Page 1
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 901 OF 2014
KESHAVLAL KHEMCHAND AND SONS PVT. LTD.
& OTHERS … Petitioners
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & OTHERS … Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 902 OF 2014
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 903 OF 2014
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 904 OF 2014
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 905 OF 2014
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 907 OF 2014
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 925 OF 2014
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 926 OF 2014
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 937 OF 2014
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 938 OF 2014
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 939 OF 2014
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 940 OF 2014
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 945 OF 2014
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 946 OF 2014
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 947 OF 2014
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 948 OF 2014Page 2
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1230 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.2230 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1231 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12008 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1233 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12153 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1234 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12233 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1235 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12266 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1236 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12368 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1237 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12408 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1238 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 12445 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1239 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12461 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1240 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12509 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1241 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12584 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1242 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12585 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1243 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12588 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1244 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12589 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1245 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12590 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1246 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12592 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1247 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12593 of 2014)
2Page 3
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1248 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12594 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1249 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.12596 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1250-1251 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 13706-13707 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1252 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.14100 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1253 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.14259 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1254 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.14343 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1255-56 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 14345-14346 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1257 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.14358 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1258 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.14407 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1259 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.14518 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1260 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.14565 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1261 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.15076 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1262 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.15105 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1263 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.15756 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1264 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.15818 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1265-66 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.15835-15836 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1267-68 OF 2015
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(Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.15837-15838 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1269-70 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.15841-15842 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1271 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.15963 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1272 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.15964 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1273 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.16163 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1274 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.16164 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1275 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.16165 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1276 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.18478 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1277 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.18756 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1278 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.18949 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1279 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 21232 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1280 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.22198 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1281-82 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 24451-24452 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1283 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 25752 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1284 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 28796 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1285-86 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 29722-29723 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1287 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.29792 of 2014)
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CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1288 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 30196 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1289 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 25444 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1290 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 25445 of 2014)
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1291-92 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos. 32028-32029 of 2014)
AND
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1293 OF 2015
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 33096 of 2014)
J U D G M E N T
Chelameswar, J.
1. Leave granted in all the SLPs.
2. The Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and
Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002, (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘Act’), was made by the Parliament in the year 2002. The
Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Act explained the
purpose behind the enactment as follows:-
“There is no legal provision for facilitating securitization of financial
assets of banks and financial institutions. Further, unlike international
banks, the banks and financial institutions in India do not have power
to take possession of securities and sell them. Our existing legal
framework relating to commercial transactions has not kept pace with
the changing commercial practices and financial sector reforms. This
has resulted in slow place (sic pace) of recovery of defaulting loans
and mounting levels of non-performing assets of banks and financial
institutions.”
5Page 6
The enactment was preceded by three Committee Reports – two
headed by Mr. M. Narasimham1
and the third by Mr. T.R.
Andhyarujina2
.
3. Recovery of money from a debtor by resorting to the filing of a
suit takes painfully long time in this country, for various reasons3
.
Huge amounts of money are lent by various banks and other financial
institutions. Speedy recovery of the monies due to such institutions is
an important element determining the efficiency not only of such
institutions but also becomes an important factor for the financial
health of the country.
4. In order to facilitate banks and financial institutions (hereinafter
collectively referred to as “CREDITORS” for the sake of convenience)
to speedily recover the monies due to them from the borrowers,
Parliament made a law called ‘The Recovery of Debts due to Banks
and Financial Institutions Act, 1993’ (51 of 1993) under which banks
1
Ex. Governor, Reserve Bank of India
2
Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India
3
1.31 There has been a perception, and not without reason, that our legal system have not kept pace with measures of
financial sector reform and indeed economic reforms more generally. As far as the banking sector is concerned, there is
continuing need for an appropriate legal framework to help enforce contracts and protect the interests of secured creditors
especially in bankruptcy proceedings. Some of our laws are outdated and legal procedures are cumbersome and time
consuming. Even where Court decrees are obtained their enforcement has been marked by delays. Our experience with
the Debt Recovery Tribunals has not been altogether satisfactory in view of the legal issues that have been raised. Our laws
indeed seem marked by a basic asymmetry in their protection of creditors as distinct from borrowers which comes in the
way of the proper and smooth functioning of banking and credit systems. [See: Introduction : The Issues, Report of the
Committee on Banking Sector Reforms (April 1998), Ch.I page 6]
6Page 7
and financial institutions could approach a tribunal constituted under
the said Act. It deals exclusively with the claims for the recovery of
the monies due from the borrowers to the CREDITORS. Apart from
creating such an exclusive forum, the Act also provided for a more
simpler procedure for the adjudication of the legality of the claims
brought before it by the CREDITOR and a procedure for speedy
recovery of sums so adjudicated.
5. After a decade of working of the tribunals constituted under Act
51 of 1993, the Parliament felt that even machinery and procedure
established under the Act 51 of 1993 is not able to produce the
desired result of efficiently recovering monies from the borrowers.
The Parliament, therefore, made the Act. The crux of the Act is that
any ‘security interest’4
created in favour of a ‘CREDITOR’5
, who by
definition under the Act becomes a ‘SECURED CREDITOR’, can be
enforced without the intervention either of the court or tribunal6
4
Section 2(zf) "security interest" means right, title and interest of any kind whatsoever upon property, created in favour of
any secured creditor and includes any mortgage, charge, hypothecation, assignment other than those specified in section 31;
5
Section 2(zd) "secured creditor" means any bank or financial institution or any consortium or group of banks
or financial institutions and includes—
(i) debenture trustee appointed by any bank or financial institution; or
(ii) securitisation company or reconstruction company, whether acting as such or managing a trust set up by such
securitisation company or reconstruction company for the securitisation or reconstruction, as the case may be; or
(iii) any other trustee holding securities on behalf of a bank or financial institution in whose favour security
interest is created for due repayment by any borrower of any financial assistance;
6
Section 13. Enforcement of security interest.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 69 or section 69A of
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882), any security interest created in favour of any secured creditor may
7Page 8
constituted under Act 51 of 1993 by following the procedure under
Section 13 of the Act. Section 13(2) of the Act provides as follows:
“(2) Where any borrower, who is under a liability to a secured
creditor under a security agreement, makes any default in repayment
of secured debt or any instalment thereof, and his account in respect
of such debt is classified by the secured creditor as non-performing
asset, then, the secured creditor may require the borrower by notice
in writing to discharge in full his liabilities to the secured creditor
within sixty days from the date of notice failing which the secured
creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of the rights under subsection
(4).”
6. It provides that the SECURED CREDITOR may call upon the
borrower7
, by issuing a notice in writing to discharge his liabilities in
full within a period of sixty days from the date of the notice. If the
borrower fails to discharge his liabilities after such a demand, the
secured creditor is entitled to take any one of the steps contemplated
under Section 13(4). Sub-section (2) also stipulates three conditions
precedent for the issuance of such notice – (i) that the borrower must
have a liability under a ‘security agreement’8
; (ii) that the borrower
made a default in repayment of the debt or the instalment thereof;
be enforced, without the intervention of the court or tribunal, by such creditor in accordance with the
provisions of this Act.
7
Section 2(f) "borrower" means any person who has been granted financial assistance by any bank or financial institution
or who has given any guarantee or created any mortgage or pledge as security for the financial assistance granted by any
bank or financial institution and includes a person who becomes borrower of a securitisation company or reconstruction
company consequent upon acquisition by it of any rights or interest of any bank or financial institution in relation to such
financial assistance;
8
Section 2(zb) "security agreement" means an agreement, instrument or any other document or arrangement under which
security interest is created in favour of the secured creditor including the creation of mortgage by deposit of title deeds with
the secured creditor;
8Page 9
and (iii) that the account in respect of such debt is classified by the
secured creditor as a ‘non-performing asset’ (hereinafter referred to
as “NPA”)
7. Sub-section (3) stipulates9
that notice referred to in sub-section
(2) shall give the details of the amounts payable by the borrower and
details of the secured assets intended to be enforced by the secured
creditor in the event of borrower not complying with the demand
made in the notice.
8. Sub-section (4) provides that in the event of the borrower failing
to discharge his liability in spite of notice under sub-section (2), the
secured creditor may take recourse to any one or more of the
measures indicated under sub-section 13(4)10
.
9
Section 13(3) - The notice referred to in sub-section (2) shall give details of the amount payable by the borrower and the
secured assets intended to be enforced by the secured creditor in the event of non-payment of secured debts by the
borrower.
10 Section 13(4) In case the borrower fails to discharge his liability in full within the period specified in sub-section (2), the
secured creditor may take recourse to one or more of the following measures to recover his secured debt, namely:--
(a) take possession of the secured assets of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment
or sale for realising the secured asset;
(b) take over the management of the business of the borrower including the right to transfer by way of lease,
assignment or sale for realising the secured asset:
PROVIDED that the right to transfer by way of lease, assignment or sale shall be exercised only where the
substantial part of the business of the borrower is held as security for the debt:
PROVIDED FURTHER that where the management of whole of the business or part of the business is
severable, the secured creditor shall take over the management of such business of the borrower which is relatable to the
security or the debt.
(c) appoint any person (hereafter referred to as the manager), to manage the secured assets the possession of which
has been taken over by the secured creditor;
(d) require at any time by notice in writing, any person who has acquired any of the secured assets from the
borrower and from whom any money is due or may become due to the borrower, to pay the secured creditor, so much of the
money as is sufficient to pay the secured debt.
9Page 10
9. Another important aspect of the Act is that the activity of the
Securitisation Companies (SC) and Reconstruction Companies (RC) are
given a statutory recognition. Their activity is regulated under
Sections 3 and 4 of the Act. Under Section 3 such companies are
required to be registered with the RBI. Such registration is liable for
cancellation under Section 4 on the happening of any one of the
events specified therein. Section 5 confers statutory authority upon
SCs and RCs to acquire the “financial assets”11 of any CREDITOR.
Section 5(2)12 further provides that upon such acquisition of an asset,
the SC or RC, as the case may be, steps into the shoes of the original
SECURED CREDITOR from whom the asset is acquired.
10. Under the Act, SCs and RCs are also treated to be SECURED
CREDITORS by definition. [See Section 2(1)(zd)]
11 2(1)(l) “financial asset” means debt or receivables and includes-
(i) a claim to any debt or receivables or part thereof, whether secured or unsecured; or
(ii) any debt or receivables secured by, mortgage of, or charge on, immovable property; or
(iii) a mortgage, charge, hypothecation or pledge of movable property; or
(iv) any right or interest in the security, whether full or part underlying such debt or receivables; or
(v) any beneficial interest in property, whether movable or immovable, or in such debt, receivables,
whether such interest is existing, future, accruing, conditional or contingent; or
(vi) any financial assistance;
12 5(2) If the bank or financial institution is a lender in relation to any financial assets acquired under sub-section (1) by
the securitisation company or the reconstruction company such securitisation company or reconstruction company shall, on
such acquisition, be deemed to be the lender and all the rights of such bank or financial institution shall vest in such
company in relation to such financial assets.
10Page 11
11. The constitutional validity of the Act was examined by this Court
in Mardia Chemicals Ltd. & Others v. Union of India & Others,
(2004) 4 SCC 311. This Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act
except that of sub-section (2) of Section 17.
“82. We, therefore, subject to what is provided in para 80 above, uphold the validity
of the Act and its provisions except that of sub-section (2) of Section 17 of the Act,
which is declared ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India.”
12. One of the grounds on which the Act was challenged in Mardia
Chemicals (supra) was that the said Act enables the SECURED
CREDITORS to classify the account of a borrower as NPA at the whims
and fancies of such SECURED CREDITORS. This Court rejected the
said submission for the reasons that the guidelines laid down by the
Reserve Bank of India for classifying the account of a borrower as a
NPA would eliminate the possibility of the SECURED CREDITOR
arbitrarily declaring the account of a borrower as a NPA.
“37. Next we come to the question as to whether it is on
the whims and fancies of the financial institutions to
classify the assets as non-performing assets, as
canvassed before us. We find it not to be so. As a matter
of fact a policy has been laid down by Reserve Bank of India providing
guidelines in the matter for declaring an asset to be a non-performing
asset known as “RBI’s prudential norms on income recognition, asset
classification and provisioning – pertaining to advances” through a
circular dated 30-8-2001. It is mentioned in the said circular as
follows:
**** **** **** ****
**** **** **** ****
11Page 12
From what is quoted above, it is quite evident that
guidelines as laid down by Reserve bank of India which are in more
details but not necessary to be reproduced here, lay down the
terms and conditions and circumstances in which the
debt is to be classified as non-performing asset as
clearly as possible. Therefore, we find no substance in the
submission made on behalf of the petitioners that there are no
guidelines for treating the debt as a non-performing asset.”
13. Section 2(1)(o) of the Act defines NPA. The said definition came
to be amended by Act 30 of 2004. It is the amended definition which
is the subject matter of dispute in this bunch of matters. The said
amended definition came to be challenged in various High Courts.
14. The High Court of Gujarat, by a common judgment dated 24.4.14
in a batch of writ petitions, held that the amended Section 2(1)(o) of
the Act is unconstitutional.
“55. In view of the above-discussions, the writ application is partly
allowed by holding that the amended provisions of Section 2(1)(o) of
the Securitisation Act are ultra vires the Article 14 of the Constitution
and the object of the above Act itself and consequently, we restore
the provisions which existed earlier, i.e., prior to the amendment of
2004 and existed at the time of decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of Mardia Chemicals (supra). We, however, uphold the
guidelines of the RBI challenged in this application.”
15. On the other hand, in another common judgment dated 18.5.14
in a batch of writ petitions, the Madras High Court rejected the
challenge.
12Page 13
16. Hence these appeals by the various aggrieved parties, either the
borrowers or the SECURED CREDITORS. Various writ petitions
invoking Article 32 of the Constitution also came to be filed by some
borrowers against whom proceedings under Section 13 of the Act
were initiated during the pendency of the appeals from the two
judgments referred to above.
17. Since the bone of contention in this bunch of matters is the
amended Section 2(1)(o) of the Act, we deem it appropriate to extract
the provision as it existed both prior to and after the amendment.
THE SECURITISATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION OF FINANCIAL
ASSETS AND ENFORCEMENT OF
SECURITY INTEREST ACT, 2002
THE ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY
INTEREST AND RECOVERY OF DEBTS
LAWS (AMENDMENT) ACT, 2004
2. Definitions
(1) In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires:
(o) “Non-Performing Asset” means an
asset or account of a borrower, which has
been classified by a bank or financial
institution as sub-standard, doubtful or loss
assets, in accordance with the directions or
under guidelines relating to assets
classification issued by the Reserve Bank.
2. Definitions
(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires:
(o) “Non-Performing Asset” means an asset
or account of a borrower, which has been
classified by a bank or financial institution,
as sub-standard, doubtful or loss asset.-
(a) In case such bank or financial
institution is administered or regulated by
any authority or body established,
constituted or appointed by any law for the
time being in force, in accordance with the
directions or guidelines relating to assets
classifications issued by such authority or
13Page 14
body;
(b) In any other case, in accordance with
the directions or guidelines relating to
assets classifications issued by the Reserve
Bank.
18. It can be seen from the above, that prior to its amendment by
Act 30 of 2004, NPA is defined as ‘an account of a borrower which has
been classified’ by a CREDITOR either ‘as a sub-standard asset or a
doubtful asset or a loss asset’ of the CREDITOR and such a
classification is required to be made in accordance with the directions
or guidelines relating to assets classification issued by the Reserve
Bank.
19. But, under the amended definition, such a classification of the
account of a borrower by the CREDITOR is required to be made in
accordance with the directions or guidelines issued by an “authority
or body either established or constituted or appointed by any law for
the time being in force”, in all those cases where the CREDITOR is
either administered or regulated by such an authority (hereinafter
referred to as the “REGULATOR”). If the CREDITOR is not
administered or regulated by any such REGULATOR then the
CREDITOR is required to classify the account of a borrower as NPA in
14Page 15
accordance with the guidelines and directions issued by the Reserve
Bank of India.
20. In other words, by the amendment, the Parliament made it
possible that different sets of guidelines made by different bodies may
be followed by different CREDITORS depending upon the fact as to
who is the administering or regulating authority of such CREDITOR.
Hence, the challenge to the amended provision.
21. Before we examine the various submissions made at the Bar, we
deem it appropriate to give a brief analysis of the judgments of the
Madras High Court as well as the Gujarat High Court.
22. The High Court of Madras rejected the submission of the
petitioners that the impugned provision suffers from the vires of
excessive delegation.
(a) The High Court took note of the fact that the Reserve Bank of
India introduced in the year 1992 the prudential norms of “income
recognition, asset classification, provisioning and other related
15Page 16
matters” and such norms were revised periodically keeping in mind
various developments in the banking system, both nationally and
internationally. The High Court took note of the practice of the
Reserve Bank of issuing master circulars annually which contain the
consolidated instructions issued by the Reserve Bank from time to
time on the above-mentioned matters.
(b) The High Court took note of the fact that the Reserve Bank of
India in exercise of the statutory authority under Section 21 and
Section 35A of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949 prescribes norms for
the various aspects of banking specified under the Act.
(c) The High Court held that the Parliament, while defining a nonperforming
asset under Section 2(1)(o) of the Act, only adopted the
norms prescribed from time to time by the Reserve Bank of India for
the purpose of identifying the NPA.13
“34.….In this case, the Legislature has left the job of defining “nonperforming
asset’ in the hands of Reserve Bank of India. Therefore,
when once the Legislature has approved the power of Reserve Bank
13 29. However, the question for consideration before us is as to whether there is indeed any delegated legislation or not.
We are of the view that there is no delegated legislation involved in the case on hand. As discussed above, the power
exercised by the Reserve Bank of India in a separate enactment has been taken note of by the Legislature in the subsequent
one. It is only a definition clause, which has been adopted by the Legislature. This has been done to put its machinery into
use towards its avowed object of activity – appropriate recovery. Therefore, we do not find any delegated legislation
involved and therefore contentions raised on the power of delegation and thereafter it is excessive, has no force. We only
observe for the sake of completion, that even assuming that there is a delegated legislation involved, the same is not
excessive as there are sufficient guidelines available in the earlier enactment and based upon which the Circular has been
issued by the Reserve Bank of India, being a specialized body.
16Page 17
of India on the classification of assets, the resultant consequence
would be that a subsequent amendment pertaining to such a
classification would apply with its vigour and force to the new Act as
well.
35. In the light of the discussions made above, we are of the view
that it is a case of an adoption involved in the present case.
Therefore it can only be termed as legislation by reference and hence
the impugned Circular is valid in law.”
23. On the other hand, the Gujarat High Court opined that the
amended definition of the expression ‘NPA’ creates two classes of
borrowers. In the context of the classification of the account of a
borrower as a NPA of the CREDITOR, while one class of borrowers are
governed by the guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India, the
other class of borrowers are governed by the guidelines issued by
different authorities.14 The High Court also placed reliance on the
statement of objects and reasons of the Act, as it was originally
enacted, which inter alia stated as:
“(h) empowering banks and financial institutions to take possession
of securities given for financial assistance and sell or lease the same
or take over management in the event of default, i.e. classification of
the borrower’s account as non-performing asset in accordance with
the directions given or guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India
from time to time.”
and recorded a conclusion that the Parliament deviated from the
original aims and objects propounded by it. It also took note of the
14 23. Thus, borrowers are divided into two different classes; First, the borrowers in respect of the Banks and Financial
Institutions which are administered or regulated by an authority or body established, constituted or appointed by any law for
the time being in force, and in those cases, it will be for that authority or body to frame the guidelines for asset classification
and, secondly, the borrowers in respect of all other cases not covered by clause (a), and in respect of those cases, it will be
in accordance with the directions or guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank for asset classification.
