the case by referring to the facts which appeared from the record and/or the reported judgments dealing with the same subject matter. As already noticed, Civil Appeal No. 6707of 1999 was heard along with Writ Petition No. 216 of 1999 by this Court. During the pendency of these proceedings, Mr. B.P. Banerjee was ordered to be impleaded as Respondent No. 24 and thereafter he appeared before this Court and contested the matter. The direction with regard to cancellation of the plot in his favour was finally passed by this Court. While allowing the appeal limited to that extent, the writ petition as well as the appeal was dismissed against all other respondents and the Court held as under:
"It is also contended by Mr Ganguli that a large number of Judges of the High Court and the Supreme Court have also been allotted plots in Salt Lake City under the discretionary quota of the Chief Minister and it will be unfair to single out Respondent 24 for meting out a different treatment. At the time of hearing of this writ petition, we requested the learned Senior Counsel to inform us whether any other Judge or Judges obtained the allotment order from the 10 discretionary quota of the Chief Minister by compromising his judicial duties, we would also proceed against such allottee. He, however, was unable to receive any instructions in this behalf. It is trite, un equals cannot be treated equally. 24. In the backdrop of the facts and circumstances, as recited above, we are of the view that the conduct of the learned Judge is beyond condonable limits. We are aware that the order, we propose to pass, no doubt is painful, but we have to perform a painful duty to in stil public confidence in the judiciary. It is a case where a private interest is pitted against the public interest.

It is now a well-settled principle of law that in such cases the latter must prevail over the former. Consequently, the order dated 24-7- 1987 passed by the Chief Minister and the formal allotment order dated 16-10-1987 allotting Plot No. FD-429 measuring 4 cottahs in Salt Lake City in favour of Respondent 24 Justice B.P. Banerjee are hereby quashed and cancelled. The plot shall stand vested with the Government. 27. The net result is that Writ Petition No. 216 of 1999 against Respondent 24 is allowed and is dismissed qua other respondents. CA No. 6707 of 1999 is dismissed. Rule is discharged. 28. We clarify that dismissal of the writ petition against other respondents should not be misunderstood as approval of the policy decision of the Government with regard to the allotment of land by the Chief Minister from his discretionary quota." As the directions contained in the case of Tarak Singh (Supra)were not being properly implemented by the State Government and the concerned authorities, Mr. Dipak Ghosh, the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 216 of 1999, filed another application for strict implementation and compliance of the above order passed by this Court. In those proceedings, applications were also filed by Mr. B.P.Banerjee stating that the order of the Supreme Court in Tarak Singh's case (supra) is a nullity, void and non est against him.

In its judgment in the case of Dipak Ghosh (supra), this Court dismissed the applications filed by Mr. B.P. Banerjee and directed that the order of the Court in Tarak Singh's case (supra) be complied with. The Court also specifically directed that no application filed by either of the parties in this case shall be accepted by the Registry without leave of the Court. Since then, no application appears to have been filed in either of these proceedings. The above prolonged history of this case clearly shows that in proceedings before the Calcutta High Court, the merit or otherwise of the discretionary allotments made by the Chief Minister was not decided in accordance with law. One writ petition, being W.P. No.7553 of 1986, came to be dismissed for default vide order dated September 2, 2003 which order attained finality as no further proceedings were taken by the petitioners therein. Thereafter, WP No. 17306 of 1997 came to be dismissed, primarily, on the ground of non-joinder of necessary parties and the allotments under the discretionary quota of the Chief Minister were not set aside. On the contrary, while referring to the order dated June 11, 1987 of the other Bench in Writ Petition No. 7553 of 1986 that was still subsisting, it was observed that the Chief Minister was permitted to make allotments from the discretionary quota, however, in accordance with the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Common Cause, A Registered Society (supra).

A Civil Appeal No. 6707 of 1999 against that judgment also came to be dismissed by this Court along with Writ Petition No.216 of 1999 which had also questioned the discretionary allotments. In other words, the allotment of large number of plots in Salt Lake City, Kolkata had been the subject matter of different writ petitions and/or appeal before the Calcutta High Court as well as this Court and for one reason or the other the allotments in favour of the private parties had not been set aside, though there were doubts raised by the Calcutta High Court as well as this Court regarding allotments under the discretionary quota of Chief Minister and the manner in which they were made. However, as all these judgments have attained finality, they cannot be permitted to be agitated over and over again including in the present writ petition. The principles of finality as well as fairness demand that there should be an end to the litigation and it is in the interest of public that the issues settled by the judgments of courts, including this Court, which have attained finality should not be permitted to be re-agitated all over again, interest re I public futsit finis litium.