17Page 18
fact that this Court in Mardia Chemicals (supra) repelled the attack
on the original definition of a NPA on the ground that the CREDITORS
are bound by the policy guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of
India, and therefore, there is no possibility of the CREDITORS
arbitrarily or whimsically classifying the account of any borrower as a
NPA.
The High Court therefore opined that the deviation from the original
objects and reasons would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution
of India.
24. Learned counsel appearing for the borrowers argued that the
amended Section 2(1)(o) is unconstitutional for the following reasons:
(1) that the Parliament, by authorizing the various bodies to frame
the guidelines in accordance with which the account of a
borrower could be classified as a NPA abdicated its essential
legislative function by making an excessive delegation;
(2) that while the un-amended Section 2(1)(o) provided for a uniform
standard by which an account of a borrower is to be classified as
NPA of the CREDITOR by applying the guidelines issued by the
Reserve Bank, the amended provision enables different
18Page 19
CREDITORS to adopt different guidelines which prescribe
different standards for arriving at a conclusion that the account
of a borrower is NPA. Such a provision according to the
borrowers, is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India as
it amounts to a class legislation forbidden by Article 14;
(3) Since the Act recognizes the possibility of acquisition of a
“financial asset”15 of a CREDITOR by either a “securitization
company”16 or a “reconstruction company”17 it introduces a great
deal of uncertainty in the matter of the application of the
guidelines appropriate for classification of an account of a
borrower as a NPA. It all depends on the fact as to who is the
current holder of such financial asset when the proceedings
under Section 13 are sought to be invoked.
15 Section 2. Definitions— (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-- (l) "financial asset" means debt or
receivables and includes--
(i) a claim to any debt or receivables or part thereof, whether secured or unsecured; or
(ii) any debt or receivables secured by, mortgage of, or charge on, immovable property; or
(iii) a mortgage, charge, hypothecation or pledge of movable property; or
(iv) any right or interest in the security, whether full or part underlying such debt or receivables; or
(v) any beneficial interest in property, whether movable or immovable, or in such debt, receivables, whether such
interest is existing, future, accruing, conditional or contingent; or
(vi) any financial assistance;
16 Section 2(za) "securitisation company" means any company formed and registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of
1956) for the purpose of securitisation;
17 Section 2(v) "reconstruction company" means a company formed and registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of
1956) for the purpose of asset reconstruction;
19Page 20
(4) As the Act does not provide for a reasonable opportunity to
demonstrate that the classification of the borrower’s account as
a NPA is untenable, the power to make such a classification itself
becomes arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.
25. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the Union
of India, the RBI and the various CREDITORS submitted that the
impugned amendment is a constitutionally valid piece of legislation.
1. In recognition of the fact that the assessment of an account of
borrower as NPA depends upon innumerable factors which
constantly keep changing, Parliament thought it fit to stipulate
that the assessment be made in the light of the guidelines made
by either the RBI or various other REGULATORS regulating the
activities of various CREDITORS. There is no delegation of any
essential legislative functions.
2. The prescription that the classification of NPA is to be made on
the basis of the guidelines framed by different bodies regulating
the different CREDITORS is a constitutionally permissible
classification having regard to the nature of the different credit
20Page 21
facilities extended by the various CREDITORS to different
categories of borrowers and on different terms and conditions.
3. The third submission made on behalf of the borrowers is
sought to be repelled on two grounds:
i) that, it is a purely hypothetical submission in the context
of the present set of cases as in none of the cases the
original SECURED CREDITOR transferred the financial
asset in favour of any other body;
ii) assuming for the sake of argument that there is a
possibility of an asset of the SECURED CREDITOR being
acquired either by a securitization company or a
reconstruction company and therefore are governed by
the guidelines (for the determination of the question
whether an acquired asset has become a non-performing
asset) other than those promulgated by the Reserve
Bank of India, it has not been demonstrated in any one of
these cases that such guidelines are less favourable to
the borrowers than the guidelines of the Reserve Bank of
India.
21Page 22
26. We would like to make it clear that we are not undertaking the
examination of a second round of attack on the constitutionality of the
Act in its entirety. It is nobody’s case that judgment of this Court in
Mardia Chemicals (supra) requires reconsideration. As pointed out
by the borrowers, the definition of the expression “NPA” [under
Section 2(1)(o)] underwent an amendment subsequent to the decision
in Mardia Chemicals, the validity of such an amendment only is
required to be examined in these matters.
27. We have already noticed that under Section 13 of the Act the
right to invoke the provisions of the Act for enforcement of a security
interest is permissible only on the satisfaction of the three conditions
specified under Section 13(2) of the Act. One of them being that the
account of the borrower is classified by the SECURED CREDITOR as a
non-performing asset (NPA) of the CREDITOR.
28. The expression ‘asset’ is not defined under the Act. But the
expressions ‘financial asset’18 and ‘non performing asset’ are defined
under Section 2(1)(l) and 2(1)(o) of the Act. The claim of a CREDITOR
to any debt or receivables etc. from the borrower becomes the
18 Footnote 11 supra
22Page 23
financial asset of the CREDITOR. Under the unamended definition, an
asset (of the CREDITOR i.e., the account of the borrower) which is
classified by the CREDITOR as “sub-standard, doubtful or loss asset”
in accordance with the direction or guidelines relating to the assets
classification issued by the Reserve Bank becomes an NPA. The
amended definition however defines a NPA as an asset classified by
the CREDITOR as “sub-standard, doubtful or loss asset” in accordance
with the relevant guidelines issued by the appropriate body. In the
case of the CREDITORS “administered or regulated by any authority or
body established, constituted or appointed by any law for the time
being in force”, such ‘REGULATOR’, and with reference to CREDITORS,
not so administered or regulated, the Reserve Bank are the
appropriate authorities.
29. We have already noticed that one of the two main purposes of
the Act is to facilitate the SECURED CREDITORS19 to recover the
19
The expression “SECURED CREDITOR” by definition under the Act takes within its sweep – (i) a bank, (ii) a financial
institution, consortium or group of banks or financial institutions, (4) debentures trustees appointed by any bank or financial
institution, (5) a securitisation company, (6) reconstruction company etc. Once again the expression ‘bank’ by definition
takes within its sweep six categories of entities specified under Section 2(1)(c). The expression ‘financial institution’, by
definition under the Act, takes within its sweep four categories of bodies specified under Section 2(1)(m). The activities of
all the above mentioned categories of entities are primarily governed by some in-house managerial body which, in turn, are
subject to the control and regulation either by the Reserve Bank of India or some other statutory body or authority, which
are also subject to the overall supervisory control of the Reserve Bank of India. For example, the National Housing Bank, a
bank established under the Act No.53 of 1987 of the Parliament, though is an autonomous body “to operate as a financial
agency to promote housing finance institutions” with vast powers to regulate the housing finance activity in the country, it
is still obliged under Section 5(5) of the Act 53 of 1987 to be guided by the directions given by the Reserve Bank of India.
23Page 24
amounts due to them from the borrowers by enforcing the security
interest created by the borrowers without the intervention of the civil
court or the tribunal.
30. We think that it is necessary to trace out the history of the
concepts of (i) NPA and (ii) loan transaction for the better appreciation
of the controversy before us.
31. On 14th August, 1991, the Government of India appointed a ninemember
Committee headed by Mr. M. Narasimham, (13th Governor of
the Reserve Bank of India) to examine various aspects relating to the
structure, organization, functions and procedures of the banking
system. The said Committee came to be appointed in the backdrop
of the Balance of Payment Crisis which the country was facing at that
point of time.
32. The Committee submitted its 1st Report on the 16th November,
1991. While examining the various aspects of the financial system,
The National Housing Bank Act, 1987 (No.53 of 1987) - Section 5(5). In the discharge of its
functions under this Act, the National Housing Bank shall be guided by such directions in matters of
policy involving public interest as the Central government, in consultation with the Reserve Bank, or the
Reserve Bank, may give in writing.
We are informed at the bar by the learned counsel appearing for the Reserve Bank of India that there are some 49
entities (we doubt the accuracy of the statement but it does not make any difference for this decision on hand), such as, 18
State Financial Corporations, Exim Bank, National Housing Bank, NABARD etc., which fall within the definition of the
expression “bank” or “financial institution” as defined under the SARFAESI Act which fall within the sweep of Section
2(1)(o)(a) of the said Act.
24Page 25
the said Committee considered the functioning of the banking system
in the country. It took note of the existing guidelines issued by the
Reserve Bank of India from time to time and also the various practices
of the banking industry. The Committee was of the view that the
“ratio of capital funds in relation to bank’s deposits or its assets is a
well known and universally accepted measure of the strength and
stability of the institution”.
33. It took note of the capital adequacy standards prescribed by the
Committee known as Basle Committee20 and opined that it is
necessary that the Indian banks also conform to those standards.
But as a prelude to the compliance with the BIS standards, the
Committee opined that the banks should have their assets revalued
on a more realistic basis and on the basis of their realizable value.
34. It also took note of the fact that the banks and development
financial institutions (DFIs) had not been following a universal practice
with regard to the income recognition, valuation of investments or
20 The Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices appointed by the Bank of International
Settlements (BIS) has prescribed certain capital adequacy standards to be followed by commercial banks and these
standards have been accepted for implementation by several countries. The BIS standard, as it is popularly known, seeks to
measure capital adequacy as the ratio of capital to risk weighted assets. It has prescribed weightages for different categories
of assets which include certain off-balance sheet items as well. The Committee believes that it is necessary that banks in
India also conform to these standards in a phased manner. [See: Capital Adequacy, Accounting Policies and Other Related
Matters, Report of the Committee on the Financial System (November 1991), Ch.V page 51]
25Page 26
provisioning against doubtful debts. It is in this background, the
Committee recommended as follows:-
“..The international practice is that an asset is treated as “non-performing” when interest
is overdue for at least two quarters. In respect of such non-performing assets interest is
not recognized on accrual basis but is booked as income only when actually received.
The Committee is of the view that a similar practice should be followed by banks and
financial institutions in India and accordingly recommends that interest on nonperforming
assets should not be booked as income on accrual basis. The nonperforming
assets would be defined as an advance where, as on the balance sheet date
(a) in respect of term loans, interest remains past due for a period of more
than 180 days.
(b) in respect of overdraft and cash credits, accounts remain out of order
for a period of more than 180 days,
(c) in respect of bills purchased and discounted, the bill remains overdue
and unpaid for a period of more than 180 days,
(d) in respect of other accounts, any amount to be received remains past
due for a period of more than 180 days.
An amount is considered past due when it remains outstanding 30 days beyond
the date.
**** **** **** ****
The Committee is of the view that for the purposes of provisioning, banks and
financial institutions should classify their assets by compressing the Health
Codes into the following broad groups:
i) Standard
ii) Sub-standard
iii) Doubtful and
iv) Loss
The RBI should prescribe clear and objective definitions for these 4 categories to
ensure a uniform, consistent and logical basis for classification of assets.
Broadly stated, sub-standard assets would be those which exhibit problems and
would include assets classified as non-performing for a period not exceeding two
years. Doubtful assets are those non-performing assets which remain as such
for a period exceeding two years and would also include loans in respect of
which instalments are overdue for a period exceeding 2 years. Loss assets are
26Page 27
accounts where loss has been identified but the amounts have not been written
off.”
35. Narasimham Committee Report on asset classification by the
CREDITORS was accepted by the Reserve Bank of India and guidelines
are being issued from time to time. Different instructions culminating
into different “Master Circulars” with respect to various classes of
banks and financial institutions came to be issued by the Reserve
Bank from time to time. For example, the Reserve Bank of India
issued instructions dealing with the Non Banking Financial Companies
(NBFCs)21 and also the Securitisation Companies and Reconstruction
Companies. Originally such guidelines were meant only to enable the
CREDITORS to have a rational view of their “assets”/”financial assets”
for the better administration of their funds and the banking business.
The Parliament thought it fit to adopt the above-mentioned guidelines
issued by the Reserve Bank of India even for the purpose of
identifying NPAs under the Act.
21
Section 45-I(f) ‘‘non-banking financial company’’ means–
(i) a financial institution which is a company;
(ii) a non-banking institution which is a company and which has as its principal business
the receiving of deposits, under any scheme or arrangement or in any other manner, or lending in
any manner;
(iii) such other non-banking institution or class of such institutions, as the Bank may,
with the previous approval of the Central Government and by notification in the Official Gazette,
specify.
27Page 28
36. Now, we proceed to examine what exactly is a loan transaction –
the rights and obligations arising out of a loan transaction and the
impact of the Act on such rights and obligations.
37. The expression ‘loan’, though not defined under the Act, has a
well-settled connotation i.e., advancing of money by one person to
another under an agreement by which the recipient of the money
agrees to repay the amount on such agreed terms with regard to the
time of repayment and the liability to pay interest.
“Definition of loan. A contract of loan of money is a contact whereby one person lends
or agrees to lend a sum of money to another, in consideration of a promise express or
implied to repay that sum on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future time, or
conditionally upon an event which is bound to happen, with or without interest.”
- Chitty on Contracts, Vol.II 30th Edn., p.909
38. The person advancing the money is generally called a CREDITOR
and the person receiving the money is generally called a borrower.
The most simple form of a loan transaction is a contract by which the
borrower agrees to repay the amount borrowed on demand by the
creditor with such interest as stipulated under the agreement. Such a
loan transaction may be attended by any arrangement of a security
like a mortgage or pledge etc. depending upon the agreement of the
parties.
28Page 29
39. The Act provides for a mode of speedy recovery of the monies
due from the borrowers to one class of creditors who are banks and
financial institutions (CREDITORS). Advances/loans made by
CREDITORS to businessmen and industrialists are generally not
repayable on demand but repayable in accordance with a fixed time
schedule agreed upon by the parties known as “term loans”.
“Term loans. A loan may be made for a specified period (a term loan). In such a case
repayment is due at the end of the specified period and, in the absence of any express
provision or implication to the contrary, no further demand for repayment is necessary.”
- Chitty on Contracts, Vol.II 30th Edn., p.913
In other words, such loans are repayable in instalments over a period
of time the terms of which are evidenced by a written agreement
between the parties. A default in the repayment, (in terms of the
agreed schedule) generally provides a cause of action for the
CREDITOR to initiate legal proceedings for the recovery of the entire
amount due and outstanding from the borrower. Normally such term
loans are also accompanied by some ‘security interest’ in a ‘secured
asset’ of the borrower. Such a recovery is to be made normally by
instituting a suit for recovery of the amounts by enforcing the
‘security interest’. The Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial
Institutions Act, 1993 created an exclusive forum for a speedy
ascertainment of the amounts actually due from the defaulting
29Page 30
borrower and also provided for a mechanism for speedy recovery of
the amounts so ascertained from such borrowers.
40. Since such a system was also found to be inadequate for the
speedy recovery of the monies due from the borrowers to the
CREDITORS, the Parliament made the Act under which the process of
ascertainment of the amounts due from a borrower by an
independent adjudicatory body is dispensed with. The SECURED
CREDITOR is made the sole judge of the amount due and outstanding
from a borrower subject to an appeal under Section 17 of the Act.
41. Be that as it may, such an ascertainment of amount due and
outstanding is not the only criteria on the basis of which the SECURED
CREDITOR is entitled to initiate proceedings under Section 13(4) of the
Act, but the SECURED CREDITOR is also required to classify the
account of the borrower (asset of the CREDITOR) as an NPA.
42. De hors the Act, when the borrower of a term loan defaults in the
repayment, the CREDITOR can initiate legal proceeding straight away
for recovery of the amounts due and outstanding from the borrower.
The Act places an additional legal obligation on the CREDITOR to
30Page 31
examine and decide whether the account of the borrower has become
an NPA before initiating action under the Act.
43. The question – why did the Parliament impose such an additional
obligation on the CREDITORS while proposing to create a mechanism
for the expeditious recovery of the money due to the SECURED
CREDITORS – requires examination. The answer appears to be that
under the scheme of Section 13(4) the ‘secured asset’ (generally the
assets of an industrial concern, like plant and machinery etc.) could
be taken possession of and could either be sold or the management
could be taken over etc. Such an action if not taken after an
appropriate deliberation in a given case could result in the disruption
of industrial production and consequently resulting in unemployment
and loss of GDP etc. impacting larger interests of the nation.
Therefore, Parliament must have thought that the SECURED
CREDITORS are required to assess whether the default in repayment
by the borrower is due to any factor which is a temporary
phenomenon and the same could be managed by the borrower if
some accommodation is given.
31Page 32
44. The above analysis of the scheme of Section 13 of the Act would
derive support from the fact that even prior to the coming into force
of the Act, the CREDITORS were classifying the accounts of the
borrowers as NPAs under the statutory guidelines issued by the RBI.
We have already noticed that under the said guidelines FINANCIAL
ASSETS are sub-divided into 4 categories i.e. (i) standard, (ii) substandard,
(iii) doubtful, and (iv) loss. Depending upon the length of
the period for which the installment of money is over due, such assets
are classified as NPA. As the length of the period of over due
increased, the account of the borrower is progressively classified from
“sub-standard” to “loss”.
45. The same classification is adopted by the Parliament while
enacting the Act. Therefore, all NPAs do not belong to the same class.
Their characters vary depending on the length of time for which they
remained NPAs.
46. In our view, such a classification is relevant and assumes
importance in the decision making process of the SECURED CREDITOR
under Section 13(2) as to which one of the steps contemplated under
Section 13(4) should be resorted to in the case of a given defaulting
32Page 33
borrower. We hasten to add that it may not be the only factor which
determines the cause of action to be taken by the SECURED
CREDITOR. The magnitude of the amount due and outstanding in a
given case, the reasons which prompted the borrower to default in the
repayment schedule, the nature of the business carried on by the
defaulting borrower, the overall prospects of the defaulter’s business,
national and international market conditions relevant to the business
of a defaulter – in our opinion, are some of the factors which are
germane to a decision that action under Section 13(4) is required to
be taken against a defaulting borrower. Even in a case where on
rational and objective consideration of all the relevant factors
including the representations/objections referred to under Section
13(3A), the CREDITOR comes to a conclusion that steps contemplated
under Section 13(4) are required to be taken in the case of a
particular defaulter, the further question as to which one of the steps
contemplated under Section 13(4) is required to be taken or would
meet the ends of justice is a matter for a further rational decision on
the part of the SECURED CREDITOR.
33Page 34
47. The international practice - noted by Narasimham Committee – is
that “an asset is treated as non-performing when interest is overdue
for at least two quarters”. Such a practice of classifying the asset for
the administrative purposes of the Banks only indicates that a
borrower’s account is not treated as a written off asset, the moment
there is a default. CREDITORS keep a watch on such account and
monitor the performance of the borrower’s activity to ensure the
recovery of the amounts due having regard to the needs of the
industrial sector of the country and the importance of protecting the
industry as far as possible in the larger interest of the economy of the
State.
48. The basic definition under the various circulars of the Reserve
Bank of India and also other REGULATORS of a NPA is an asset which
ceases to generate income for the CREDITORS (banks or financial
institutions) i.e. a loan or advances made by the banks on which
interest and/or instalment of principal amount is overdue for a
specified period depending upon the nature of the loan or advance -
whether the loan or advance is a term loan or agricultural loan, money
advanced on bill discounting etc.
34Page 35
49. To make any attempt to define the expression ‘non-performing
asset’ valid for the millions of cases of loan transactions of various
categories of loans and advances, lent or made by different categories
of CREDITORS for all time to come would not only be an impracticable
task but could also simply paralyse the entire banking system thereby
producing results which are counter productive to the object and the
purpose sought to be achieved by the Act.
50. Realising the same, the Parliament left it to the Reserve Bank of
India and other REGULATORS to prescribe guidelines from time to
time in this regard. The Reserve Bank of India is the expert body to
which the responsibility of monitoring the economic system of the
country is entrusted under various enactments like the RBI Act, 1934,
the Banking Regulation Act, 1949. Various banks like the State Bank
of India, National Housing Bank, which are though bodies created
under different laws of Parliament enjoying a large amount of
autonomy, are still subject to the overall control of the Reserve Bank
of India.
35Page 36
51. Regulation of monetary system and banking business is one of
the fundamental responsibilities of any modern State and essential for
the economic and political stability of the State. The vast increase of
commerce both national and the international made easy by the
tremendous developments of technology, renders such regulation a
very complicated matter with complex variables. The span of each
variable could vary from minutes to years. Therefore, it requires
constant monitoring on daily basis sometime even on minute to
minute basis. In lieu of the importance and complexities, the Reserve
Bank, the prime regulator of the Indian economy and banking system,
has been issuing guidelines and directions from time to time not only
to the banks but to various other financial institutions which are
amenable to its jurisdiction. Such instructions given from time to time
are consolidated annually and published in the form of “Master
Circulars”. One of such circular dated 30.08.2001 was taken note of
by this Court in Mardia Chemicals. Incidentally, the authority of the
Reserve Bank to issue such instructions was considered by this Court
in ICICI Bank Limited v. Official Liquidator of APS Star
Industries Limited & Others, (2010) 10 SCC 1, and this Court held
36Page 37
that the Reserve Bank did have such authority by virtue of Sections
21 and 35-A of the Banking Regulation Act, 194922
.
52. The question is whether in making such a prescription, the
Parliament has delegated any essential legislative function? To
answer the question it is required to understand what is an essential
legislative function and what are the limits subject to which such
function could be delegated.
53. The first major decision of this Court on the subject of the validity
of delegated legislation is In re Art. 143, Constitution of India and
Delhi Laws Act (1912) etc., AIR 1951 SC 332, by a Constitution
bench of 7-Judges. Seven separate judgments were delivered. It was
a case where Section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act authorized the provincial
government to extend by a notification in the official gazette to the
provinces of Delhi, any enactment which was in force in any part of
British India as on the date of such notification. Similar provisions
were contained in two other enactments. One of the questions was
whether such conferment of power on the executive amounted to
22 “39. The Guidelines issued by RBI dated 13.7.2005 itself authorizes the banks to deal inter se in NPAs. These
guidelines have been issued by the regulator in exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 21 and 35-A of the Act.
…………………. All this comes within the ambit of Section 21 which enables RBI to frame the policy in relation to
advances to be followed by the banking companies under Section 21(2). These guidelines and directions following them
have a statutory force.”
37Page 38
excessive delegation of the legislative power. Even according to
Patanjali Sastri, J., who was a member of the Bench which decided the
case, in a subsequent decision in Kathi Raning Rawat v. State of
Saurashtra, AIR 1952 SC 123, while dealing with the decision in
Delhi Laws Act’s case observed thus:
“While undoubtedly certain definite conclusions were reached by the majority of the
Judges who took part in the decision in regard to the constitutionality of certain
specified enactments, the reasoning in each case was different, and it is difficult to say
that any particular principle has been laid down by the majority which can be of
assistance in the determination of other cases.”.
54. In the case of B. Shama Rao v. Union Territory of
Pondicherry, AIR 1967 SC 1480, J.M. Shelat, J. speaking for majority
(3) of a Constitution Bench of 5 Judges, after summarizing the views of
the 7-Judges who delivered the judgment in Delhi Laws Act’s case
opined;
“5. …….In view of the intense divergence of opinion except for their conclusion
partially to uphold the validity of the said laws it is difficult to deduce any general
principle which on the principle of stare decisis can be taken as binding for future cases.
It is trite to say that a decision is binding not because of its conclusion but in regard to
its ratio and the principle laid down therein. The utmost, therefore, that can be said of
this decision is that the minimum on which there appears to be consensus was (1) that
legislatures in India both before and after the Constitution had plenary power within
their respective fields; (2) that they were never the delegates of the British Parliament;
(3) that they had power to delegate within certain limits not by reason of such a power
being inherent in the legislative power but because such power is recognised even in the
United States of America where separatist ideology prevails on the ground that it is
necessary to effectively exercise the legislative power in a modern State with
multifarious activities and complex problems facing legislatures; and (4) that delegation
of an essential legislative function which amounts to abdication even partial is not
permissible. All of them were agreed that it could be in respect of subsidiary and
ancillary power.”
38Page 39
55. In Devi Das Gopal Krishnan etc. v. State of Punjab &
Others, AIR 1967 SC 1895, another Constitution Bench though struck
down the impugned provision on the ground of excessive delegation,
recognized the need of delegating and this Court opined as follows:-
“……… But in view of the multifarious activities of a welfare State, it cannot
presumably work out all the details to suit the varying aspects of a complex situation. It
must necessarily delegate the working out of details to the executive or any other
agency. But there is danger inherent in such a process of delegation. An over-burdened
legislature or one controlled by a powerful executive may unduly overstep the limits of
delegation. It may not lay down any policy at all; it may declare its policy in vague and
general terms; it may not set down any standard for the guidance of the executive; it
may confer an arbitrary power on the executive to change or modify the policy laid
down by it without reserving for itself any control over subordinate legislation. Thus
self effacement of legislative power in favour of another agency either in whole or in
part is beyond the permissible limits of delegation. It is for a court to hold on a fair,
generous and liberal construction of an impugned statute whether the legislature
exceeded such limits.
But the said liberal construction should not be carried by the courts to the extent
of always trying to discover a dormant or latent legislative policy to sustain an arbitrary
power conferred on executive authorities. It is the duty of the court to strike down
without any hesitation an arbitrary power conferred on the executive by the legislature.”
56. In 1968, a Constitution Bench of 7-Judges in Municipal
Corporation of Delhi v. Birla Cotton, Spinning and Weaving
Mills, Delhi & Another, AIR 1968 SC 1232 considered the question
whether Section 150 of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act (66 of
1957) is unconstitutional on the ground that it provided for
impermissible delegation of the ‘essential legislative function’. On an
39Page 40
examination of the abovementioned authorities, apart from others,
Chief Justice Wanchoo, speaking for himself and Justice Shelat, held as
follows:
“28. …… The legislature must retain in its own hands the essential legislative
functions and what can be delegated is the task of subordinate legislation necessary for
implementing the purposes and objects of the Act. Where the legislative policy is
enunciated with sufficient clearness or a standard is laid down, the courts should not
interfere. :What guidance should be given and to what extent and whether guidance has
been given in a particular case at all depends on a consideration of the provisions of the
particular Act with which the Court has to deal including its preamble. Further it
appears to us that the nature of the body to which delegation is made is also a factor to
be taken into consideration in determining whether there is sufficient guidance in the
matter of delegation.”
The Court held that there was no impermissible delegation of
legislative power.
57. Justice Hidayatullah, speaking for himself and for Justice
Ramaswami, agreed with the conclusion reached at by the Chief
Justice, though on slightly different reasons.
58. In M.K. Papiah & Sons v. The Excise Commissioner &
Another, (1975) 1 SCC 492, this Court once again considered the
question of delegated legislation in the context of a provision in the
Mysore Excise Act which provided for the levy of excise duty “at such
rate or rates as the Government may prescribe on excisable goods”.
40Page 41
Such a provision was challenged as unconstitutional on the ground
that it was a case of abdication of essential legislative function by the
legislature. The Court after reviewing the number of earlier decisions
held the impugned provision to be valid. Placing reliance on a
judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Cobb & Co. v. Kropp
[1967 1 AC 141], this Court held as follows:-
“23. The point to be emphasized – and this is rather crucial – is the statement of their
Lordships that the Legislature preserved its capacity intact and retained perfect control
over the Commissioner for Transport inasmuch as it could at any time repeal the
legislation and withdraw the authority and discretion it had vested in him, and,
therefore, the Legislature did not abdicate its functions.
In other words, the very fact that the legislature has the power to
repeal and withdraw the authority of the delegate and the discretion
vested in the delegate, should lead to the conclusion that the
legislature did not abdicate its essential functions.
59. According to Seervai, by its judgment in M.K. Papiah’s case
(supra), this Court “after twenty five years of wandering in the legal maze of its own creation”
…… “come round to the view expressed by the Privy Council in 1878” i.e. Queen v. Burah
[1878 (5) Ind App 178].
41Page 42
60. This Court in the case of Registrar of Cooperative Societies
v. K. Kunjaboo, AIR 1980 SC 350 took note of the uncertainty
prevailing in the following words;
“2. Lawyers and judges have never ceased to be interested in the question of delegated
legislation and since the Delhi Laws Act case, we have been blessed by an abundance of
authority, the blessing not necessarily unmixed. We do not wish, in this case, to search
for the precise principles decided in the Re Delhi Laws Act case, nor to consider
whether M.K. Papiah v. Excise Commissioner beats the final retreat from the earlier
position. For the purposes of this case we are content to accept the “policy” and
“guidelines” theory and seek such assistance as we may derive from cases where near
identical provisions have been considered.”
This Court declined “to consider whether M.K. Papiah & Sons v.
The Excise Commissioner, (1975) 3 SCR 607, beat the final retreat
from the earlier position” but proceeded to examine the case before it
on the theory of “policy” and “guidelines” propounded in some of the
cases.
61. We can safely state that none of the judgments of this Court so
far has laid down any principle indicating as to what exactly
constitutes “essential legislative function”.
62. While the Delhi Laws Act’s case dealt with the delegation of
power to the Executive by the Legislature of applying certain laws
with or without modification to new territories, the other cases
42Page 43
essentially dealt with the permissibility of the delegation of the power
to the Executive to fix the rates of tax etc.
63. An examination of the above authorities, in our view leads to the
following inferences;
(i) The proposition that essential legislative functions cannot be
delegated does not appear to be such a clearly settled
proposition and requires a further examination which exercise
is not undertaken by the counsel appearing in the matter. We
leave it open for debate in a more appropriate case on a
future date.
For the present, we confine to the examination of the
question:
(a) Whether defining every expression used in an enactment
is an essential legislative function or not?
(ii) All the judgments examined above recognize that there is a
need for some amount of delegated legislation in the modern
world.
43Page 44
(iii) If the parent enactment enunciates the legislative policy with
sufficient clarity, delegation of the power to make subordinate
legislation to carry out the purpose of the parent enactment is
permissible.
(iv) Whether the policy of the legislature is sufficiently clear to
guide the delegate depends upon the scheme and the
provisions of the parent Act.
(v) The nature of the body to whom the power is delegated is also
a relevant factor in determining “whether there is sufficient
guidance in the matter of delegation.”
44Page 45
64. Whether defining every word employed in a statute is really
necessary and whether it is a part of the essential legislative function
was never the subject matter of debate in any of these cases.
65. We are of the firm opinion that it is not necessary that legislature
should define every expression it employs in a statute. If such a
process is insisted upon, legislative activity and consequentially
governance comes to a standstill. It has been the practice of the
legislative bodies following the British parliamentary practice to define
certain words employed in any given statute for a proper appreciation
of or the understanding of the scheme and purport of the Act. But if a
statute does not contain the definition of a particular expression
employed in it, it becomes the duty of the courts to expound the
meaning of the undefined expressions in accordance with the well
established rules of statutory interpretation.
66. Therefore, in our opinion, the function of prescribing the norms
for classifying a borrower’s account as a NPA is not an essential
legislative function. The laying down of such norms requires a
constant and close monitoring of the financial system demanding
considerable amount of expertise in the areas of public finance,
45Page 46
banking etc., and the norms may require a periodic revision. All that
activity involves too much of detail and promptitude of action. The
crux of the impugned Act is the prescription that a SECURED
CREDITOR could take steps contemplated under Section 13(4) on the
“default”23 of the borrower. The expression “default” is clearly
defined under the Act. Even if the Act were not to be on the statute
book, under the existing law a CREDITOR could initiate legal action for
the recovery of the amounts due from the borrower, the moment
there is a breach of the terms of the contract under which the loan or
advance is granted. The stipulation under the Act of classifying the
account of the borrower as NPA as a condition precedent for enforcing
the security interest is an additional obligation imposed by the Act on
the CREDITOR. In our opinion, the borrower cannot be heard to
complain that defining of the conditions subject to which the
CREDITOR could classify the account as NPA, is part of the essential
legislative function. If the Parliament did not choose to define the
expression “NPA” at all, Court would be bound to interpret that
expression as long as that expression occurs in Section 13(2). In such
23 Section 2(1) (j) "default" means non-payment of any principal debt or interest thereon or any other amount payable by a
borrower to any secured creditor consequent upon which the account of such borrower is classified as non-performing asset
in the books of account of the secured creditor ;
46Page 47
a situation, Courts would have resorted to the principles of
interpretation (i) as to how that expression is understood in the
commercial world, and (ii) to the existing practice if any of either the
particular CREDITOR or CREDITORS as a class generally. If the
Parliament chose to define a particular expression by providing that
the expression shall have the same meaning as is assigned to such an
expression by a body which is an expert in the field covered by the
statute and more familiar with the subject matter of the legislation, in
our opinion, the same does not amount to any delegation of the
legislative powers. Parliament is only stipulating that the expression
“NPA” must be understood by all the CREDITORS in the same sense in
which such expression is understood by the expert body i.e., the RBI
or other REGULATORS which are in turn subject to the supervision of
the RBI. Therefore, the submission that the amendment of the
definition of the expression ‘non-performing asset’ under Section 2(1)
(o) is bad on account of excessive delegation of essential legislative
function, in our view, is untenable and is required to be rejected.
67. Coming to the submission that by authorizing different
REGULATORS to prescribe different norms for the identification of a
NPA with reference to different CREDITORS amount to unreasonable
47Page 48
classification is also required to be rejected for the reason that all the
CREDITORS do not form a uniform/homogenous class.
68. There are innumerable differences among the CREDITORS.
Differences based on the legal structure of the CREDITORS’
organization, differences based upon the nature of the loan advanced
by them, and differences based on the terms and conditions subject
to which such loans or advances are made by each of those
CREDITORS, etc. For example, the Exim Bank loans are generally in
foreign currencies. Similarly, loans granted by Housing Finance
CREDITORS which are in turn regulated by the National Housing Bank
are loans which are term loans for relatively longer periods than other
loans. There is nothing uniform about these CREDITORS or their
activities.
69. It is submitted by learned counsel for the RBI -
“Prior to the amendment in 2004, NPA was defined as sub-standard,
doubtful or loss asset in accordance with the directions or under
guidelines relating to assets classification issued by the Reserve Bank.
Irrespective of whether the financial entity was regulated by RBI or
not, for the purposes of SARFAESI Act, the asset classification
stipulated by RBI was applicable. Though the regulator concerned of
the financial entity had stipulated different standards for regulatory
purposes, the entities had to apply the criteria stipulated by RBI for
asset classification so far as SARFAESI Act was concerned. The
amendment brought about in 2004 addresses this issue and brings in
uniformity in the classification of assets by financial entities, both for
the purposes of complying with the directions issues by their own
48Page 49
regulations and for the purposes of SARFAESI Act. As such, a
situation where an asset is not an NPA as per the specifications of the
regulator but the same asset is an NPA for the purposes of SARFAESI
Act or vice versa does not arise after the amendment made in 2004.”
70. The Union of India filed a counter affidavit (through Director,
Department of Financial Services, Ministry of Finance) before the High
Court of Gujarat in Special Civil Application No.2910 of 2013 regarding
the purpose for which the impugned amendment was brought in. It is
stated in the counter affidavit as follows:
“9. I state and submit that the amendment in Section 2(1)(o) of
SARFAESI Act, 2002 was made in 2004 to extend the classification
norms of non-performing assets stipulated buy (sic by) the concerned
regulator who is administering or regulating such entity or the
Reserve Bank of India when the said institution is not regulated by
any regulator in India. There are financial institutions such as Housing
Finance corporations notified by Central Government under SARFAESI
Act, which are regulated by National Housing Bank. The nonperforming
assets of these institutions are classified as per guidelines
prescribed by National Housing Bank. The Act covers certain other
institutions such as Asian Development Bank and assets are classified
as per the guidelines prescribed by Reserve Bank of India. The above
amendments in the Act were made so that the guidelines issued by
concerned regulator as applicable to them are covered for the
purpose of recovery under the Act.
10. I further state and submit that the amendment covered the
entities under the Act regulated by different regulators such as
Reserve Bank of India, National Housing Bank etc. who had stipulated
their own guidelines for the purpose. At the same time, the
amendment also covered the entities like Asian Development Bank,
which did not fall within the purview of any regulator in India.
Therefore, the amendment was made in the Act to take care of these
situations and these amendments were necessary to cover the
deficiencies noticed in the Act.”
49Page 50
71. Therefore, to say that enabling them to follow different norms
would be violative of Article 14, in our view, would be wholly
untenable.
72. Coming to the third submission of the borrower, we would not
like to deal with this submission in the instant batch of cases as there
are few cases where factually the SECURED ASSETS have been
transferred by the ORIGINAL CREDITORS. Those cases have been detagged
from this batch to be heard separately.
73. Coming to the fourth submission of the borrower, it must fail on
the basis of express language of Section 13(3A)24 which obligates the
SECURED CREDITORS to examine the representation/objection, if any,
made by the borrower on the receipt of notice contemplated under
Section 13(2) and communicate the reasons to the borrower if such a
representation is not accepted by the SECURED CREDITORS. We have
already indicated in our judgment, in para no. 48, that the
representation/objection contemplated under Section 13(3A) is
24 Section 13(3A). If, on receipt of the notice under sub-section (2), the borrower makes any representation or raises any
objection, the secured creditor shall consider such representation or objection and if the secured creditor comes to the
conclusion that such representation or objection is not acceptable or tenable, he shall communicate within fifteen days of
receipt of such representation or objection the reasons for non-acceptance of the representation or objection to the borrower.
Provided that the reasons so communicated or the likely action of the secured creditor at the stage of
communication of reasons shall not confer any right upon the borrower to prefer an application to the Debts Recovery
Tribunal under section 17 or the Court of District Judge under section 17A.
50Page 51
required to be examined objectively. Section 13 obligates the
SECURED CREDITOR to communicate the reasons for non-acceptance
of the representation or objections to the borrowers.
74. Before closing these matters, we may also deal with one aspect
of the judgment of the Gujarat High Court. The Gujarat High Court
recorded that the impugned amendment is ultra vires the object of
the Act. We presume for the sake of this judgment that the
impugned amendment is not strictly in consonance with the objects
enunciated when the Act was initially made. We fail to understand as
to how such inconsistency will render the Act unconstitutional. The
objects and reasons are not voted upon by the legislature. If the
enactment is otherwise within the constitutionally permissible limits,
the fact that there is a divergence between the objects appended to
the Bill and the tenor of the Act, in our opinion, cannot be a ground for
declaring the law unconstitutional.
75. In view of our abovementioned conclusions, we do not propose to
examine other submissions regarding the correctness of the Gujarat
High Court’s declaration that the unamended definition of the
expression “NPA” would continue to govern the situation in view of
51Page 52
the Gujarat High Court’s conclusion that the amended definition of
NPA is unconstitutional.