We are unable to appreciate that para 28 of the judgment of this Court in the case of Tarak Singh (supra) leaves the questions open for a fresh adjudication. All that the Bench has said in that case was that the Court had not approved the policy decision of the Government with regard to allotment of land by the Chief Minister from his discretionary quota, but at the same time what is of significance is that none of the allotments made except that in favour of Respondent No. 24, was set aside by the Court. The Court then clarified that it had not granted approval to the action of the State Government of making discretionary allotments in the manner in which they had been made. This is further substantiated by the fact that allotment in favour of Respondent No. 24 was specifically set aside. Thus, the arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner that para 28 of that judgment leaves all issues open for future determination in this proceeding or like cases, is legally unsustainable and misconceived.

The jurisdiction of this Court, in a Public Interest Litigation, cannot be pressed into service where the matters have already been completely and effectively adjudicated upon not only in the individual petitions but even in the writ petitions raising larger question as was raised in Writ Petition No. 216 of 1999 before this Court. Another important aspect of this case which has persuaded us not to interfere with settled rights and grant the prayers in this Public Interest Litigation is that an affidavit on behalf of the State of West Bengal has been filed recently on December 3, 2010 revealing certain pertinent facts for proper adjudication of this case. The affidavit, sworn by Mr. Abanindranath Palodhi, Joint Secretary, Urban Development Department, Government of West Bengal, has stated that guidelines for allotment of both individual and co-operative residential plots in Salt Lake were issued by a Government order on December 7, 1999 on the strength of the Cabinet decision taken on November 10, 1999.

The then Chief Minister, Late Mr. Jyoti Basu, had already allotted 276 plots out of 290 plots from his discretionary quota which were available at that point of time and presently only 14plots are left in that discretionary quota. This affidavit further states as under: "Subsequently, on 7th December, 1999 four orders were issued with regard to allotment of residential plots, non-residential plots for educational institutions and for allotment of plots for cultural, institutional, industrial, commercial 15 etc. purposes at Salt Lake. All these notifications required advertisement in newspapers and invitation of application. But what is significant is that no guidelines had in fact been framed for allotment of plots from the discretionary quota of the Chief Minister, as a result of which all the 14 plots belonging to the discretionary quota, which were in existence in February, 1999, still continue to remain un allotted. As a result, these 14 plots will no more be treated as part of the discretionary quota. (Emphasis supplied by us) From the above specific averments made in the affidavit, it is clear that there are very few plots presently left for allotment under the discretionary quota.

The State Government has taken a conscious decision not to make further allotments under the discretionary quota even qua those plots. As far as already allotted plots are concerned, the rights of the parties appear to have been settled and attained finality, as in none of the writ petitions/appeals referred above any of these allotments was set aside by the Courts of competent jurisdiction. The petitioners in those cases, in fact, did not even care to take further proceedings to have the matters adjudicated before the higher Courts and in accordance with law. In these circumstances it will be a futile exercise of jurisdiction of this Court to reopen the whole controversy once again. The questions raised in the present petition have become merely academic as the rights of the parties have been finally settled and further the parties have acted thereupon to their respective prejudices. Without intending to state any law in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case we find no merit in this Public Interest Litigation which is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.
.............................................CJI. (S.H. Kapadia)
................................................J. (K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan)
................................................J. (Swatanter Kumar)
New Delhi
February 3, 2011.

Expunging of Remarks


SMT. MONA PANWAR vs. THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD THROUGH ITS REGISTRAR AND OTHERS. 
( J.M. PANCHAL & H.L. GOKHALE, JJ.)

Criminal Appeal No.298 of 2011 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) 9803 of 2009)-Decided on 02-02-
2011.

JUDGMENT

J.M. Panchal, J.-Leave granted.

2. The present appeal is filed by the appellant, who is member of judicial service of the State of
Uttar Pradesh, for expunging the remarks made by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of
Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Application No. 21606 of 2009 while setting aside
order dated August 1, 2009, passed by the appellant in case No. nil of 2009 titled as Shabnam vs.
Irshad registering the application filed by the respondent No. 3 under Section 156(3) of the Code
of Criminal Procedure ("Code" for short) as complaint and directing the Registry to present the
file before the appellant on August 9, 2009 for recording the statement of the complainant, i.e., of
Shabnam under Section 200 of the Code.

3. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are as under:
The respondent No. 3 is wife of one Mustqeem and resides at Village Sayyed Mazra,
District Saharanpur with her husband and in-laws. It may be stated that the accused is her
father-in-law. According to the respondent No. 3 her father-in-law had bad eye on her
since her marriage. The case of the respondent No. 3 was that in the intervening night of
June 18/19, 2009 at about 3 O'clock she was all alone in her room as her husband had
gone out and she was sleeping but the doors of the room were kept open due to heat. The
allegation made by the respondent No. 3 is that Irshad, i.e., her father-in-law came inside
her room, caught hold of her with bad intention, scratched her breasts, forcibly pushed
cloth in her mouth and forcibly committed rape on her. The case of the respondent No. 3
was that though she offered resistance, Irshad did not pay any heed and committed rape
on her. The allegation made by her was that because of the incident she became
unconscious and in the morning she narrated the whole incident to her mother-in-law
Bindi, but she advised her not to disclose the incident to anyone as it was a matter of
reputation of the family. According to respondent No. 3 she telephoned her mother, who
arrived at her in-laws' place along with Muneer, her brother-in-law, on a motor cycle but
Irshad in the meanwhile had fled away from the village. The case projected by the
respondent No. 3 was  that as her condition was deteriorating, she was got medically
examined in District hospital by her mother and thereafter she had gone to the Police
Station, Nakur, but the police had refused to register her FIR. It was claimed by the
respondent No. 3 that under the circumstances she had moved an application before the
Senior Superintendent of Police, Saharanpur but he had also not taken any action and,
therefore, she had filed an application under Section 156(3) of the Code before the
learned Judicial Magistrate II, Court No. 14, Saharanpur mentioning therein as to how the
incident of rape with her had taken place and praying the learned Magistrate to direct the
Officer-in-charge of Police Station, Nakur, to register her complaint and investigate the
case against the accused under Section 156 (3) of the Code.

4. On receipt of the application the appellant called for report from the concerned police station.
As per the report received no case was registered regarding the incident narrated by the
respondent No. 3. The respondent No. 3 had filed her own affidavit in support of the case pleaded
in the application filed before the appellant and produced a carbon copy of the application sent by
her to the Senior Superintendent of Police, Saharanpur with its postal registration as well as
photocopy of medical certificate. The learned Magistrate perused the averments made by the
respondent No. 3 in her application as well as documents annexed to the said application. The
appellant was of the view that the respondent No. 3 was acquainted with the facts and
circumstances of the case and was also familiar with the accused and knew the witnesses too. The
appellant was of the view that the respondent No. 3 would be able to produce all the evidence
herself. The appellant referred to the principles of law laid down by the Allahabad High Court in
Gulab Chand vs. State of U.P. 2002 Cr.L.J. 2907, Ram Babu Gupta vs. State of U.P. 2001 
(43) ACC 50, Chandrika Singh vs. State of U.P. 2007 (50) ACC 777 and Sukhwasi S/o 
Hulasi vs. State of U.P. 2007 (59) ACC 739 and after taking into consideration the principles
laid down in the above referred to decisions the appellant was of the view that this was not a fit
case to be referred to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code and, therefore,
directed that the application submitted by the respondent under Section 156(3) of the Code be
registered as complaint and further ordered the Registry to present the file before her on August
28, 2009 for recording the statement of the respondent No. 3 i.e. the original complainant under
Section 200 of the Code.

5. Feeling aggrieved, the respondent No. 3 invoked jurisdiction of the High Court under Section
482 of the Code by filing Criminal Misc. Application No. 21606 of 2009 and prayed the High
Court to quash the order dated August 1, 2009, passed by the appellant and to direct the police to
register her  F.I.R. filed against Irshad and to investigate the same as provided under Section
156(3) of the Code.