76. All the writ petitions and the appeals are disposed of declaring
that the amended definition of the expression “NPA” under Section
2(1)(o) of the Act is constitutionally valid.
77. In the result, all the writ petitions either filed before this Court or
filed before the Madras and Gujarat High Courts and the appeals of
the borrowers stand dismissed. The appeals of the CREDITORS are
allowed. Each of the writ petitioners/borrowers shall pay costs to the
respective CREDITORS calculated at 1% of the amount outstanding on
the date of the notice under Section 13(2) of the Act in each of the
cases.
………………………………….J.
(J. CHELAMESWAR)
………………………………….J.
(S.A. BOBDE)
New Delhi;
January 28, 2015
52
Thursday, January 29, 2015
Friday, January 23, 2015
“Deferring cross examination for a long time is anathema to the concept of fair trail”: SC
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 554 OF 2012
Vinod Kumar ... Appellant
Versus
State of Punjab ... Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
If one is asked a question, what afflicts the legally
requisite criminal trial in its conceptual eventuality in this
country the two reasons that may earn the status of
phenomenal signification are, first, procrastination of trial
due to non-availability of witnesses when the trial is in
progress and second, unwarranted adjournments sought
by the counsel conducting the trial and the unfathomable
reasons for acceptation of such prayers for adjournmentsby the trial courts, despite a statutory command under
Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)
and series of pronouncements by this Court. What was a
malady at one time, with the efflux of time, has
metamorphosed into malignancy. What was a mere
disturbance once has become a disorder, a diseased one, at
present.
2. The instant case frescoes and depicts a scenario that
exemplifies how due to passivity of the learned trial Judge,
a witness, despite having stood embedded absolutely firmly
in his examination-in-chief, has audaciously and, in a way,
obnoxiously, thrown all the values to the wind, and paved
the path of tergiversation. It would not be a hyperbole to
say that it is a maladroit and ingeniously designed attempt
to strangulate and crucify the fundamental purpose of trial,
that is, to arrive at the truth on the basis of evidence on
record. The redeeming feature is, despite the malevolent
and injurious assault, the cause of justice has survived,
for there is, in the ultimate eventuate, a conviction which is
under assail in this appeal, by special leave.
23. The narration of the sad chronology shocks the
judicial conscience and gravitates the mind to pose a
question, is it justified for any conscientious trial Judge to
ignore the statutory command, not recognize “the felt
necessities of time” and remain impervious to the cry of the
collective asking for justice or give an indecent and
uncalled for burial to the conception of trial, totally
ostracizing the concept that a civilized and orderly society
thrives on rule of law which includes “fair trial” for the
accused as well as the prosecution.
4. In the aforesaid context, we may recapitulate a
passage from Gurnaib Singh V. State of Punjab.
1
“...... We are compelled to proceed to reiterate the
law and express our anguish pertaining to the
manner in which the trial was conducted as it
depicts a very disturbing scenario. As is
demonstrable from the record, the trial was
conducted in an extremely haphazard and
piecemeal manner. Adjournments were granted
on a mere asking. The cross-examination of the
witnesses was deferred without recording any
special reason and dates were given after a long
gap. The mandate of the law and the views
expressed by this Court from time to time
appears to have been totally kept at bay. The
learned trial Judge, as is perceptible, seems to
have ostracised from his memory that a criminal
1
(2013) 7 SCC 108
3trial has its own gravity and sanctity. In this
regard, we may refer with profit to the
pronouncement in Talab Haji Hussain v.
Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar2
wherein it has
been stated that an accused person by his
conduct cannot put a fair trial into jeopardy, for
it is the primary and paramount duty of the
criminal courts to ensure that the risk to fair
trial is removed and trials are allowed to proceed
smoothly without any interruption or
obstruction.”
5. Be it noted, in the said case, the following passage
from Swaran Singh V. State of Punjab3
, was reproduced.
“It has become more or less a fashion to have a
criminal case adjourned again and again till the
witness tires and gives up. It is the game of
unscrupulous lawyers to get adjournments for
one excuse or the other till a witness is won over
or is tired. Not only is a witness threatened, he is
abducted, he is maimed, he is done away with, or
even bribed. There is no protection for him. In
adjourning the matter without any valid cause a
court unwittingly becomes party to miscarriage of
justice.”
6. In this regard, it is also fruitful to refer to the
authority in State of U.P. V. Shambu Nath Singh4
,
wherein this Court deprecating the practice of a Sessions
2
AIR 1958 SC 376
3
(2000) 5 SCC 668
4
(2001) 5 SCC 667
4Court adjourning a case in spite of the presence of the
witnesses willing to be examined fully, opined thus:
“9. We make it abundantly clear that if a witness
is present in court he must be examined on that
day. The court must know that most of the
witnesses could attend the court only at heavy
cost to them, after keeping aside their own
avocation. Certainly they incur suffering and loss
of income. The meagre amount of bhatta
(allowance) which a witness may be paid by the
court is generally a poor solace for the financial
loss incurred by him. It is a sad plight in the trial
courts that witnesses who are called through
summons or other processes stand at the
doorstep from morning till evening only to be told
at the end of the day that the case is adjourned
to another day. This primitive practice must be
reformed by the presiding officers of the trial
courts and it can be reformed by everyone
provided the presiding officer concerned has a
commitment towards duty.”
7. With the aforesaid concern and agony, we shall
presently proceed to adumbrate the necessitous facts. We
have already stated that despite the impasse, there is a
conviction by the trial Judge and an affirmation thereof by
the High Court. Elucidating the factual score, be it noted,
the instant appeal is directed against the judgment and
order dated 13.10.2011 passed by the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No.
51280-SB of 2001 (O&M) wherein the learned Single Judge
has given the stamp of approval to the judgment and order
dated 24.10.2001 passed by the learned Special Judge,
Patiala whereby he had convicted the appellant under
Section 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (for brevity, ‘the Act’) and sentenced him to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay
a fine of Rs.2,000/- with a default clause.
8. The prosecution case, as has been unfurled, is that
Baj Singh, PW-5, used to bring earth in tractor trolley
within the municipal area of Rajpura. The appellant, at the
relevant time, was posted as Octroi Inspector and he
demanded Rs.20/- per trolley for permitting him to enter
into the municipal area. Eventually, a deal was struck that
the accused-appellant would be paid Rs.500/- per month
for the smooth operation. As the prosecution story further
unfolds, on 25.1.1995, Baj Singh met Jagdish Verma,
PW-7, and disclosed before him the fact about the demand
of the accused for permitting the entry of the tractor trolley
inside the municipal area and thereafter, as he was not
6desirous of obliging the accused, he narrated the entire
story to DSP Vigilance, who in his turn, with the intention
to lay the trap, explained it to Baj Singh, PW-5, and
Jagdish Verma, PW-7 about the procedure of the trap. As
alleged, Baj Singh gave five notes of Rs.100/- to the DSP
Vigilance who noted the numbers of the notes and
completed other formalities like applying phenolphthalein
powder on the currency notes. Thereafter, they proceeded
to the place of the accused and a trap was laid. Eventually,
currency notes amounting to Rs.500/- were recovered from
the trouser of the appellant and were taken into
possession. The statements of the witnesses were recorded
and after completing the investigation chargesheet was
placed for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and
13(2) of the Act.
9. To bring home the charges against the
accused-appellant, the prosecution examined eight
witnesses. PW-1 to PW-4 are formal witnesses. PW-5, the
complainant resiled from his previous statement and was
cross-examined by the prosecution. Sher Singh, PW-6, a
7clerk in the office of Tehsildar, Rajpura had joined the
police party as an independent witness. He supported the
case of the prosecution in detail. Jagdish Verma, PW-7, in
his examination-in-chief, supported the prosecution case in
all aspects, but in cross-examination, resiled from his
examination-in-chief. The witness, PW-7, was declared
hostile on a prayer being made by the Public Prosecutor
and was re-examined. Narinder Pal Kaushal, PW-8, DSP of
Vigilance Bureau who had led the raiding party on
25.1.1995, in his deposition, deposed in detail about the
conducting of the raid and recovery of the amount.
10. The accused, in his statement under Section 313
CrPC, denied the allegations and took the plea of false
implication due to party faction and animosity. It was his
further stand that he was brought from his office and was
taken to the office of the Tehsildar and thereafter to the
Vigilance office.
11. The learned trial Judge, on the basis of the evidence
brought on record, came to hold that though the
complainant had not supported the case of the prosecution
8yet prosecution had been able to prove the demand and
acceptance of the bribe and the recovery of the tainted
money from the accused and, therefore, the presumption
as envisaged under Section 20 of the Act would get
attracted and accordingly convicted the accused and
sentenced him, as has been stated hereinbefore.
12. In appeal, it was contended before the High Court that
when the testimony of Baj Singh, PW-5, and Jagdish
Verma, PW-7, the shadow witness, was absolutely
incredible, the same could not have been pervertedly
filtered by the learned trial Judge to convict the
accused-appellant for the crime in question. It was also
urged that mere recovery of the currency notes would not
constitute the offence under Section 7 of the Act. It was
also propounded that the offence under Section 13(2) of the
Act would not get attracted unless the demand and
acceptance were proven. Non-involvement of any
independent witness in the raid was also seriously
criticised. The High Court posed the question whether the
prosecution had been able to prove the factum of demand
9of bribe, its acceptance and the recovery of the money from
the possession of the accused. With regard to demand of
bribe, the High Court placed reliance on the testimony of
the independent witness Sher Singh, PW-6, and the
examination–in-chief of Jagdish Verma, PW-7, and came to
hold that the demand of bribe had been proven. It
appreciated the deposition of PW-7 and the documents,
especially, the Chemical Examiner’s report of the hand
wash liquid and came to hold there had been acceptance of
bribe. Relating to the recovery of the tainted money, the
High Court took note of the fact that the ocular testimony
had been duly corroborated by the documentary evidence
and hence, the recovery had been proved.
13. Be it noted, the High Court placed reliance upon
Raghubir Singh V. State of Haryana5
and Madhukar
Bhaskarrao Joshi V. State of Maharashtra6
and
eventually came to hold that the prosecution had proven its
case to the hilt and resultantly affirmed the conviction and
order of sentence passed by the trial Court, but reduced
the sentence of 2 years’ rigorous imprisonment to one year.
5
(1974) 4 SCC 560
6
(2000) 8 SCC 571
1014. Criticizing the conviction as recorded by the learned
trial Judge and affirmed by the High Court, it is submitted
by Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel for the appellant that
when the informant had not supported the case of the
prosecution, it was not justifiable on the part of the learned
trial Judge to record a conviction against the accused. It is
his submission that on the basis of the testimony of PW-6
to PW-8, the conviction could not have been recorded, for
Sher Singh, PW-6, is not a witness either to the demand or
acceptance of the bribe by the appellant and further the
version PW-7 requires careful scrutiny, regard being had to
the fact that he is a hostile witness. It is also urged that
the evidence of PW-8 deserves to be discarded as he is an
interested witness. To bolster the aforesaid submissions,
learned senior counsel has drawn inspiration from B.
Jayaraj V. State of Andhra Pradesh7
and M.R.
Purushotham Vs. State of Karnataka8
.
15. Apart from above, it is further put forth by him that
as PW-7 has not supported the prosecution story and
stated to have been tutored to give statement, his whole
7
(2014) 4 SCALE 81
8
(2014) 11 SCALE 467
11testimony should have been thrown out of consideration
and no reliance should have been placed on it. It is
contended by him that the High Court has failed to
appreciate the importance of cross-examination of PW-7
and hence, the judgment affirming the conviction is
absolutely flawed. To buttress the said submission,
reliance has been placed on Sat Paul V. Delhi
Administration9
. It is the further stand of Mr. Jain,
learned senior counsel that the evidence of the trap
witnesses, PW-6 and PW-8 should have been wholly
ignored as they are partisan witnesses and their statements
could not have been given any credence to inasmuch as
there has been no corroboration. In this context, he has
commended us to the authorities in State of Bihar V.
Basawan Singh (CB)10, Major E.G. Barsey V. State of
Bombay11, Bhanupratap Hariprasad Dave V. State of
Gujarat12 and MO Shamshuddin V. State of Kerala13
.
9
(1976) 1 SCC 727
10 (1959) SCR 195
11 (1962) 2 SCR 195
12 (1969) 1 SCR 22
13 (1995) 3 SCC 351
1216. Learned senior counsel would contend, solely on the
basis of evidence of recovery, a conviction is not
sustainable and in the obtaining factual matrix, the
presumption under Section 20 of the Act would not be
attracted. To substantiate the said proposition, strength
has been drawn from C.M. Girish Babu V. C.B.I., Cochin14
and Benarsi Das V. State of Haryana15
.
17. The last plank of submission of Mr. Jain, is that in
the instant case, the prosecution was launched by Narinder
Pal Kaushal, PW-8, who has investigated into the case and,
therefore, the concept of fair investigation, has been totally
marred as a consequence of which, the trial is vitiated.
Learned senior counsel would contend that a person who is
a part of the trap party is an interested witness and he
would be enthusiastic to see that the trap is sustained in
every manner and in such a situation, it is per se an unfair
and biased investigation that frustrates the essential
principle inhered under Article 21 of the Constitution and
eventually the trial.
14 (2009) 3 SCC 779
15 (2010) 4 SCC 450
1318. Mr. Madhukar, learned senior counsel appearing for
the State of Punjab, per contra, would contend that the
view expressed by the learned trial Judge and the High
Court cannot be found fault with, for a conviction under
the Act can be based on the evidence of trap witnesses, if
they are trustworthy and the ingredients of the offence are
satisfied and in the case at hand, the High Court on x-ray
of the evidence has so recorded. It is urged by him that
neither the learned trial Judge nor the High Court has
fallen into error by applying the principle of presumption as
engrafted under Section 20 of the Act. It is canvassed by
Mr. Madhukar that the evidence of the hostile witness can
be placed reliance upon by the prosecution and in the
obtaining factual matrix, the testimony of PW-7, one of the
shadow witnesses, renders immense assistance for
establishing the case of the prosecution. He has with great
pains, taken us through the evidence to substantiate the
stand that the conviction recorded against the appellant is
totally defensible.
1419. Keeping in abeyance what we intend to say on the
facet of anguish expressed by us in the beginning, we shall
proceed to deal with the proponement of Mr. Jain that
when the investigation conducted by Mr. Narinder Pal
Kaushal, PW-8, is vitiated on the foundation that he has
lodged the FIR, the trial is also vitiated. Though the said
submission has been raised and taken note of by us as the
last plank, yet we think it seemly to deal with it first as it
goes to the root of the matter. On a perusal of the material
on record, it is manifest that PW-8 is a part of the raiding
party, a shadow witness, and admittedly had also sent the
complaint through a Constable to the concerned police
station for lodging of FIR. This being the factual score, we
are required to take note of certain authorities in this
regard. In Basawan Singh (supra), the Constitution
Bench, after referring to the decision in Shiv Bahadur
Singh V. State of Vindhya Pradesh16, opined that the
said decision does not lay down an invariable rule that the
evidence of the witness of the raiding party must be
16 AIR 1954 SC 322
15discarded in the absence of any independent corroboration.
The larger Bench proceeded to state thus:
“......The correct rule is this: if any of the
witnesses are accomplices who are particeps
criminis in respect of the actual crime charged,
their evidence must be treated as the evidence of
accomplices is treated; if they are not
accomplices but are partisan or interested
witnesses, who are concerned in the success of
the trap, their evidence must be tested in the
same way as other interested evidence is tested
by the application of diverse consideration which
must vary from case to case, and in a proper
case, the Court may even look for independent
corroboration before convicting the accused
person. If a Magistrate puts himself in the
position of a partisan or interested witness, he
cannot claim any higher status and must be
treated as any other interested witness.”
20. In Major E.G. Barsey (supra), while dealing with the
evidence of a trap witness, the court opined that though a
trap witness is not an approver, he is certainly an
interested witness in the sense that he is interested to see
that the trap laid by him succeeds. The Court further laid
down that he can at least be equated with a partisan
witness and it would not be admissible to rely upon his
evidence without corroboration, but his evidence is not a
tainted one.
1621. In Bhanupratap Hariprasad Dave (supra), the
Court observed that the police witnesses can be said to be
partisan witnesses as they are interested in the success of
the trap laid by them, but it cannot be said that they are
accomplices. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state that
their evidence must be tested in the same way as any other
interested witness is tested and in an appropriate case, the
Court may look for independent corroboration before
convicting the accused person. The three-Judge Bench
reiterated the principle thus:
“....It is now well settled by a series of decisions
of this Court that while in the case of evidence of
an accomplice, no conviction can be based on his
evidence unless it is corroborated in material
particulars but as regards the evidence of a
partisan witness it is open to a court to convict
an accused person solely on the basis of that
evidence, if it is satisfied that that evidence is
reliable. But it may in appropriate case look for
corroboration”.
22. In MO Shamshuddin (supra), the Court, after
referring to the decisions in DPP V. Hester17 and DPP V.
Kilbourne18, made a distinction between accomplice and
an interested witness. The Court, referred to the authority
17 (1972) 3 All ER 1056
18 (1973) 1 All ER 440
17in Basawan Singh (supra) at length and eventually
adverted to the concept of corroborating evidence. In that
context it has been ruled thus:
“.......Now coming to the nature of corroborating
evidence that is required, it is well-settled that
the corroborating evidence can be even by way of
circumstantial evidence. No general rule can be
laid down with respect to quantum of evidence
corroborating the testimony of a trap witness
which again would depend upon its own facts
and circumstances like the nature of the crime,
the character of trap witness etc. and other
general requirements necessary to sustain the
conviction in that case. The court should weigh
the evidence and then see whether corroboration
is necessary. Therefore as a rule of law it cannot
be laid down that the evidence of every
complainant in a bribery case should be
corroborated in all material particulars and
otherwise it cannot be acted upon. Whether
corroboration is necessary and if so to what
extent and what should be its nature depends
upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
In a case of bribe, the person who pays the bribe
and those who act as intermediaries are the only
persons who can ordinarily be expected to give
evidence about the bribe and it is not possible to
get absolutely independent evidence about the
payment of bribe.”
From the aforesaid authorities it is clear that a trap
witness is an interested witness and his testimony, to be
accepted and relied upon requires corroboration and the
corroboration would depend upon the facts and
18circumstances, nature of the crime and the character of the
trap witness.
23. There is no doubt that the status of PW8 is that of an
interested witness. There is no cavil over the fact that he
had sent the FIR and conducted the investigation, but the
question posed is whether the investigation by him is
vitiated. In this context we may, with profit, refer to the
decision in Bhagwan Singh V. State of Rajasthan19
,
where one Ram Singh, who was a Head Constable, was the
person to whom the offer of bribe was alleged to have been
made by the appellant therein and he was the informant
who had lodged the First Information Report for taking
action against the appellant. He himself had undertaken
the investigation. In that factual backdrop the Court ruled
thus:
“Now, ordinarily this Court does not interfere
with concurrent findings of fact reached by the
trial court and the High Court on an appreciation
of the evidence. But this is one of those rare and
exceptional cases where we find that several
important circumstances have not been taken
into account by the trial court and the High
Court and that has resulted in serious
miscarriage of justice calling for interference from
19 (1976) 1 SCC 15
19this Court. We may first refer to a rather
disturbing feature of this case. It is indeed such
an unusual feature that it is quite surprising
that it should have escaped the notice of the trial
court and the High Court. Head Constable Ram
Singh was the person to whom the offer of bribe
was alleged to have been made by the appellant
and he was the informant or complainant who
lodged the first information report for taking
action against the appellant. It is difficult to
understand how in these circumstances Head
Constable Ram Singh could undertake
investigation of the case. How could the
complainant himself be the investigator? In fact,
Head Constable Ram Singh, being an officer
below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of
Police, was not authorised to investigate the case
but we do not attach any importance to that fact,
as that may not affect the validity of the
conviction. The infirmity which we are pointing
out is not an infirmity arising from investigation
by an officer not authorised to do so, but an
infirmity arising from investigation by a Head
Constable who was himself the person to whom
the bribe was alleged to have been offered and
who lodged the first information report as
informant or complainant. This is an infirmity
which is bound to reflect on the credibility of the
prosecution case”.
24. In Megha Singh V. State of Haryana20, the Court
noticed the discrepancy in the depositions of PW-2 and
PW-3 and absence of independent corroboration. Be it
noted, the Court was dealing with an offence under Section
6(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)
20 (1996) 11 SCC 709
20Act, 1985. In that context the Court observed that the
testimony of the said witnesses did not inspire confidence
about the reliability of the prosecution’s case. Proceeding
further, the Court held:
“.... We have also noted another disturbing
feature in this case. PW 3, Siri Chand, Head
Constable arrested the accused and on search
being conducted by him a pistol and the
cartridges were recovered from the accused. It
was on his complaint a formal first information
report was lodged and the case was initiated. He
being complainant should not have proceeded
with the investigation of the case. But it appears
to us that he was not only the complainant in the
case but he carried on with the investigation and
examined witnesses under Section 161 CrPC.
Such practice, to say the least, should not be
resorted to so that there may not be any occasion
to suspect fair and impartial investigation”.
25. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the
pronouncement in State vs. V. Jayapaul21 wherein the
Court posed the question whether the High Court was
justified in quashing the criminal proceedings on the
ground that the police officer, who had lodged/recorded the
FIR regarding the suspected commission of certain
cognizable offence by the respondent should not have
investigated the case. The case against the accused was
21 (2004) 5 SCC 223
21that he was indulging in corrupt practices by extracting
money from the drivers and owners of the motor-vehicles
while conducting check of the vehicles and making use of
certain bogus notice forms in the process. The
charge-sheet was filed under Sections 420 and 201 I.P.C.
and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act. The
Court referred to the decision in the State of U.P. V.
Bhagwant Kishore Joshi22, wherein it has been ruled
thus:
“Section 154 of the Code prescribes the mode of
recording the information received orally or in
writing by an officer in charge of a police station
in respect of the commission of a cognisable
offence. Section 156 thereof authorises such an
officer to investigate any cognisable offence
prescribed therein. Though ordinarily
investigation is undertaken on information
received by a police officer, the receipt of
information is not a condition precedent for
investigation. Section 157 prescribes the
procedure in the matter of such an investigation
which can be initiated either on information or
otherwise. It is clear from the said provisions
that an officer in charge of a police station can
start investigation either on information or
otherwise.”
26. After reproducing the said paragraph, the Court
proceeded to state thus:
22 AIR 1964 SC 221
22“Though there is no such statutory bar, the
premise on which the High Court quashed the
proceedings was that the investigation by the
same officer who “lodged” the FIR would
prejudice the accused inasmuch as the
investigating officer cannot be expected to act
fairly and objectively. We find no principle or
binding authority to hold that the moment the
competent police officer, on the basis of
information received, makes out an FIR
incorporating his name as the informant, he
forfeits his right to investigate. If at all, such
investigation could only be assailed on the
ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on the
part of the investigating officer. The question of
bias would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case and it is not proper
to lay down a broad and unqualified proposition,
in the manner in which it has been done by the
High Court, that whenever a police officer
proceeds to investigate after registering the FIR
on his own, the investigation would necessarily
be unfair or biased. In the present case, the
police officer received certain discreet
information, which, according to his assessment,
warranted a probe and therefore made up his
mind to investigate. The formality of preparing
the FIR in which he records the factum of having
received the information about the suspected
commission of the offence and then taking up the
investigation after registering the crime, does not,
by any semblance of reasoning, vitiate the
investigation on the ground of bias or the like
factor. If the reason which weighed with the High
Court could be a ground to quash the
prosecution, the powers of investigation
conferred on the police officers would be unduly
hampered for no good reason. What is expected
to be done by the police officers in the normal
23course of discharge of their official duties will
then be vulnerable to attack.”
Be it noted, the Court distinguished the decisions in
Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (supra) and Megha Singh
(supra).
27. At this juncture, it would be fruitful to refer to
S.Jeevanatham V. State (through Inspector of Police,
T.N.)23. In the said case, the appellant was found guilty
under Section 8(c) read with Section 20(b)(ii) of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. One of the
contentions that was canvassed was that PW-8, who lodged
the FIR had himself conducted the investigation and hence,
the entire investigation was vitiated. The Court referred to
the decision in Jayapaul (supra) and opined thus:
“In the instant case, PW 8 conducted the search
and recovered the contraband article and
registered the case and the article seized from the
appellants was narcotic drug and the counsel for
the appellants could not point out any
circumstances by which the investigation caused
prejudice or was biased against the appellants.
PW 8 in his official capacity gave the information,
registered the case and as part of his official duty
later investigated the case and filed a
charge-sheet. He was not in any way personally
23 (2004) 5 SCC 230
24interested in the case. We are unable to find any
sort of bias in the process of investigation.”
28. In the instant case, PW-8, who was a member of the
raiding party had sent the report to the police station and
thereafter carried the formal investigation. In fact, nothing
has been put to him to elicit that he was anyway personally
interested to get the appellant convicted. In our considered
view, the decision in S. Jeevanatham (supra) would be
squarely applicable to the present case and, accordingly,
without any reservation we repel the submission so
assiduously urged by Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel for
the appellant.
29. The next aspect which requires to be adverted to is
whether testimony of a hostile evidence that has come on
record should be relied upon or not. Mr. Jain, learned
senior counsel for the appellant would contend that as
PW-7 has totally resiled in his cross-examination, his
evidence is to be discarded in toto. On a perusal of the
testimony of the said witness, it is evincible that in
examination-in-chief, he has supported the prosecution
story in entirety and in the cross-examination he has taken
25the path of prevarication. In Bhagwan Singh V. State of
Haryana24, it has been laid down that even if a witness is
characterised has a hostile witness, his evidence is not
completely effaced. The said evidence remains admissible
in the trial and there is no legal bar to base a conviction
upon his testimony, if corroborated by other reliable
evidence. In Khuji @ Surendra Tiwari V. State of
Madhya Pradesh25, the Court after referring to the
authorities in Bhagwan Singh (supra), Rabindra Kumar
Dey V. State of Orissa26 and Syad Akbar V. State of
Karnataka27, opined that the evidence of such a witness
cannot be effaced or washed off the record altogether, but
the same can be accepted to the extent it is found to be
dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof.
30. In this context, we think it apt to reproduce some
passages from Rammi @ Rameshwar V. State of Madhya
Pradesh28, where the Court was dealing with the purpose
24 (1976) 1 SCC 389
25 (1991) 3 SCC 627
26 (1976) 4 SCC 233
27 (1980) 1 SCC 30
28 (1999) 8 SCC 649
26of re-examination. After referring to Section 138 of the
Evidence Act, the Court held thus:
“There is an erroneous impression that
re-examination should be confined to clarification
of ambiguities which have been brought down in
cross-examination. No doubt, ambiguities can be
resolved through re-examination. But that is not
the only function of the re-examiner. If the party
who called the witness feels that explanation is
required for any matter referred to in
cross-examination he has the liberty to put any
question in re-examination to get the
explanation. The Public Prosecutor should
formulate his questions for that purpose.
Explanation may be required either when the
ambiguity remains regarding any answer elicited
during cross-examination or even otherwise. If
the Public Prosecutor feels that certain answers
require more elucidation from the witness he has
the freedom and the right to put such questions
as he deems necessary for that purpose, subject
of course to the control of the court in
accordance with the other provisions. But the
court cannot direct him to confine his questions
to ambiguities alone which arose in
cross-examination.
Even if the Public Prosecutor feels that new
matters should be elicited from the witness he
can do so, in which case the only requirement is
that he must secure permission of the court. If
the court thinks that such new matters are
necessary for proving any material fact, courts
must be liberal in granting permission to put
necessary questions”.
2731. We have reproduced the aforesaid paragraphs to
highlight that when the prosecution has such a right in the
process of re-examination, as a natural corollary, the
testimony of a hostile witness cannot be brushed aside. On
the contrary, both the prosecution and the defence can rely
for their stand and stance. Emphasis on re-examination by
the prosecution is not limited to any answer given in the
cross-examination, but the Public Prosecutor has the
freedom and right to put such questions as it deems
necessary to elucidate certain answers from the witness. It
is not confined to clarification of ambiguities, which have
been brought down in the cross-examination.
32. Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel has propounded that
testimony of PW7 deserves to be discredited, and the
learned trial Judge as well as the High Court having not
ignored have committed a grave error. We will be dealing
with the aspect whether the evidence of PW-7 should be
totally ignored or not while we will be dwelling upon the
credibility and acceptability of his testimony.
2833. As a contention has been raised that once the
informant has resiled totally from his earlier statement no
conviction can be recorded on the basis of evidence of the
trap witnesses, it required to be carefully dwelled upon. In
this regard, reference to the authority in Hazari Lal v.
State (Delhi Administration)29 would be apt. In the said
case a police Constable was convicted under Section 5(2) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 on the allegation
that he had demanded and received Rs.60/- from the
informant who was examined as PW-3 and had resiled from
his previous statement and was declared hostile by the
prosecution. Official witnesses had supported the
prosecution version. Keeping in mind the evidence of the
official witnesses the trial Court had convicted the
appellant therein which was affirmed by the High Court. A
contention was raised that in the absence of any direct
evidence to show that the police constable demanded or
accepted bribery no presumption under Section 4 of the
Act, 1947 could be drawn merely on the strength of
recovery of the marked currency notes from the said police
29 (1980) 2 SCC 390
29constable. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the
two-Judge Bench observed as follows:-
“...It is not necessary that the passing of
money should be proved by direct evidence.
It may also be proved by circumstantial
evidence. The events which followed in quick
succession in the present case lead to the
only inference that the money was obtained
by the accused from PW 3. Under Section
114 of the Evidence Act the court may
presume the existence of any fact which it
thinks likely to have happened, regard being
had to the common course of natural events,
human conduct and public and private
business, in their relation to facts of the
particular case. One of the illustrations to
Section 114 of the Evidence Act is that the
court may presume that a person who is in
possession of the stolen goods soon after the
theft, is either the thief or has received the
goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he
can account for his possession. So too, in the
facts and circumstances of the present case
the court may presume that the accused who
took out the currency notes from his pocket
and flung them across the wall had obtained
them from PW 3, who a few minutes earlier
was shown to have been in possession of the
notes. Once we arrive at the finding that the
accused had obtained the money from PW 3,
the presumption under Section 4(1) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act is immediately
attracted.”
3034. It is pertinent to note here that in the aforesaid case
the decision rendered in Sita Ram v. State of
Rajasthan30 was pressed into service. In the case of Sita
Ram (supra) the complainant had turned hostile in the
court of Special Judge. However, the trial Judge convicted
the accused who was tried along with another accused,
namely, Vikram Singh. The High court on appreciation of
the evidence acquitted Vikram Singh but maintained the
conviction against Sita Ram. This Court opined that the
presumption under Section 4(1) of the 1947 Act could not
be drawn in the facts of the case. The question, whether
the rest of the evidence was sufficient to establish that the
accused had obtained the money from the complaint was
not considered. The Court in Hazari Lal (supra)
distinguished the pronouncement in Sita Ram (supra) by
stating thus:-
“...The question whether the rest of the
evidence was sufficient to establish that the
accused had obtained the money from the
complainant was not considered. All that was
taken as established was the recovery of
30 (1975) 2 SCC 227
31certain money from the person of the accused
and it was held that mere recovery of money
was not enough to entitle the drawing of the
presumption under Section 4(1) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court did
not consider the further question whether
recovery of the money along with other
circumstances could establish that the
accused had obtained gratification from any
person. In the present case we have found
that the circumstances established by the
prosecution entitled the court to hold that the
accused received the gratification from PW 3.
In Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.)31, also it
was said mere recovery of money divorced
from the circumstances under which it was
paid was not sufficient when the substantive
evidence in the case was not reliable to prove
payment of bribe or to show that the accused
voluntarily accepted the money. There can be
no quarrel with that proposition but where
the recovery of the money coupled with other
circumstances leads to the conclusion that
the accused received gratification from some
person the court would certainly be entitled to
draw the presumption under Section 4(1) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act. In our view
both the decisions are of no avail to the
appellant and as already observed by us
conclusions of fact must be drawn on the
facts of each case and not on the facts of
other cases.”
35. In this context it would be germane to understand
what has been stated in M. Narsinga Rao v. State of
A.P32
. In the said case, allegations against the accused-
31 (1979) 4 SCC 725
32 (2001) 1 SCC 691
32appellant were that one Satya Prasad, PW1 therein was to
get some amount from Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development
Cooperative Federation for transporting milk to or from the
milk chilling centre at Luxettipet (Adilabad District). He
had approached the appellant for taking steps to enable
him to get money disbursed. The appellant demanded
Rs.5000/- for sending the recommendation in favour of
payment of the amount due to PW1. As the appellant
persisted with his demand PW1 yielded to the same. But
before handing over the money to him he lodged a
complaint with DSP of Anti-Corruption Bureau. On the
basis of the said complaint all arrangements were made for
a trap to catch the corrupt public servant red-handed.
Thereafter the Court adverted how the trap had taken
place. The court took note of the fact that PW1 and PW2
made a volteface in the trial court and denied having paid
any bribery to the appellant and also denied that the
appellant demanded the bribe amount. The stand of the
accused before the trial court under Section 313 of CrPC
was that one Dr. Krishna Rao bore grudge and had
33orchestrated a false trap against him by employing PW1
and PW2. Be it stated, in his deposition PW1 had stated
that he had acted on the behest of one Dr. Krishna Rao. It
was further the stand of the accused-appellant that the
tainted currency notes were forcibly stuffed into his pocket.
The trial court and the High Court had disbelieved the
defence evidence and found that PW1 and PW2 were won
over by the appellant and that is why they turned hostile
against their own version recorded by the investigating
officer and subsequently by a Magistrate under Section 164
of CrPC. The Special Judge ordered the witnesses to be
prosecuted for perjury and the said course suggested by
the trial Judge found approval of the High Court also.
While dealing with the controversy this court took note of
the fact that the High Court had observed that though
there was no direct evidence to show that the accused had
demanded and accepted the money, yet the rest of the
evidence and the circumstances were sufficient to establish
that the accused had accepted the amount and that gave
rise to a presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of
34Corruption Act that he accepted the same as illegal
gratification, particularly so, when the defence theory put
forth was not accepted. It was contended before this court
that presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn
only when the prosecution succeeded in establishing with
direct evidence that the delinquent public servant had
accepted or obtained gratification. It was further urged
that it was not enough that some currency notes were
handed over to the pubic servant to make it acceptance of
gratification and it was incumbent on the part of the
prosecution to further prove that what was paid amounted
to gratification. In support of the said contention reliance
was placed on Sita Ram (supra) and Suraj Mal v. State
(Delhi Admn.)33
. The three-Judge Bench referred to
Section 20(1) of the Act, the pronouncements in Hawkins
v. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Co. Ltd34 and Suresh
Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra35 and
adverted to the facts and came to hold as follows:-
33 (1979) 4 SCC 725
34 (1911) 1 KB 988 : 1911 WN 53
35 (1998) 7 SCC 337
35“From those proved facts the court can
legitimately draw a presumption that the
appellant received or accepted the said currency
notes on his own volition. Of course, the said
presumption is not an inviolable one, as the
appellant could rebut it either through
cross-examination of the witnesses cited against
him or by adducing reliable evidence. But if the
appellant fails to disprove the presumption the
same would stick and then it can be held by the
court that the prosecution has proved that the
appellant received the said amount.”
36. It is apt to note here the three-Judge Bench referred
to the observations in Hazari Lal (supra) and opined
thus:-
“The aforesaid observation is in consonance
with the line of approach which we have
adopted now. We may say with great respect
to the learned Judges of the two-Judge Bench
that the legal principle on this aspect has
been correctly propounded therein.”
37. In this regard Mr. Jain has placed reliance on the
authority B. Jayaraj (supra). In the said case the
complainant did not support the prosecution version and
had stated in his deposition that the amount that was paid
by him to the accused was with a request that it may be
deposited in the bank as fee for renewal of his licence for
36the fair price shop. The court referred to Section 7 of the
Act and observed as follows:-
“Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is
concerned, it is a settled position in law
that demand of illegal gratification is sine
qua non to constitute the said offence and
mere recovery of currency notes cannot
constitute the offence under Section 7
unless it is proved beyond all reasonable
doubt that the accused voluntarily
accepted the money knowing it to be a
bribe. The above position has been
succinctly laid down in several judgment
of this Court. By way of illustration
reference may be made to the decision in
C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P.36 and C.M.
Girish Babu v. C.B.I.37
”
After so observing, the court proceeded to state thus:-
“In the present case, the complainant did
not support the prosecution case insofar
as demand by the accused is concerned.
The prosecution has not examined any
other witness, present at the time when
the money was allegedly handed over to
the accused by the complainant, to prove
that the same was pursuant to any
demand made by the accused. When the
complainant himself has disowned what
he had stated in the initial complaint
(exbt. P-11) before LW-9, and there is no
other evidence to prove that the accused
had made any demand, the evidence of
PW-1 and contents of Exbt. P-11 cannot
be relied upon to come to the conclusion
that the above material furnishes proof of
36 (2010) 15 SCC 1
37 (2009) 3 SCC 779
37the demand allegedly made by the
accused. We are, therefore, inclined to
hold that the Ld. Trial court as well as the
High Court was not correct in holding the
demand alleged to be made by the
accused as proved. The only other
material available is the recovery of the
tainted currency notes from the
possession of the accused. In fact, such
possession is admitted by the accused
himself. Mere possession and recovery of
the currency notes from the accused
without proof of demand will not bring
home the offence under Section 7. The
above also will be conclusive insofar as
the offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) is
concerned as in the absence of any proof
of demand for illegal gratification, the use
of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of
position as a public servant to obtain any
valuable thing of pecuniary advantage
cannot be held to be established.”
38. The said principle has been followed in M.R.
Purushotham v. State of Karnataka38
. On an attentive
and cautious reading of the aforesaid decisions it is
noticeable that the court disbelieved the story of the
prosecution as no other evidence was brought on record.
In N. Narsinga Rao case the accused was charged for the
offences punishable under Sections 7 read with Section
13(1)(d) & (2) of the Act. The court, as we have stated
38 2014 (11) SCALE 467
38earlier, had referred to section 20(1) of the Act and opined
that from the proven facts the court can legitimately draw a
presumption that the delinquent officer had received and
accepted money. As we notice, the authorities in B.
Jayaraj (supra) and M.R. Purushotam (supra) do not lay
down as a proposition of law that when the complainant
turns hostile and does not support the case of the
prosecution, the prosecution cannot prove its case
otherwise and the court cannot legitimately draw the
presumption under Section 20 of the Act. Therefore the
proposition, though industriously, presented by Mr. Jain
that when Baj Singh, PW5, the complainant, had turned
hostile the whole case of the prosecution would collapse is
not acceptable and accordingly hereby rejected.
39. Presently, we shall refer to the evidence of PW6, a
clerk in the office of Tehsildar, Rajpura. He has deposed
that on 25.1.1995, on the day of the raid, he joined the
police party headed by Narinder Pal Kaushal, DSP, on the
instruction of Tehsildar. He was introduced to Baj Singh,
the complainant and Jagdish Verma, a shadow witness.