6. The learned Single Judge of the High Court, who heard the matter, was of the view that the
appellant had done the gravest injustice to the respondent No. 3. According to the learned Single
Judge though the appellant is a lady Magistrate yet she could not think about the outcome of
ravishing the chastity of daughter-in-law by her father-in-law and the nature of crime committed
by the accused. After going through the order dated August 1, 2009, passed by the appellant, the
learned Single Judge expressed the view that the order indicated total non- application of mind by
the appellant. The learned Single Judge noticed that the incident had occurred inside the room in
early hours of June 19, 2009 and there was no mention of any witness in application filed by the
respondent but in the order passed by the appellant it was noted that the victim was in the
knowledge of all the facts and that the witnesses were also known to her, which indicated nonapplication of mind by the appellant. The learned Single Judge while setting aside the order dated
August 1, 2009, passed by the appellant, observed that the order was a blemish on justice meted
out to a married lady who was ravished by her own father- in-law. The learned Single Judge
expressed the view that the appellant had passed the order ignoring all judicial disciplines and had
not at all applied her judicial mind and had only referred to some of the judgments of the
Allahabad High Court, which were contrary to the opinion expressed by the Apex Court rendered
in many decisions. After observing that a judicial  order should be passed by applying judicial
mind, the learned Single Judge severely criticized  the conduct of the appellant and recorded his
serious displeasure against the appellant for passing such type of illegal orders.  The learned
Single Judge further warned the  appellant for future and cautioned the appellant to be careful in
passing the judicial orders. The learned Single Judge observed that the appellant should have
thought that the rape not only causes physical injury to the victim but also leaves scars on the
mind of the victim for the whole life and implant the victim with such ignominy which is worse
than her death. The learned Single Judge expressed  the view that he was inclined to refer the
matter to the Administrative Committee for taking action against the appellant but refrained from
doing so because the appellant is a young officer and has a long career to go. The learned Single
Judge by his judgment dated September 9, 2009 set aside the order dated August 1, 2009, passed
by the appellant, and directed the appellant to decide the application of the respondent No. 3
within the ambit of her power under Section 156(3) of the Code and also directed her to pass
order for registration of FIR against the erring police officers, who had refused to register the FIR
of the respondent No. 3. The learned Single Judge directed the Registry of the High Court to send
a copy of his judgment to the appellant for her future guidance and also to the Senior
Superintendent of Police, Saharanpur. As noted above, the disparaging remarks made by the
learned Single Judge while setting aside the order passed by the appellant has given rise to the
present appeal.

7. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned counsel for the
State Government and the learned counsel representing the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad. The record shows that the Respondent No.3 i.e. the original complainant is duly
served in the matter but she has neither appeared through a lawyer or in person nor has filed any
reply in the matter. This Court has also considered the documents forming part of the present
appeal.