39Thereafter, the complainant and the shadow witness,
Jagdish Verma, were sent to the octroi post and he stopped
at some distance along with Narinder Pal Kaushal who was
waiting for signal and on receiving signal they went inside
the octroi post. As per his testimony Narinder Pal Kaushal
introduced himself as DSP and thereafter a glass of water
was procured and sodium was added to it. Both the hands
of the accused were dipped in the glass of water and the
water turned pink. On search of the accused Rs.500/- in
the denomination of Rs.100/- were recovered. The
numbers tallied with the numbers mentioned in the memo,
Ex. PE. The notes were taken into possession vide Ex. PH.
As is manifest that the said witness has supported the
story of the prosecution in toto. The submission of Mr.
Jain is that he is merely a witness to recovery and solely on
the basis of recovery no conviction can be recorded. There
can be no quarrel over the proposition that on the basis of
mere recovery an accused cannot be found guilty. It is the
settled principle of law that mere recovery of the tainted
money is not sufficient to record a conviction unless there
40is evidence that bribe had been demanded or money was
paid voluntarily as bribe. In the absence of any evidence
of demand and acceptance of the amount as illegal
gratification, recovery would not alone be a ground to
convict the accused. This has been so held in T.
Subramanian v. The State of Tamil Nadu39, Madhukar
Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State of Maharashtra40, Raj
Rajendra Singh Seth v. State of Jharkhand and Anr.41
,
State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao
Wankhede42, C.M. Girish Babu v. C.B.I., Cochin43, K. S.
Panduranga v. State of Karnataka44 and Satvir Singh
v. State of Delhi45
. The fact remains that PW6 has
supported the recovery in entirety. He has stood firm and
remained unshaken in the cross-examination and nothing
has been elicited to dislodge his testimony. His evidence
has to be appreciated regard being had to what has been
deposed by Jagdish Verma, PW7. In examination-in-chief
he has deposed that he had met the DSP, Narinder Pal
39 AIR 2006 SC 836
40 (2000) 8 SCC 571
41 AIR 2008 SC 3217
42 (2009) 15 SCC 200
43 AIR 2009 SC 2011
44 (2012) 3 SCC 721
45 (2014) 13 SCC 143
41Kaushal who had introduced him to Sher Singh, PW6. He
has further stated that he and PW5, Baj Singh, went inside
the octroi post where Vinod Kumar demanded bribe from
Baj Singh whereupon Baj Singh gave Rs.500/- to him, and
at that juncture, he gave the signal to the vigilance party to
come inside where after and they came and apprehended
the accused. Apart from stating about the demand and
acceptance he had also stated that the hands of the
accused were dipped in that water and the colour of the
water had turned light pink. It was transferred into a
quarter bottle and was sealed and was taken into
possession vide recovery memo Ex.PG which was attested
by him and Baj Singh. The amount of Rs.500/- was
recovered from right side pant pocket of the accused. After
making the arrangement for the pant of the accused, the
right side pocket of the pant of the accused was dipped in
the mixture of water and sodium and its colour turned light
pink. It was also transferred into a quarter bottle which
was duly sealed and was taken into possession vide
recovery memo Ex.PJ. The pant was also taken into
42possession vide recovery memo Ex.PJ. The notes recovered
from the accused were compared with the numbers
mentioned in the memo and those tallied. The notes were
taken into possession vide recovery memo Ex.PF. A sum of
Rs.310/- was recovered from the further search of the
accused which was taken into possession vide recovery
memo Ex.PK. Thus, from the aforesaid testimony it is
absolutely clear that he has supported in entirety about the
demand, acceptance and recovery of money. It is
necessary, though painful, to note that PW7 was
examined-in-chief on 30.9.1999 and was cross-examined
on 25.5.2001, almost after 1 year and 8 months. The delay
in said cross-examination, as we have stated earlier had
given enough time for prevarication due to many a reason.
A fair trial is to be fair both to the defence and the
prosecution as well as to the victim. An offence registered
under the Prevention of Corruption Act is to be tried with
all seriousness. We fail to appreciate how the learned trial
Judge could exhibit such laxity in granting so much time
for cross-examination in a case of this nature. It would
43have been absolutely appropriate on the part of the learned
trial Judge to finish the cross-examination on the day the
said witness was examined. As is evident, for no reason
whatsoever it was deferred and the cross-examination took
place after 20 months. The witness had all the time in the
world to be gained over. We have already opined that he
was declared hostile and re-examined. It is settled in law
that the testimony of a hostile witness can be relied upon
by the prosecution as well as the defence. In
re-examination by the public prosecutor this witness has
accepted about the correctness of his statement in the
court on 13.9.1999. He has also accepted that he had not
made any complaint to the Presiding Officer of the Court in
writing or verbally that the Inspector was threatening him
to make a false statement in the Court. It has also been
accepted by him that he had given the statement in the
Court on account of fear of false implication by the
Inspector. He has agreed to have signed his statement
dated 13.9.99 after going through and admitting it to be
correct. It has come in the re-examination that he had not
44stated in his statement dated 13.9.99 in the Court that
recovery of tainted money was not effected in his presence
from the accused or that he had been told by the Inspector
that amount has been recovered from the accused. He had
also not stated in his said statement that the accused and
witnesses were taken to the Tehsil and it was there that he
had signed all the memos.
40. Reading the evidence in entirety, his evidence cannot
be brushed aside. The delay in cross-examination has
resulted in his pre-varication from the
examination-in-chief. But, a significant one, his
examination-in-chief and the re-examination impels us to
accept the testimony that he had gone into the octroi post
and had witnessed about the demand and acceptance of
money by the accused. In his cross-examination he has
stated that he had not gone with Baj Singh to the vigilance
department at any time and no recovery was made in his
presence. The said part of the testimony, in our considered
view, does not commend acceptance in the backdrop of
entire evidence in examination-in-chief and the
45re-examination. The evidence of PW6 and PW7 have got
corroboration from PW8. He in all material particulars has
stated about the recovery and proven the necessary
documents pertaining to the test carried with
phenolphthalein powder. The fact remains that the
appellant’s pocket contained phenolphthalein smeared
currency notes when he was searched. It is apt to take
note of the fact that the currency notes that have been
recovered from the right side of the pant pocket were
actually prepared by PW8 by smearing them with
phenolphthalein powder. The appellant was caught
red-handed with those currency notes. In is statement
recorded under Section 313 of CrPC he has taken the plea
that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated due to
animosity. No explanation has been given as regards the
recovery. Therefore, from the above facts, legitimately a
presumption can be drawn that the accused-appellant had
received or accepted the said currency notes on his own
volition. The factum of presumption and the testimony of
PW6 and 7 go a long way to show that the prosecution has
46been able to prove demand, acceptance and recovery of the
amount. Hence, we are inclined to hold that the learned
trial Judge and the High Court have appositely concluded
that the charges leveled against the accused have duly
been proven by the prosecution. It is not a case that there
is no other evidence barring the evidence of the
complainant. On the contrary there are adequate
circumstances which establish the ingredients of the
offences in respect of which he was charged.
41. Before parting with the case we are constrained to
reiterate what we have said in the beginning. We have
expressed our agony and anguish the manner in which
trials in respect of serious offences relating to corruption
are being conducted by the trial courts. Adjournments are
sought on the drop of a hat by the counsel, even though
the witness is present in court, contrary to all principles of
holding a trial. That apart, after the examination-in-chief
of a witness is over, adjournment is sought for
cross-examination and the disquieting feature is that the
trial courts grant time. The law requires special reasons to
47be recorded for grant of time but the same is not taken note
of. As has been noticed earlier, in the instant case the
cross-examination has taken place after a year and 8
months allowing ample time to pressurize the witness and
to gain over him by adopting all kinds of tactics. There is
no cavil over the proposition that there has to be a fair and
proper trial but the duty of the court while conducting the
trial to be guided by the mandate of the law, the conceptual
fairness and above all bearing in mind its sacrosanct duty
to arrive at the truth on the basis of the material brought
on record. If an accused for his benefit takes the trial on
the path of total mockery, it cannot be countenanced. The
Court has a sacred duty to see that the trial is conducted
as per law. If adjournments are granted in this manner it
would tantamount to violation of rule of law and eventually
turn such trials to a farce. It is legally impermissible and
jurisprudentially abominable. The trial courts are expected
in law to follow the command of the procedure relating to
trial and not yield to the request of the counsel to grant
adjournment for non-acceptable reasons. In fact, it is not
48all appreciable to call a witness for cross-examination after
such a long span of time. It is imperative if the
examination-in-chief is over, the cross-examination should
be completed on the same day. If the examination of a
witness continues till late hours the trial can be adjourned
to the next day for cross-examination. It is inconceivable in
law that the cross-examination should be deferred for such
a long time. It is anathema to the concept of proper and
fair trial. The duty of the court is to see that not only the
interest of the accused as per law is protected but also the
societal and collective interest is safe-guarded. It is
distressing to note that despite series of judgments of this
Court, the habit of granting adjournment, really an
ailment, continues. How long shall we say, “Awake! Arise!”.
There is a constant discomfort. Therefore, we think it
appropriate that the copies of the judgment be sent to the
learned Chief Justices of all the High Courts for circulating
the same among the learned trial Judges with a command
to follow the principles relating to trial in a requisite
manner and not to defer the cross-examination of a witness
49at their pleasure or at the leisure of the defence counsel, for
it eventually makes the trial an apology for trial and
compels the whole society to suffer chicanery. Let it be
remembered that law cannot allowed to be lonely; a
destitute.
42. In the ultimate analysis, we perceive no merit in the
appeal and consequently the same stands dismissed. As
the appellant is on bail, his bail bonds are cancelled. He be
taken into custody forthwith to suffer the sentence.
........................................J.
[DIPAK MISRA]
........................................J.
[ROHINTON FALI
NARIMAN]
NEW DELHI
JANUARY 21, 2015.
50
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 554 OF 2012
Vinod Kumar ... Appellant
Versus
State of Punjab ... Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
If one is asked a question, what afflicts the legally
requisite criminal trial in its conceptual eventuality in this
country the two reasons that may earn the status of
phenomenal signification are, first, procrastination of trial
due to non-availability of witnesses when the trial is in
progress and second, unwarranted adjournments sought
by the counsel conducting the trial and the unfathomable
reasons for acceptation of such prayers for adjournmentsby the trial courts, despite a statutory command under
Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC)
and series of pronouncements by this Court. What was a
malady at one time, with the efflux of time, has
metamorphosed into malignancy. What was a mere
disturbance once has become a disorder, a diseased one, at
present.
2. The instant case frescoes and depicts a scenario that
exemplifies how due to passivity of the learned trial Judge,
a witness, despite having stood embedded absolutely firmly
in his examination-in-chief, has audaciously and, in a way,
obnoxiously, thrown all the values to the wind, and paved
the path of tergiversation. It would not be a hyperbole to
say that it is a maladroit and ingeniously designed attempt
to strangulate and crucify the fundamental purpose of trial,
that is, to arrive at the truth on the basis of evidence on
record. The redeeming feature is, despite the malevolent
and injurious assault, the cause of justice has survived,
for there is, in the ultimate eventuate, a conviction which is
under assail in this appeal, by special leave.
23. The narration of the sad chronology shocks the
judicial conscience and gravitates the mind to pose a
question, is it justified for any conscientious trial Judge to
ignore the statutory command, not recognize “the felt
necessities of time” and remain impervious to the cry of the
collective asking for justice or give an indecent and
uncalled for burial to the conception of trial, totally
ostracizing the concept that a civilized and orderly society
thrives on rule of law which includes “fair trial” for the
accused as well as the prosecution.
4. In the aforesaid context, we may recapitulate a
passage from Gurnaib Singh V. State of Punjab.
1
“...... We are compelled to proceed to reiterate the
law and express our anguish pertaining to the
manner in which the trial was conducted as it
depicts a very disturbing scenario. As is
demonstrable from the record, the trial was
conducted in an extremely haphazard and
piecemeal manner. Adjournments were granted
on a mere asking. The cross-examination of the
witnesses was deferred without recording any
special reason and dates were given after a long
gap. The mandate of the law and the views
expressed by this Court from time to time
appears to have been totally kept at bay. The
learned trial Judge, as is perceptible, seems to
have ostracised from his memory that a criminal
1
(2013) 7 SCC 108
3trial has its own gravity and sanctity. In this
regard, we may refer with profit to the
pronouncement in Talab Haji Hussain v.
Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar2
wherein it has
been stated that an accused person by his
conduct cannot put a fair trial into jeopardy, for
it is the primary and paramount duty of the
criminal courts to ensure that the risk to fair
trial is removed and trials are allowed to proceed
smoothly without any interruption or
obstruction.”
5. Be it noted, in the said case, the following passage
from Swaran Singh V. State of Punjab3
, was reproduced.
“It has become more or less a fashion to have a
criminal case adjourned again and again till the
witness tires and gives up. It is the game of
unscrupulous lawyers to get adjournments for
one excuse or the other till a witness is won over
or is tired. Not only is a witness threatened, he is
abducted, he is maimed, he is done away with, or
even bribed. There is no protection for him. In
adjourning the matter without any valid cause a
court unwittingly becomes party to miscarriage of
justice.”
6. In this regard, it is also fruitful to refer to the
authority in State of U.P. V. Shambu Nath Singh4
,
wherein this Court deprecating the practice of a Sessions
2
AIR 1958 SC 376
3
(2000) 5 SCC 668
4
(2001) 5 SCC 667
4Court adjourning a case in spite of the presence of the
witnesses willing to be examined fully, opined thus:
“9. We make it abundantly clear that if a witness
is present in court he must be examined on that
day. The court must know that most of the
witnesses could attend the court only at heavy
cost to them, after keeping aside their own
avocation. Certainly they incur suffering and loss
of income. The meagre amount of bhatta
(allowance) which a witness may be paid by the
court is generally a poor solace for the financial
loss incurred by him. It is a sad plight in the trial
courts that witnesses who are called through
summons or other processes stand at the
doorstep from morning till evening only to be told
at the end of the day that the case is adjourned
to another day. This primitive practice must be
reformed by the presiding officers of the trial
courts and it can be reformed by everyone
provided the presiding officer concerned has a
commitment towards duty.”
7. With the aforesaid concern and agony, we shall
presently proceed to adumbrate the necessitous facts. We
have already stated that despite the impasse, there is a
conviction by the trial Judge and an affirmation thereof by
the High Court. Elucidating the factual score, be it noted,
the instant appeal is directed against the judgment and
order dated 13.10.2011 passed by the High Court of
Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No.
51280-SB of 2001 (O&M) wherein the learned Single Judge
has given the stamp of approval to the judgment and order
dated 24.10.2001 passed by the learned Special Judge,
Patiala whereby he had convicted the appellant under
Section 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (for brevity, ‘the Act’) and sentenced him to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for a period of two years and to pay
a fine of Rs.2,000/- with a default clause.
8. The prosecution case, as has been unfurled, is that
Baj Singh, PW-5, used to bring earth in tractor trolley
within the municipal area of Rajpura. The appellant, at the
relevant time, was posted as Octroi Inspector and he
demanded Rs.20/- per trolley for permitting him to enter
into the municipal area. Eventually, a deal was struck that
the accused-appellant would be paid Rs.500/- per month
for the smooth operation. As the prosecution story further
unfolds, on 25.1.1995, Baj Singh met Jagdish Verma,
PW-7, and disclosed before him the fact about the demand
of the accused for permitting the entry of the tractor trolley
inside the municipal area and thereafter, as he was not
6desirous of obliging the accused, he narrated the entire
story to DSP Vigilance, who in his turn, with the intention
to lay the trap, explained it to Baj Singh, PW-5, and
Jagdish Verma, PW-7 about the procedure of the trap. As
alleged, Baj Singh gave five notes of Rs.100/- to the DSP
Vigilance who noted the numbers of the notes and
completed other formalities like applying phenolphthalein
powder on the currency notes. Thereafter, they proceeded
to the place of the accused and a trap was laid. Eventually,
currency notes amounting to Rs.500/- were recovered from
the trouser of the appellant and were taken into
possession. The statements of the witnesses were recorded
and after completing the investigation chargesheet was
placed for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and
13(2) of the Act.
9. To bring home the charges against the
accused-appellant, the prosecution examined eight
witnesses. PW-1 to PW-4 are formal witnesses. PW-5, the
complainant resiled from his previous statement and was
cross-examined by the prosecution. Sher Singh, PW-6, a
7clerk in the office of Tehsildar, Rajpura had joined the
police party as an independent witness. He supported the
case of the prosecution in detail. Jagdish Verma, PW-7, in
his examination-in-chief, supported the prosecution case in
all aspects, but in cross-examination, resiled from his
examination-in-chief. The witness, PW-7, was declared
hostile on a prayer being made by the Public Prosecutor
and was re-examined. Narinder Pal Kaushal, PW-8, DSP of
Vigilance Bureau who had led the raiding party on
25.1.1995, in his deposition, deposed in detail about the
conducting of the raid and recovery of the amount.
10. The accused, in his statement under Section 313
CrPC, denied the allegations and took the plea of false
implication due to party faction and animosity. It was his
further stand that he was brought from his office and was
taken to the office of the Tehsildar and thereafter to the
Vigilance office.
11. The learned trial Judge, on the basis of the evidence
brought on record, came to hold that though the
complainant had not supported the case of the prosecution
8yet prosecution had been able to prove the demand and
acceptance of the bribe and the recovery of the tainted
money from the accused and, therefore, the presumption
as envisaged under Section 20 of the Act would get
attracted and accordingly convicted the accused and
sentenced him, as has been stated hereinbefore.
12. In appeal, it was contended before the High Court that
when the testimony of Baj Singh, PW-5, and Jagdish
Verma, PW-7, the shadow witness, was absolutely
incredible, the same could not have been pervertedly
filtered by the learned trial Judge to convict the
accused-appellant for the crime in question. It was also
urged that mere recovery of the currency notes would not
constitute the offence under Section 7 of the Act. It was
also propounded that the offence under Section 13(2) of the
Act would not get attracted unless the demand and
acceptance were proven. Non-involvement of any
independent witness in the raid was also seriously
criticised. The High Court posed the question whether the
prosecution had been able to prove the factum of demand
9of bribe, its acceptance and the recovery of the money from
the possession of the accused. With regard to demand of
bribe, the High Court placed reliance on the testimony of
the independent witness Sher Singh, PW-6, and the
examination–in-chief of Jagdish Verma, PW-7, and came to
hold that the demand of bribe had been proven. It
appreciated the deposition of PW-7 and the documents,
especially, the Chemical Examiner’s report of the hand
wash liquid and came to hold there had been acceptance of
bribe. Relating to the recovery of the tainted money, the
High Court took note of the fact that the ocular testimony
had been duly corroborated by the documentary evidence
and hence, the recovery had been proved.
13. Be it noted, the High Court placed reliance upon
Raghubir Singh V. State of Haryana5
and Madhukar
Bhaskarrao Joshi V. State of Maharashtra6
and
eventually came to hold that the prosecution had proven its
case to the hilt and resultantly affirmed the conviction and
order of sentence passed by the trial Court, but reduced
the sentence of 2 years’ rigorous imprisonment to one year.