8. On receipt of notice issued by this Court, Mr. Anand Kumar, Deputy Superintendant of Police,
Saharanpur, U.P. has filed reply affidavit mentioning inter alia that as per the office record
maintained at the Police Station, Nakur or in the officer of the Senior Superintendant of Police,
Saharanpur does not disclose receipt of any complaint from the Respondent No. 3. It is mentioned
in the reply that when the impugned judgment dated September 10, 2009 passed by the learned
Single Judge of High Court was brought to the notice of the authorities concerned a first
information report was lodged at the Police Station, Nakur being FIR 36/2009 against accused
Irshad and offence punishable under Section 376 IPC was registered. The reply proceeds to state
that the Investigating Officer had recorded the statement of the Respondent No. 3 as well as that
of her mother and the statement of her brother-in-law. But the mother and the brother-in-law had
mentioned that they were not eye-witnesses to the incident. The reply mentions that inquiries
made by Investigating Officer with the neighbourers of the accused indicated that Respondent
No. 3 was a divorcee and was residing at her parents house from the date of divorce. As per the
reply of Deputy Superintendant of Police almost all neighbourers had unanimously informed the
Investigating Officer that the Respondent No. 3 was not seen at her husband's house on 17th, 18th
and 19th June, 2009 and thus the incident referred to by Respondent No. 3 in her complaint was
found to be a concocted story. The reply further mentions that the Investigating Officer had
recorded the statement of doctor who had medically  examined the Respondent No. 3 and the
doctor had categorically stated that medical examination of the Respondent No. 3 did not confirm
allegation of rape made by her. What is relevant to notice is that in the reply it is stated that on
completion of investigation the Investigating Officer had closed the investigation and submitted
the final report as contemplated by Section 169 of the Code on December 18, 2009.
9. Section 156(1) of the Code authorizes the police to investigate into a cognizable offence
without requiring any sanction from a judicial authority. However, sub-section (3) of Section 156
of the Code provides that any Magistrate empowered under Section 190 of the Code may order
such an investigation as mentioned in sub-section (1) of the said Section. Section 190 of the Code
deals with cognizance of offences by Magistrates and inter alia provides that any Magistrate of
the first class may take cognizance of an offence (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which
constitute such offence, (b) upon a police report of such facts and (c) upon information received
from any person other than a police officer or upon his own knowledge that such offence has
been committed. Neither Section 154  nor Section 156 of the Code contemplates any application
to be made to the police under Section 156(3) of the Code. What is provided in Section 156(1) of
the Code is that any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate,
investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the
limits of such station would have power to inquiry  into or try under the provisions of Chapter
XIII. However, this Court finds that in the present case it was alleged by the respondent No. 3
that she had filed complaint before police but according to her, the police officer in charge of the
police station had refused to register her complaint and, therefore, she had made application to the
Senior Superintendent of Police as required by Section 154(3) of the Code, but of no avail.
Therefore, the respondent No. 3 had approached the appellant, who was then discharging duties
as Judicial Magistrate II, Court No. 14, Saharanpur. When the complaint was presented before the
appellant, the appellant had mainly two options available to her. One was to pass an order as
contemplated by Section 156(3) of the Code and second one was to direct examination of the
complainant upon oath and the witnesses present, if any, as mentioned in Section 200 and
proceed further with the matter as provided by Section 202 of the Code. An order made under
sub-section (3) of Section 156 of the Code is in the nature of a peremptory reminder or intimation
to the police to exercise its plenary power of investigation under Section 156(1). Such an
investigation embraces the entire continuous process which begins with the collection of evidence
under Section 156 and ends with the final report either under Section 169 or submission of charge
sheet under Section 173 of the Code. A Magistrate can under Section 190 of the Code before
taking cognizance ask for investigation by the police under Section 156(3) of the Code. The
Magistrate can also issue warrant for production, before taking cognizance. If after cognizance
has been taken and the Magistrate wants any investigation, it will be under Section 202 of the
Code. The phrase "taking cognizance of" means cognizance of offence and not of the offender.
Taking cognizance does not involve any formal action or indeed action of any kind but occurs as
soon as a Magistrate applies his mind to the suspected commission of an offence. Cognizance,
therefore, takes place at a point when a Magistrate first takes judicial notice of an offence. This is
the position whether the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence on a complaint or on a police
report or upon information of a person other than a police officer. Before the Magistrate can be
said to have taken cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code, he must have
not only applied his mind to the contents of the complaint presented before him, but must have
done so for the purpose of proceeding under Section 200 and the provisions following that
Section. However, when the Magistrate had applied his mind only for ordering an investigation
under Section 156(3) of the Code or issued a warrant for the purposes of investigation, he cannot
be said to have taken cognizance of an offence. Taking cognizance is a different thing from
initiation of the proceedings. One of the objects of examination of complainant and his witnesses
as mentioned in Section 200 of the Code is to ascertain whether there is prima facie case against
the person accused of the offence in the complaint  and to prevent the issue of process on a
complaint which is either false or vexatious or intended only to harass such person. Such
examination is provided, therefore, to find out whether there is or not sufficient ground for
proceeding further.