5
(1974) 4 SCC 560
6
(2000) 8 SCC 571
1014. Criticizing the conviction as recorded by the learned
trial Judge and affirmed by the High Court, it is submitted
by Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel for the appellant that
when the informant had not supported the case of the
prosecution, it was not justifiable on the part of the learned
trial Judge to record a conviction against the accused. It is
his submission that on the basis of the testimony of PW-6
to PW-8, the conviction could not have been recorded, for
Sher Singh, PW-6, is not a witness either to the demand or
acceptance of the bribe by the appellant and further the
version PW-7 requires careful scrutiny, regard being had to
the fact that he is a hostile witness. It is also urged that
the evidence of PW-8 deserves to be discarded as he is an
interested witness. To bolster the aforesaid submissions,
learned senior counsel has drawn inspiration from B.
Jayaraj V. State of Andhra Pradesh7
and M.R.
Purushotham Vs. State of Karnataka8
.
15. Apart from above, it is further put forth by him that
as PW-7 has not supported the prosecution story and
stated to have been tutored to give statement, his whole
7
(2014) 4 SCALE 81
8
(2014) 11 SCALE 467
11testimony should have been thrown out of consideration
and no reliance should have been placed on it. It is
contended by him that the High Court has failed to
appreciate the importance of cross-examination of PW-7
and hence, the judgment affirming the conviction is
absolutely flawed. To buttress the said submission,
reliance has been placed on Sat Paul V. Delhi
Administration9
. It is the further stand of Mr. Jain,
learned senior counsel that the evidence of the trap
witnesses, PW-6 and PW-8 should have been wholly
ignored as they are partisan witnesses and their statements
could not have been given any credence to inasmuch as
there has been no corroboration. In this context, he has
commended us to the authorities in State of Bihar V.
Basawan Singh (CB)10, Major E.G. Barsey V. State of
Bombay11, Bhanupratap Hariprasad Dave V. State of
Gujarat12 and MO Shamshuddin V. State of Kerala13
.
9
(1976) 1 SCC 727
10 (1959) SCR 195
11 (1962) 2 SCR 195
12 (1969) 1 SCR 22
13 (1995) 3 SCC 351
1216. Learned senior counsel would contend, solely on the
basis of evidence of recovery, a conviction is not
sustainable and in the obtaining factual matrix, the
presumption under Section 20 of the Act would not be
attracted. To substantiate the said proposition, strength
has been drawn from C.M. Girish Babu V. C.B.I., Cochin14
and Benarsi Das V. State of Haryana15
.
17. The last plank of submission of Mr. Jain, is that in
the instant case, the prosecution was launched by Narinder
Pal Kaushal, PW-8, who has investigated into the case and,
therefore, the concept of fair investigation, has been totally
marred as a consequence of which, the trial is vitiated.
Learned senior counsel would contend that a person who is
a part of the trap party is an interested witness and he
would be enthusiastic to see that the trap is sustained in
every manner and in such a situation, it is per se an unfair
and biased investigation that frustrates the essential
principle inhered under Article 21 of the Constitution and
eventually the trial.
14 (2009) 3 SCC 779
15 (2010) 4 SCC 450
1318. Mr. Madhukar, learned senior counsel appearing for
the State of Punjab, per contra, would contend that the
view expressed by the learned trial Judge and the High
Court cannot be found fault with, for a conviction under
the Act can be based on the evidence of trap witnesses, if
they are trustworthy and the ingredients of the offence are
satisfied and in the case at hand, the High Court on x-ray
of the evidence has so recorded. It is urged by him that
neither the learned trial Judge nor the High Court has
fallen into error by applying the principle of presumption as
engrafted under Section 20 of the Act. It is canvassed by
Mr. Madhukar that the evidence of the hostile witness can
be placed reliance upon by the prosecution and in the
obtaining factual matrix, the testimony of PW-7, one of the
shadow witnesses, renders immense assistance for
establishing the case of the prosecution. He has with great
pains, taken us through the evidence to substantiate the
stand that the conviction recorded against the appellant is
totally defensible.
1419. Keeping in abeyance what we intend to say on the
facet of anguish expressed by us in the beginning, we shall
proceed to deal with the proponement of Mr. Jain that
when the investigation conducted by Mr. Narinder Pal
Kaushal, PW-8, is vitiated on the foundation that he has
lodged the FIR, the trial is also vitiated. Though the said
submission has been raised and taken note of by us as the
last plank, yet we think it seemly to deal with it first as it
goes to the root of the matter. On a perusal of the material
on record, it is manifest that PW-8 is a part of the raiding
party, a shadow witness, and admittedly had also sent the
complaint through a Constable to the concerned police
station for lodging of FIR. This being the factual score, we
are required to take note of certain authorities in this
regard. In Basawan Singh (supra), the Constitution
Bench, after referring to the decision in Shiv Bahadur
Singh V. State of Vindhya Pradesh16, opined that the
said decision does not lay down an invariable rule that the
evidence of the witness of the raiding party must be
16 AIR 1954 SC 322
15discarded in the absence of any independent corroboration.
The larger Bench proceeded to state thus:
“......The correct rule is this: if any of the
witnesses are accomplices who are particeps
criminis in respect of the actual crime charged,
their evidence must be treated as the evidence of
accomplices is treated; if they are not
accomplices but are partisan or interested
witnesses, who are concerned in the success of
the trap, their evidence must be tested in the
same way as other interested evidence is tested
by the application of diverse consideration which
must vary from case to case, and in a proper
case, the Court may even look for independent
corroboration before convicting the accused
person. If a Magistrate puts himself in the
position of a partisan or interested witness, he
cannot claim any higher status and must be
treated as any other interested witness.”
20. In Major E.G. Barsey (supra), while dealing with the
evidence of a trap witness, the court opined that though a
trap witness is not an approver, he is certainly an
interested witness in the sense that he is interested to see
that the trap laid by him succeeds. The Court further laid
down that he can at least be equated with a partisan
witness and it would not be admissible to rely upon his
evidence without corroboration, but his evidence is not a
tainted one.
1621. In Bhanupratap Hariprasad Dave (supra), the
Court observed that the police witnesses can be said to be
partisan witnesses as they are interested in the success of
the trap laid by them, but it cannot be said that they are
accomplices. Thereafter, the Court proceeded to state that
their evidence must be tested in the same way as any other
interested witness is tested and in an appropriate case, the
Court may look for independent corroboration before
convicting the accused person. The three-Judge Bench
reiterated the principle thus:
“....It is now well settled by a series of decisions
of this Court that while in the case of evidence of
an accomplice, no conviction can be based on his
evidence unless it is corroborated in material
particulars but as regards the evidence of a
partisan witness it is open to a court to convict
an accused person solely on the basis of that
evidence, if it is satisfied that that evidence is
reliable. But it may in appropriate case look for
corroboration”.
22. In MO Shamshuddin (supra), the Court, after
referring to the decisions in DPP V. Hester17 and DPP V.
Kilbourne18, made a distinction between accomplice and
an interested witness. The Court, referred to the authority
17 (1972) 3 All ER 1056
18 (1973) 1 All ER 440
17in Basawan Singh (supra) at length and eventually
adverted to the concept of corroborating evidence. In that
context it has been ruled thus:
“.......Now coming to the nature of corroborating
evidence that is required, it is well-settled that
the corroborating evidence can be even by way of
circumstantial evidence. No general rule can be
laid down with respect to quantum of evidence
corroborating the testimony of a trap witness
which again would depend upon its own facts
and circumstances like the nature of the crime,
the character of trap witness etc. and other
general requirements necessary to sustain the
conviction in that case. The court should weigh
the evidence and then see whether corroboration
is necessary. Therefore as a rule of law it cannot
be laid down that the evidence of every
complainant in a bribery case should be
corroborated in all material particulars and
otherwise it cannot be acted upon. Whether
corroboration is necessary and if so to what
extent and what should be its nature depends
upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
In a case of bribe, the person who pays the bribe
and those who act as intermediaries are the only
persons who can ordinarily be expected to give
evidence about the bribe and it is not possible to
get absolutely independent evidence about the
payment of bribe.”
From the aforesaid authorities it is clear that a trap
witness is an interested witness and his testimony, to be
accepted and relied upon requires corroboration and the
corroboration would depend upon the facts and
18circumstances, nature of the crime and the character of the
trap witness.
23. There is no doubt that the status of PW8 is that of an
interested witness. There is no cavil over the fact that he
had sent the FIR and conducted the investigation, but the
question posed is whether the investigation by him is
vitiated. In this context we may, with profit, refer to the
decision in Bhagwan Singh V. State of Rajasthan19
,
where one Ram Singh, who was a Head Constable, was the
person to whom the offer of bribe was alleged to have been
made by the appellant therein and he was the informant
who had lodged the First Information Report for taking
action against the appellant. He himself had undertaken
the investigation. In that factual backdrop the Court ruled
thus:
“Now, ordinarily this Court does not interfere
with concurrent findings of fact reached by the
trial court and the High Court on an appreciation
of the evidence. But this is one of those rare and
exceptional cases where we find that several
important circumstances have not been taken
into account by the trial court and the High
Court and that has resulted in serious
miscarriage of justice calling for interference from
19 (1976) 1 SCC 15
19this Court. We may first refer to a rather
disturbing feature of this case. It is indeed such
an unusual feature that it is quite surprising
that it should have escaped the notice of the trial
court and the High Court. Head Constable Ram
Singh was the person to whom the offer of bribe
was alleged to have been made by the appellant
and he was the informant or complainant who
lodged the first information report for taking
action against the appellant. It is difficult to
understand how in these circumstances Head
Constable Ram Singh could undertake
investigation of the case. How could the
complainant himself be the investigator? In fact,
Head Constable Ram Singh, being an officer
below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of
Police, was not authorised to investigate the case
but we do not attach any importance to that fact,
as that may not affect the validity of the
conviction. The infirmity which we are pointing
out is not an infirmity arising from investigation
by an officer not authorised to do so, but an
infirmity arising from investigation by a Head
Constable who was himself the person to whom
the bribe was alleged to have been offered and
who lodged the first information report as
informant or complainant. This is an infirmity
which is bound to reflect on the credibility of the
prosecution case”.
24. In Megha Singh V. State of Haryana20, the Court
noticed the discrepancy in the depositions of PW-2 and
PW-3 and absence of independent corroboration. Be it
noted, the Court was dealing with an offence under Section
6(1) of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention)
20 (1996) 11 SCC 709
20Act, 1985. In that context the Court observed that the
testimony of the said witnesses did not inspire confidence
about the reliability of the prosecution’s case. Proceeding
further, the Court held:
“.... We have also noted another disturbing
feature in this case. PW 3, Siri Chand, Head
Constable arrested the accused and on search
being conducted by him a pistol and the
cartridges were recovered from the accused. It
was on his complaint a formal first information
report was lodged and the case was initiated. He
being complainant should not have proceeded
with the investigation of the case. But it appears
to us that he was not only the complainant in the
case but he carried on with the investigation and
examined witnesses under Section 161 CrPC.
Such practice, to say the least, should not be
resorted to so that there may not be any occasion
to suspect fair and impartial investigation”.
25. In this regard, it is useful to refer to the
pronouncement in State vs. V. Jayapaul21 wherein the
Court posed the question whether the High Court was
justified in quashing the criminal proceedings on the
ground that the police officer, who had lodged/recorded the
FIR regarding the suspected commission of certain
cognizable offence by the respondent should not have
investigated the case. The case against the accused was
21 (2004) 5 SCC 223
21that he was indulging in corrupt practices by extracting
money from the drivers and owners of the motor-vehicles
while conducting check of the vehicles and making use of
certain bogus notice forms in the process. The
charge-sheet was filed under Sections 420 and 201 I.P.C.
and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act. The
Court referred to the decision in the State of U.P. V.
Bhagwant Kishore Joshi22, wherein it has been ruled
thus:
“Section 154 of the Code prescribes the mode of
recording the information received orally or in
writing by an officer in charge of a police station
in respect of the commission of a cognisable
offence. Section 156 thereof authorises such an
officer to investigate any cognisable offence
prescribed therein. Though ordinarily
investigation is undertaken on information
received by a police officer, the receipt of
information is not a condition precedent for
investigation. Section 157 prescribes the
procedure in the matter of such an investigation
which can be initiated either on information or
otherwise. It is clear from the said provisions
that an officer in charge of a police station can
start investigation either on information or
otherwise.”
26. After reproducing the said paragraph, the Court
proceeded to state thus:
22 AIR 1964 SC 221
22“Though there is no such statutory bar, the
premise on which the High Court quashed the
proceedings was that the investigation by the
same officer who “lodged” the FIR would
prejudice the accused inasmuch as the
investigating officer cannot be expected to act
fairly and objectively. We find no principle or
binding authority to hold that the moment the
competent police officer, on the basis of
information received, makes out an FIR
incorporating his name as the informant, he
forfeits his right to investigate. If at all, such
investigation could only be assailed on the
ground of bias or real likelihood of bias on the
part of the investigating officer. The question of
bias would depend on the facts and
circumstances of each case and it is not proper
to lay down a broad and unqualified proposition,
in the manner in which it has been done by the
High Court, that whenever a police officer
proceeds to investigate after registering the FIR
on his own, the investigation would necessarily
be unfair or biased. In the present case, the
police officer received certain discreet
information, which, according to his assessment,
warranted a probe and therefore made up his
mind to investigate. The formality of preparing
the FIR in which he records the factum of having
received the information about the suspected
commission of the offence and then taking up the
investigation after registering the crime, does not,
by any semblance of reasoning, vitiate the
investigation on the ground of bias or the like
factor. If the reason which weighed with the High
Court could be a ground to quash the
prosecution, the powers of investigation
conferred on the police officers would be unduly
hampered for no good reason. What is expected
to be done by the police officers in the normal
23course of discharge of their official duties will
then be vulnerable to attack.”
Be it noted, the Court distinguished the decisions in
Bhagwant Kishore Joshi (supra) and Megha Singh
(supra).
27. At this juncture, it would be fruitful to refer to
S.Jeevanatham V. State (through Inspector of Police,
T.N.)23. In the said case, the appellant was found guilty
under Section 8(c) read with Section 20(b)(ii) of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. One of the
contentions that was canvassed was that PW-8, who lodged
the FIR had himself conducted the investigation and hence,
the entire investigation was vitiated. The Court referred to
the decision in Jayapaul (supra) and opined thus:
“In the instant case, PW 8 conducted the search
and recovered the contraband article and
registered the case and the article seized from the
appellants was narcotic drug and the counsel for
the appellants could not point out any
circumstances by which the investigation caused
prejudice or was biased against the appellants.
PW 8 in his official capacity gave the information,
registered the case and as part of his official duty
later investigated the case and filed a
charge-sheet. He was not in any way personally
23 (2004) 5 SCC 230
24interested in the case. We are unable to find any
sort of bias in the process of investigation.”
28. In the instant case, PW-8, who was a member of the
raiding party had sent the report to the police station and
thereafter carried the formal investigation. In fact, nothing
has been put to him to elicit that he was anyway personally
interested to get the appellant convicted. In our considered
view, the decision in S. Jeevanatham (supra) would be
squarely applicable to the present case and, accordingly,
without any reservation we repel the submission so
assiduously urged by Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel for
the appellant.
29. The next aspect which requires to be adverted to is
whether testimony of a hostile evidence that has come on
record should be relied upon or not. Mr. Jain, learned
senior counsel for the appellant would contend that as
PW-7 has totally resiled in his cross-examination, his
evidence is to be discarded in toto. On a perusal of the
testimony of the said witness, it is evincible that in
examination-in-chief, he has supported the prosecution
story in entirety and in the cross-examination he has taken
25the path of prevarication. In Bhagwan Singh V. State of
Haryana24, it has been laid down that even if a witness is
characterised has a hostile witness, his evidence is not
completely effaced. The said evidence remains admissible
in the trial and there is no legal bar to base a conviction
upon his testimony, if corroborated by other reliable
evidence. In Khuji @ Surendra Tiwari V. State of
Madhya Pradesh25, the Court after referring to the
authorities in Bhagwan Singh (supra), Rabindra Kumar
Dey V. State of Orissa26 and Syad Akbar V. State of
Karnataka27, opined that the evidence of such a witness
cannot be effaced or washed off the record altogether, but
the same can be accepted to the extent it is found to be
dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof.
30. In this context, we think it apt to reproduce some
passages from Rammi @ Rameshwar V. State of Madhya
Pradesh28, where the Court was dealing with the purpose
24 (1976) 1 SCC 389
25 (1991) 3 SCC 627
26 (1976) 4 SCC 233
27 (1980) 1 SCC 30
28 (1999) 8 SCC 649
26of re-examination. After referring to Section 138 of the
Evidence Act, the Court held thus:
“There is an erroneous impression that
re-examination should be confined to clarification
of ambiguities which have been brought down in
cross-examination. No doubt, ambiguities can be
resolved through re-examination. But that is not
the only function of the re-examiner. If the party
who called the witness feels that explanation is
required for any matter referred to in
cross-examination he has the liberty to put any
question in re-examination to get the
explanation. The Public Prosecutor should
formulate his questions for that purpose.
Explanation may be required either when the
ambiguity remains regarding any answer elicited
during cross-examination or even otherwise. If
the Public Prosecutor feels that certain answers
require more elucidation from the witness he has
the freedom and the right to put such questions
as he deems necessary for that purpose, subject
of course to the control of the court in
accordance with the other provisions. But the
court cannot direct him to confine his questions
to ambiguities alone which arose in
cross-examination.
Even if the Public Prosecutor feels that new
matters should be elicited from the witness he
can do so, in which case the only requirement is
that he must secure permission of the court. If
the court thinks that such new matters are
necessary for proving any material fact, courts
must be liberal in granting permission to put
necessary questions”.
2731. We have reproduced the aforesaid paragraphs to
highlight that when the prosecution has such a right in the
process of re-examination, as a natural corollary, the
testimony of a hostile witness cannot be brushed aside. On
the contrary, both the prosecution and the defence can rely
for their stand and stance. Emphasis on re-examination by
the prosecution is not limited to any answer given in the
cross-examination, but the Public Prosecutor has the
freedom and right to put such questions as it deems
necessary to elucidate certain answers from the witness. It
is not confined to clarification of ambiguities, which have
been brought down in the cross-examination.
32. Mr. Jain, learned senior counsel has propounded that
testimony of PW7 deserves to be discredited, and the
learned trial Judge as well as the High Court having not
ignored have committed a grave error. We will be dealing
with the aspect whether the evidence of PW-7 should be
totally ignored or not while we will be dwelling upon the
credibility and acceptability of his testimony.
2833. As a contention has been raised that once the
informant has resiled totally from his earlier statement no
conviction can be recorded on the basis of evidence of the
trap witnesses, it required to be carefully dwelled upon. In
this regard, reference to the authority in Hazari Lal v.
State (Delhi Administration)29 would be apt. In the said
case a police Constable was convicted under Section 5(2) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 on the allegation
that he had demanded and received Rs.60/- from the
informant who was examined as PW-3 and had resiled from
his previous statement and was declared hostile by the
prosecution. Official witnesses had supported the
prosecution version. Keeping in mind the evidence of the
official witnesses the trial Court had convicted the
appellant therein which was affirmed by the High Court. A
contention was raised that in the absence of any direct
evidence to show that the police constable demanded or
accepted bribery no presumption under Section 4 of the
Act, 1947 could be drawn merely on the strength of
recovery of the marked currency notes from the said police
29 (1980) 2 SCC 390
29constable. Chinnappa Reddy, J. speaking for the
two-Judge Bench observed as follows:-
“...It is not necessary that the passing of
money should be proved by direct evidence.