10. From the order dated August 1, 2009, passed by the appellant, it is evident that the appellant
had called for report from the concerned police station and considered the said report wherein it
was inter alia mentioned that no case was registered on the basis of the application made by the
respondent No. 3. The respondent No. 3 at the time of filing complaint before the appellant had
filed her own affidavit, carbon copy of the application sent by her to the Senior Superintendent of
Police, Saharanpur with its postal registration and photocopy of the medical certificate. Under the
circumstances the appellant had exercised judicial  discretion available to a Magistrate and
directed that the application, which was submitted by the respondent No. 3 under Section 156(3)
of the Code, be registered as complaint and directed the Registry to present the said complaint
before her on August 28, 2009 for recording the statement of the respondent No.3 under Section
200 of the Code. The judicial discretion exercised by the appellant was in consonance with the
scheme postulated by the Code. There is no material on the record to indicate that the judicial
discretion exercised by the appellant was either arbitrary or perverse. There was no occasion for
the learned Single Judge of High Court to substitute the judicial discretion exercised by the
appellant merely because another view is possible. The appellant was the responsible judicial
officer on the spot and after assessing the material placed before him he had exercised the judicial
discretion. In such circumstances this Court is of the opinion that the High Court had no occasion
to interfere with the discretion exercised judiciously in terms of the provisions of Code.
Normally, an order under Section 200 of the Code for examination of the complainant and his
witnesses would not be passed because it consumes the valuable time of the Magistrate being
vested in inquiring into the matter which primarily is the duty of the police to investigate.
However, the practice which has developed over the years is that examination of the complainant
and his witnesses under Section 200 of the Code would be directed by the Magistrate only when a
case is found to be serious one and not as a matter of routine course. If on a reading of a
complaint the Magistrate finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and
forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code will
not be conducive to justice, he will be justified in adopting the course suggested in Section 200 of
the Code. Here, in this case the respondent No. 3 had averred in the application submitted before
the appellant that the Officer-in-charge of the Nakur Police Station had refused to register her
complaint against her father-in-law regarding alleged rape committed on her and that no action
was taken by the Senior Superintendent of Police though necessary facts were brought to his
notice. Under the circumstances, the judicial discretion exercised by the appellant, to proceed
under Section 200 of  the Code in the light of principles of law laid down by the Allahabad High
Court in various reported decisions could not have been faulted with nor the appellant could have
been subjected to severe criticism as was done by the learned Single Judge. There was no
occasion for the learned Single Judge to observe that the appellant, a Judicial Magistrate, had
done the gravest injustice to the victim or that though the appellant is a lady Magistrate, yet she
did not think about the outcome of ravishing the chastity of daughter-in-law by her father-in-law
or the seriousness of the crime committed by the accused and the reason assigned by the learned
Magistrate in not directing the police to register  the FIR indicated total non-application of mind
by the appellant and that the order dated August 1, 2009, passed by the appellant, was a blemish
on the justice system. The learned Single Judge was not justified in concluding that the appellant
as Judicial Magistrate had passed the order dated August 1,  2009 ignoring all judicial disciplines
or that the appellant had not at all applied her judicial mind and had only referred to some of the
judgments of the Allahabad High Court, which were contrary to the opinion of the Apex Court
rendered in many decisions. There was no reason for the learned Single Judge of the High Court
to record his serious displeasure against the order of the appellant which was challenged before
him as an illegal order nor the learned Single Judge was justified in severely criticizing the
conduct of the appellant as Judicial Magistrate because the application submitted by the
respondent N. 3 was ordered to be registered as a complaint and was not dismissed.

11. This Court has laid down in several reported decisions that higher courts should observe
restraint and disparaging remarks normally should not be made against the learned members of
the lower judiciary. In Ishwari Prasad Mishra vs. Mohd. Isa (1963) 3 SCR 722, a Three Judge
Bench of this Court has emphasized the need to adopt utmost judicial restraint against using
strong language and imputation of motive against the lower judiciary by noticing that in such
matters the concerned Judge has no remedy in law to vindicate his position. The law laid down by
this Court in the matter of expunction of remarks where a subordinate Judge has been subjected to
disparaging and undeserved remarks by the superior Court, is well settled by this Court in the
matter of `K' a Judicial Officer Vs. Registrar General, High Court of Andhra Pradesh 2001 
(3) SCC 54. In the said decision this Court has succinctly outlined the guidelines in this regard in
paragraph 15 of the said Judgment as under:
"........The existence of power in higher echelons of judiciary to make observations even
extending to criticism incorporated in judicial orders cannot be denied. However, the
High Courts have to remember that criticisms and observations touching a subordinate
judicial officer incorporated in judicial pronouncements have their own mischievous
infirmities. Firstly, the judicial officer is condemned unheard which is violative of
principles of natural justice. A member of subordinate judiciary himself dispensing
justice should not be denied this minimal natural justice so as to shield against being
condemned unheard. Secondly, the harm caused by such criticism or observation may be
incapable of being undone. Such criticism of the judicial officer contained in a judgment,
reportable or not, is a pronouncement in the open and therefore becomes public. Thirdly,
human nature being what it is such criticism of a judicial officer contained in the
judgment of a higher court gives the litigating party a sense of victory not only over his
opponent but also over the Judge who had decided the case against him. This is
subversive of judicial authority of the deciding Judge. Fourthly, seeking expunging of the
observations by a judicial officer by filing an appeal or petition of his own reduces him to
the status of a litigant arrayed as a party before  the High Court or Supreme Court- a
situation not very happy from the point of view of the functioning of the judicial system.
And last but not the least, the possibility of a single or casual aberration of an otherwise
honest, upright and righteous Judge being caught unawares in the net of adverse
observations cannot be ruled out. Such an incident would have a seriously demoralizing
effect not only on him but also on his colleagues. If all this is avoidable why should it not
be avoided?"
However, this Court has further provided that the parameters outlined hereinbefore must not be
understood as meaning that any conduct of a subordinate judicial office unbecoming of him and
demanding a rebuff should be simply overlooked. This Court has outlined an alternate safer and
advisable course of action in such a situation, that is of separately drawing up proceedings,
inviting the attention of the Hon'ble Chief Justice to the facts describing the conduct of the
subordinate Judge concerned by sending a confidential letter or note to the Chief Justice. The
actions so taken would all be on the administrative side with the subordinate Judge concerned
having an opportunity of clarifying his position and he would be provided the safeguard of not
being condemned unheard, and if the decision be adverse to him, it being on the administrative
side, he would have some remedy available to him under the law. Again, in K.P. Tiwari vs. State 
of M.P. 1994 Supp. (1) SCC 540, this Court had to remind all concerned that using intemperate
language and castigating strictures on the members of lower judiciary diminishes the image of
judiciary in the eyes of public and, therefore, the higher courts should refrain from passing
disparaging remarks against the members of the lower judiciary. The record would show that the
appellant had discharged her judicial duties to the best of her capacity. To err is human. It is often
said that a Judge, who has not committed an error, is yet to be born. This dictum applies to all the
learned Judges at all levels from the lowest to the highest. The difference in views of the higher
and the lower courts is purely a result of a difference in approach and perception. But merely
because there is difference in views, it does not necessarily establish that the lower courts are
necessarily wrong and the higher courts are always right. Therefore, this Court in several reported
decision has emphasized the need to adopt utmost judicial restraint against making the
disparaging remarks so far as members of lower judiciary are concerned.

12. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the
disparaging remarks referred to above, made by the learned Single Judge of the Allahabad High
Court, were not justified at all and, therefore, the appeal will have to be accepted.

13. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal succeeds. The disparaging remarks made by the learned
Single Judge of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Application No.
21606 of 2009, decided on September 9, 2009, while setting aside order dated August 1, 2009,
passed by the appellant in case No. nil of 2009 titled as Shabnam vs. Irshad directing that the
application submitted by the respondent No. 3 be registered as complaint and ordering the
Registry to present the same before her for recording statement of the respondent No. 3 under
Section 200 of the Code, are hereby set aside and quashed. In this Appeal prayer is to expunge
remarks made by the learned Single Judge of High Court against the Appellant. The other
directions are not subject matter of challenge in the appeal, therefore, those directions are not
interfered with.

14. The appeal accordingly stands disposed of.

Double Jeopardy – no one can be tried and convicted for the same offence or even for a different offence but on the same facts


KOLLA VEERA RAGHAV RAO vs. GORANTLA VENKATESWARA RAO & ANR.
                       (MARKANDEY KATJU & GYAN SUDHA MISRA, JJ.)
Criminal Appeal No. 1160 of 2006-Decided on 01-02-2011.

ORDER
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. This Appeal has been filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 07th October, 2005
passed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Criminal Appeal No. 1581 of 1999 and Criminal
Revision Case No. 312 of 1999.

3. The facts have been set out in the impugned judgment and hence we are not repeating the same
here except wherever necessary.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant was already convicted under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and hence he could not be again tried or
punished on the same facts under Section 420 or any other provision of IPC or any other statute.
We find force in this submission.
5. It may be noticed that there is a difference between the language used in Article 20(2) of the
Constitution of India and Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C.. Article 20(2) states:   
"no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once."  


6. On the other hand, Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. States:
"300. Person once convicted or acquitted not to be tried for same office (1) A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence and convicted or acquitted of such offence shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force, not be liable to be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made under sub- section (1) of section 221 or for which he might have been convicted under subsection (2) thereof." 


7. Thus, it can be seen that Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. is wider than Article 20(2) of the
Constitution. While, Article 20(2) of the Constitution only states that 'no one can be prosecuted
and punished for the same offence more than once', Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. states that no one 
can be tried and convicted for the same offence or even for a different offence but on the same 
facts.  

8. In the present case, although the offences are different but the facts are the same. Hence,
Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. applies. Consequently, the prosecution under Section 420, IPC was
barred by Section 300(1) of Cr.P.C. The Appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the
High Court is set aside.