It may also be proved by circumstantial
evidence. The events which followed in quick
succession in the present case lead to the
only inference that the money was obtained
by the accused from PW 3. Under Section
114 of the Evidence Act the court may
presume the existence of any fact which it
thinks likely to have happened, regard being
had to the common course of natural events,
human conduct and public and private
business, in their relation to facts of the
particular case. One of the illustrations to
Section 114 of the Evidence Act is that the
court may presume that a person who is in
possession of the stolen goods soon after the
theft, is either the thief or has received the
goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he
can account for his possession. So too, in the
facts and circumstances of the present case
the court may presume that the accused who
took out the currency notes from his pocket
and flung them across the wall had obtained
them from PW 3, who a few minutes earlier
was shown to have been in possession of the
notes. Once we arrive at the finding that the
accused had obtained the money from PW 3,
the presumption under Section 4(1) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act is immediately
attracted.”
3034. It is pertinent to note here that in the aforesaid case
the decision rendered in Sita Ram v. State of
Rajasthan30 was pressed into service. In the case of Sita
Ram (supra) the complainant had turned hostile in the
court of Special Judge. However, the trial Judge convicted
the accused who was tried along with another accused,
namely, Vikram Singh. The High court on appreciation of
the evidence acquitted Vikram Singh but maintained the
conviction against Sita Ram. This Court opined that the
presumption under Section 4(1) of the 1947 Act could not
be drawn in the facts of the case. The question, whether
the rest of the evidence was sufficient to establish that the
accused had obtained the money from the complaint was
not considered. The Court in Hazari Lal (supra)
distinguished the pronouncement in Sita Ram (supra) by
stating thus:-
“...The question whether the rest of the
evidence was sufficient to establish that the
accused had obtained the money from the
complainant was not considered. All that was
taken as established was the recovery of
30 (1975) 2 SCC 227
31certain money from the person of the accused
and it was held that mere recovery of money
was not enough to entitle the drawing of the
presumption under Section 4(1) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court did
not consider the further question whether
recovery of the money along with other
circumstances could establish that the
accused had obtained gratification from any
person. In the present case we have found
that the circumstances established by the
prosecution entitled the court to hold that the
accused received the gratification from PW 3.
In Suraj Mal v. State (Delhi Admn.)31, also it
was said mere recovery of money divorced
from the circumstances under which it was
paid was not sufficient when the substantive
evidence in the case was not reliable to prove
payment of bribe or to show that the accused
voluntarily accepted the money. There can be
no quarrel with that proposition but where
the recovery of the money coupled with other
circumstances leads to the conclusion that
the accused received gratification from some
person the court would certainly be entitled to
draw the presumption under Section 4(1) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act. In our view
both the decisions are of no avail to the
appellant and as already observed by us
conclusions of fact must be drawn on the
facts of each case and not on the facts of
other cases.”
35. In this context it would be germane to understand
what has been stated in M. Narsinga Rao v. State of
A.P32
. In the said case, allegations against the accused-
31 (1979) 4 SCC 725
32 (2001) 1 SCC 691
32appellant were that one Satya Prasad, PW1 therein was to
get some amount from Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development
Cooperative Federation for transporting milk to or from the
milk chilling centre at Luxettipet (Adilabad District). He
had approached the appellant for taking steps to enable
him to get money disbursed. The appellant demanded
Rs.5000/- for sending the recommendation in favour of
payment of the amount due to PW1. As the appellant
persisted with his demand PW1 yielded to the same. But
before handing over the money to him he lodged a
complaint with DSP of Anti-Corruption Bureau. On the
basis of the said complaint all arrangements were made for
a trap to catch the corrupt public servant red-handed.
Thereafter the Court adverted how the trap had taken
place. The court took note of the fact that PW1 and PW2
made a volteface in the trial court and denied having paid
any bribery to the appellant and also denied that the
appellant demanded the bribe amount. The stand of the
accused before the trial court under Section 313 of CrPC
was that one Dr. Krishna Rao bore grudge and had
33orchestrated a false trap against him by employing PW1
and PW2. Be it stated, in his deposition PW1 had stated
that he had acted on the behest of one Dr. Krishna Rao. It
was further the stand of the accused-appellant that the
tainted currency notes were forcibly stuffed into his pocket.
The trial court and the High Court had disbelieved the
defence evidence and found that PW1 and PW2 were won
over by the appellant and that is why they turned hostile
against their own version recorded by the investigating
officer and subsequently by a Magistrate under Section 164
of CrPC. The Special Judge ordered the witnesses to be
prosecuted for perjury and the said course suggested by
the trial Judge found approval of the High Court also.
While dealing with the controversy this court took note of
the fact that the High Court had observed that though
there was no direct evidence to show that the accused had
demanded and accepted the money, yet the rest of the
evidence and the circumstances were sufficient to establish
that the accused had accepted the amount and that gave
rise to a presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of
34Corruption Act that he accepted the same as illegal
gratification, particularly so, when the defence theory put
forth was not accepted. It was contended before this court
that presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn
only when the prosecution succeeded in establishing with
direct evidence that the delinquent public servant had
accepted or obtained gratification. It was further urged
that it was not enough that some currency notes were
handed over to the pubic servant to make it acceptance of
gratification and it was incumbent on the part of the
prosecution to further prove that what was paid amounted
to gratification. In support of the said contention reliance
was placed on Sita Ram (supra) and Suraj Mal v. State
(Delhi Admn.)33
. The three-Judge Bench referred to
Section 20(1) of the Act, the pronouncements in Hawkins
v. Powells Tillery Steam Coal Co. Ltd34 and Suresh
Budharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra35 and
adverted to the facts and came to hold as follows:-
33 (1979) 4 SCC 725
34 (1911) 1 KB 988 : 1911 WN 53
35 (1998) 7 SCC 337
35“From those proved facts the court can
legitimately draw a presumption that the
appellant received or accepted the said currency
notes on his own volition. Of course, the said
presumption is not an inviolable one, as the
appellant could rebut it either through
cross-examination of the witnesses cited against
him or by adducing reliable evidence. But if the
appellant fails to disprove the presumption the
same would stick and then it can be held by the
court that the prosecution has proved that the
appellant received the said amount.”
36. It is apt to note here the three-Judge Bench referred
to the observations in Hazari Lal (supra) and opined
thus:-
“The aforesaid observation is in consonance
with the line of approach which we have
adopted now. We may say with great respect
to the learned Judges of the two-Judge Bench
that the legal principle on this aspect has
been correctly propounded therein.”
37. In this regard Mr. Jain has placed reliance on the
authority B. Jayaraj (supra). In the said case the
complainant did not support the prosecution version and
had stated in his deposition that the amount that was paid
by him to the accused was with a request that it may be
deposited in the bank as fee for renewal of his licence for
36the fair price shop. The court referred to Section 7 of the
Act and observed as follows:-
“Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is
concerned, it is a settled position in law
that demand of illegal gratification is sine
qua non to constitute the said offence and
mere recovery of currency notes cannot
constitute the offence under Section 7
unless it is proved beyond all reasonable
doubt that the accused voluntarily
accepted the money knowing it to be a
bribe. The above position has been
succinctly laid down in several judgment
of this Court. By way of illustration
reference may be made to the decision in
C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P.36 and C.M.
Girish Babu v. C.B.I.37
”
After so observing, the court proceeded to state thus:-
“In the present case, the complainant did
not support the prosecution case insofar
as demand by the accused is concerned.
The prosecution has not examined any
other witness, present at the time when
the money was allegedly handed over to
the accused by the complainant, to prove
that the same was pursuant to any
demand made by the accused. When the
complainant himself has disowned what
he had stated in the initial complaint
(exbt. P-11) before LW-9, and there is no
other evidence to prove that the accused
had made any demand, the evidence of
PW-1 and contents of Exbt. P-11 cannot
be relied upon to come to the conclusion
that the above material furnishes proof of
36 (2010) 15 SCC 1
37 (2009) 3 SCC 779
37the demand allegedly made by the
accused. We are, therefore, inclined to
hold that the Ld. Trial court as well as the
High Court was not correct in holding the
demand alleged to be made by the
accused as proved. The only other
material available is the recovery of the
tainted currency notes from the
possession of the accused. In fact, such
possession is admitted by the accused
himself. Mere possession and recovery of
the currency notes from the accused
without proof of demand will not bring
home the offence under Section 7. The
above also will be conclusive insofar as
the offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) is
concerned as in the absence of any proof
of demand for illegal gratification, the use
of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of
position as a public servant to obtain any
valuable thing of pecuniary advantage
cannot be held to be established.”
38. The said principle has been followed in M.R.
Purushotham v. State of Karnataka38
. On an attentive
and cautious reading of the aforesaid decisions it is
noticeable that the court disbelieved the story of the
prosecution as no other evidence was brought on record.
In N. Narsinga Rao case the accused was charged for the
offences punishable under Sections 7 read with Section
13(1)(d) & (2) of the Act. The court, as we have stated
38 2014 (11) SCALE 467
38earlier, had referred to section 20(1) of the Act and opined
that from the proven facts the court can legitimately draw a
presumption that the delinquent officer had received and
accepted money. As we notice, the authorities in B.
Jayaraj (supra) and M.R. Purushotam (supra) do not lay
down as a proposition of law that when the complainant
turns hostile and does not support the case of the
prosecution, the prosecution cannot prove its case
otherwise and the court cannot legitimately draw the
presumption under Section 20 of the Act. Therefore the
proposition, though industriously, presented by Mr. Jain
that when Baj Singh, PW5, the complainant, had turned
hostile the whole case of the prosecution would collapse is
not acceptable and accordingly hereby rejected.
39. Presently, we shall refer to the evidence of PW6, a
clerk in the office of Tehsildar, Rajpura. He has deposed
that on 25.1.1995, on the day of the raid, he joined the
police party headed by Narinder Pal Kaushal, DSP, on the
instruction of Tehsildar. He was introduced to Baj Singh,
the complainant and Jagdish Verma, a shadow witness.
39Thereafter, the complainant and the shadow witness,
Jagdish Verma, were sent to the octroi post and he stopped
at some distance along with Narinder Pal Kaushal who was
waiting for signal and on receiving signal they went inside
the octroi post. As per his testimony Narinder Pal Kaushal
introduced himself as DSP and thereafter a glass of water
was procured and sodium was added to it. Both the hands
of the accused were dipped in the glass of water and the
water turned pink. On search of the accused Rs.500/- in
the denomination of Rs.100/- were recovered. The
numbers tallied with the numbers mentioned in the memo,
Ex. PE. The notes were taken into possession vide Ex. PH.
As is manifest that the said witness has supported the
story of the prosecution in toto. The submission of Mr.
Jain is that he is merely a witness to recovery and solely on
the basis of recovery no conviction can be recorded. There
can be no quarrel over the proposition that on the basis of
mere recovery an accused cannot be found guilty. It is the
settled principle of law that mere recovery of the tainted
money is not sufficient to record a conviction unless there
40is evidence that bribe had been demanded or money was
paid voluntarily as bribe. In the absence of any evidence
of demand and acceptance of the amount as illegal
gratification, recovery would not alone be a ground to
convict the accused. This has been so held in T.
Subramanian v. The State of Tamil Nadu39, Madhukar
Bhaskarrao Joshi v. State of Maharashtra40, Raj
Rajendra Singh Seth v. State of Jharkhand and Anr.41
,
State of Maharashtra v. Dnyaneshwar Laxman Rao
Wankhede42, C.M. Girish Babu v. C.B.I., Cochin43, K. S.
Panduranga v. State of Karnataka44 and Satvir Singh
v. State of Delhi45
. The fact remains that PW6 has
supported the recovery in entirety. He has stood firm and
remained unshaken in the cross-examination and nothing
has been elicited to dislodge his testimony. His evidence
has to be appreciated regard being had to what has been
deposed by Jagdish Verma, PW7. In examination-in-chief
he has deposed that he had met the DSP, Narinder Pal
39 AIR 2006 SC 836
40 (2000) 8 SCC 571
41 AIR 2008 SC 3217
42 (2009) 15 SCC 200
43 AIR 2009 SC 2011
44 (2012) 3 SCC 721
45 (2014) 13 SCC 143
41Kaushal who had introduced him to Sher Singh, PW6. He
has further stated that he and PW5, Baj Singh, went inside
the octroi post where Vinod Kumar demanded bribe from
Baj Singh whereupon Baj Singh gave Rs.500/- to him, and
at that juncture, he gave the signal to the vigilance party to
come inside where after and they came and apprehended
the accused. Apart from stating about the demand and
acceptance he had also stated that the hands of the
accused were dipped in that water and the colour of the
water had turned light pink. It was transferred into a
quarter bottle and was sealed and was taken into
possession vide recovery memo Ex.PG which was attested
by him and Baj Singh. The amount of Rs.500/- was
recovered from right side pant pocket of the accused. After
making the arrangement for the pant of the accused, the
right side pocket of the pant of the accused was dipped in
the mixture of water and sodium and its colour turned light
pink. It was also transferred into a quarter bottle which
was duly sealed and was taken into possession vide
recovery memo Ex.PJ. The pant was also taken into
42possession vide recovery memo Ex.PJ. The notes recovered
from the accused were compared with the numbers
mentioned in the memo and those tallied. The notes were
taken into possession vide recovery memo Ex.PF. A sum of
Rs.310/- was recovered from the further search of the
accused which was taken into possession vide recovery
memo Ex.PK. Thus, from the aforesaid testimony it is
absolutely clear that he has supported in entirety about the
demand, acceptance and recovery of money. It is
necessary, though painful, to note that PW7 was
examined-in-chief on 30.9.1999 and was cross-examined
on 25.5.2001, almost after 1 year and 8 months. The delay
in said cross-examination, as we have stated earlier had
given enough time for prevarication due to many a reason.
A fair trial is to be fair both to the defence and the
prosecution as well as to the victim. An offence registered
under the Prevention of Corruption Act is to be tried with
all seriousness. We fail to appreciate how the learned trial
Judge could exhibit such laxity in granting so much time
for cross-examination in a case of this nature. It would
43have been absolutely appropriate on the part of the learned
trial Judge to finish the cross-examination on the day the
said witness was examined. As is evident, for no reason
whatsoever it was deferred and the cross-examination took
place after 20 months. The witness had all the time in the
world to be gained over. We have already opined that he
was declared hostile and re-examined. It is settled in law
that the testimony of a hostile witness can be relied upon
by the prosecution as well as the defence. In
re-examination by the public prosecutor this witness has
accepted about the correctness of his statement in the
court on 13.9.1999. He has also accepted that he had not
made any complaint to the Presiding Officer of the Court in
writing or verbally that the Inspector was threatening him
to make a false statement in the Court. It has also been
accepted by him that he had given the statement in the
Court on account of fear of false implication by the
Inspector. He has agreed to have signed his statement
dated 13.9.99 after going through and admitting it to be
correct. It has come in the re-examination that he had not
44stated in his statement dated 13.9.99 in the Court that
recovery of tainted money was not effected in his presence
from the accused or that he had been told by the Inspector
that amount has been recovered from the accused. He had
also not stated in his said statement that the accused and
witnesses were taken to the Tehsil and it was there that he
had signed all the memos.
40. Reading the evidence in entirety, his evidence cannot
be brushed aside. The delay in cross-examination has
resulted in his pre-varication from the
examination-in-chief. But, a significant one, his
examination-in-chief and the re-examination impels us to
accept the testimony that he had gone into the octroi post
and had witnessed about the demand and acceptance of
money by the accused. In his cross-examination he has
stated that he had not gone with Baj Singh to the vigilance
department at any time and no recovery was made in his
presence. The said part of the testimony, in our considered
view, does not commend acceptance in the backdrop of
entire evidence in examination-in-chief and the
45re-examination. The evidence of PW6 and PW7 have got
corroboration from PW8. He in all material particulars has
stated about the recovery and proven the necessary
documents pertaining to the test carried with
phenolphthalein powder. The fact remains that the
appellant’s pocket contained phenolphthalein smeared
currency notes when he was searched. It is apt to take
note of the fact that the currency notes that have been
recovered from the right side of the pant pocket were
actually prepared by PW8 by smearing them with
phenolphthalein powder. The appellant was caught
red-handed with those currency notes. In is statement
recorded under Section 313 of CrPC he has taken the plea
that he is innocent and has been falsely implicated due to
animosity. No explanation has been given as regards the
recovery. Therefore, from the above facts, legitimately a
presumption can be drawn that the accused-appellant had
received or accepted the said currency notes on his own
volition. The factum of presumption and the testimony of
PW6 and 7 go a long way to show that the prosecution has
46been able to prove demand, acceptance and recovery of the
amount. Hence, we are inclined to hold that the learned
trial Judge and the High Court have appositely concluded
that the charges leveled against the accused have duly
been proven by the prosecution. It is not a case that there
is no other evidence barring the evidence of the
complainant. On the contrary there are adequate
circumstances which establish the ingredients of the
offences in respect of which he was charged.
41. Before parting with the case we are constrained to
reiterate what we have said in the beginning. We have
expressed our agony and anguish the manner in which
trials in respect of serious offences relating to corruption
are being conducted by the trial courts. Adjournments are
sought on the drop of a hat by the counsel, even though
the witness is present in court, contrary to all principles of
holding a trial. That apart, after the examination-in-chief
of a witness is over, adjournment is sought for
cross-examination and the disquieting feature is that the
trial courts grant time. The law requires special reasons to
47be recorded for grant of time but the same is not taken note
of. As has been noticed earlier, in the instant case the
cross-examination has taken place after a year and 8
months allowing ample time to pressurize the witness and
to gain over him by adopting all kinds of tactics. There is
no cavil over the proposition that there has to be a fair and
proper trial but the duty of the court while conducting the
trial to be guided by the mandate of the law, the conceptual
fairness and above all bearing in mind its sacrosanct duty
to arrive at the truth on the basis of the material brought
on record. If an accused for his benefit takes the trial on
the path of total mockery, it cannot be countenanced. The
Court has a sacred duty to see that the trial is conducted
as per law. If adjournments are granted in this manner it
would tantamount to violation of rule of law and eventually
turn such trials to a farce. It is legally impermissible and
jurisprudentially abominable. The trial courts are expected
in law to follow the command of the procedure relating to
trial and not yield to the request of the counsel to grant
adjournment for non-acceptable reasons. In fact, it is not
48all appreciable to call a witness for cross-examination after
such a long span of time. It is imperative if the
examination-in-chief is over, the cross-examination should
be completed on the same day. If the examination of a
witness continues till late hours the trial can be adjourned
to the next day for cross-examination. It is inconceivable in
law that the cross-examination should be deferred for such
a long time. It is anathema to the concept of proper and
fair trial. The duty of the court is to see that not only the
interest of the accused as per law is protected but also the
societal and collective interest is safe-guarded. It is
distressing to note that despite series of judgments of this
Court, the habit of granting adjournment, really an
ailment, continues. How long shall we say, “Awake! Arise!”.
There is a constant discomfort. Therefore, we think it
appropriate that the copies of the judgment be sent to the
learned Chief Justices of all the High Courts for circulating
the same among the learned trial Judges with a command
to follow the principles relating to trial in a requisite
manner and not to defer the cross-examination of a witness
49at their pleasure or at the leisure of the defence counsel, for
it eventually makes the trial an apology for trial and
compels the whole society to suffer chicanery. Let it be
remembered that law cannot allowed to be lonely; a
destitute.
42. In the ultimate analysis, we perceive no merit in the
appeal and consequently the same stands dismissed. As
the appellant is on bail, his bail bonds are cancelled. He be
taken into custody forthwith to suffer the sentence.
........................................J.
[DIPAK MISRA]
........................................J.
[ROHINTON FALI
NARIMAN]
NEW DELHI
JANUARY 21, 2015.
50
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